This is a comprehensive reference to the structure, operation, aircraft and men of the 1st Tactical Air Force, or Desert Air Force as it became known. It was formed in North Africa to support the 8th Army and included squadrons from the RAF, SAAF, RAAF and eventually the USAAF. The book includes descriptions of many notable defensive and offensive campaigns, the many types of aircraft used, weapons and the airfields that played host to these events. The five main sections of the book include a general historical introduction and overview, operations, operational groups, aircrew training and technical details of each aircraft type. Lengthy annexes cover personnel, the squadrons in World War II, accuracy of attacks, orders of battle for each wartime year, maps of airfield locations and numbers of enemy aircraft downed.

"When the Axis fores were finally driven from North Africa in May 1943, over 250,000 were taken prisoner, as many as had surrendered to the Russians at Stalingrad. It was a major victory and a crucial stepping-stone to the future invasion of Italy and France." "Yet, just a year before, the Allies had been facing one disaster after another. In North Africa, the Eighth Army's terrible defeat at Gazala represented Britain's nadir. Slowly but surely, however, the Allies began to turn the tide. This crucial period was a time of learning for both America and Britain and, by the end of the Tunisian campaign they had finally gained material but also certain tactical advantages over Germany, particularly in the air war. As this book shows, the development of a tactical air force - principles that are still used to this day - were founded over the skies of North Africa." "And yet this is also a book about the men - and women - who found themselves caught up in this struggle, people drawn from all parts of the globe and brought together to make up these polyglot Allied forces: British and American, Nepalese and Punjabi, South African and Australian, Maori and Zulu, and from all ranks and all services."--BOOK JACKET.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

An exciting account of a little-known, yet vital part of World War II, the Allied effort to blockade Axis forces in North Africa with a relatively small number of planes and submarines included some of the war's most spectacular air battles, and opened the way to the attack on Fortress Europe from the south. This is the first book-length treatment of the crucial struggle to cut Axis supply lines in the Tunisian campaign of 1942-1943, a battle often ignored or played down even by official historians. The campaign marked the first big U.S. victory against the Axis powers and served as a proving ground for several top Allied commanders. This study fills an important gap in the history of the war, reevaluating the development of Allied airpower and the role of Italy in the campaign. Allied success in interdiction was a critical factor in the greatest Allied victory in the Mediterranean campaign, a victory which left the enemy so weakened that it could not stop the subsequent invasion of Europe from the south. Despite initial disorganization and early disappointments, the British waged one of only two successful submarine campaigns ever fought. This study describes some of the war's most amazing air battles, notably Operation Flax against the enemy's air transport fleet, and attacks on convoys, all interwoven with the events of the ground war in the desert and comparisons with the Pacific effort. It details the struggle to reorganize and improve the Allied effort, the belated success of sea sweeps against enemy ships, and the final victory in the spring of 1943, in which an air blockade was clamped on the sea and sky approaches to Tunisia.

CMH Pub. 93-7. This study in the Historial Analysis Series discusses the the origin and development of American close air support doctrine and practice in World War II. It explains how the Tunisian campaign demonstrated the need for tactical changes and close cooperation between the staffs and forces in joint and combined forces. The struggle of ground and air leaders to define and construct a command and control system, and ultimately to allocate and commit precious air resources to requisite ground missions, has as many lessons today as it did more than forty years ago. L.C. card 87-19335.