Air superiority has been become non-negotiable in conducting U.S. military operations. In fact, the maturation of airpower has ensured that we have not been challenged by a conventional military in a fair fight in over 50 years. Air superiority is not an end in and of itself its value is directly tied to the role air superiority plays toward the overall campaign objectives. History is replete with examples of successful or failed air superiority campaigns. This paper details air superiority's role in both the Battle of Britain, and the 1967 Six Day War's Operation MOKED. Today's operations may not face a similar air superiority challenge, but, tomorrow that may well change. We must not allow ourselves to succumb to the cult of the now. Not all future conflicts will be insurgency focused. Russia is producing and continues to export sophisticated, modern air defense systems that place our current fourth generation fighters at significant risk. China is currently purchasing advanced air defense systems which may pose significant challenges to our options in East Asia. In the future we will be challenged for control of the air we must be ready to fight for what has become our domain since the Korean War. The cost of developing and producing advanced stealth fighters is high--the cost of losing air superiority would be incalculable for the Joint Force Commander.

Air superiority has been become non-negotiable in conducting U.S. military operations. In fact, the maturation of airpower has ensured that we have not been challenged by a conventional military in a “fair fight” in over 50 years. Air superiority is not an end in and of itself—its value is directly tied to the role air superiority plays toward the overall campaign objectives. History is replete with examples of successful or failed air superiority campaigns. This paper details air superiority's role in both the Battle of Britain, and the 1967 Six Day War's Operation MOKED. Today's operations may not face a similar air superiority challenge, but, tomorrow that may well change. We must not allow ourselves to succumb to the “cult of the now.” Not all future conflicts will be insurgency focused. Russia is producing and continues to export sophisticated, modern air defense systems that place our current fourth generation fighters at significant risk. China is currently purchasing advanced air defense systems which may pose significant challenges to our options in East Asia. In the future we will be challenged for control of the air—we must be ready to fight for what has become our domain since the Korean War. The cost of developing and producing advanced stealth fighters is high—the cost of losing air superiority would be incalculable for the Joint Force Commander.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.

The U.S. has long suffered from a serious strategy deficit. In short, there is a general crisis of strategic comprehension, a lack of agreement on the most effective organizing ideas. Airpower is by no means lonely in suffering from strategic theoretical uncertainty. The study argues that the United States needs a theory of war and warfare. It claims that future warfare will be diverse and that the tactical, operational, and strategic value of airpower must always be situational. A coherent theory of employment for all of airpower's capabilities, not only the kinetic, is needed. Airpower's potential utility lies within a spectrum of possibilities and is dependent on context. The study advises frank recognition of airpower's situational limitations. (Dr. Colin S. Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading in England. Originally published by the Airpower Research Institute)