The hastily mounted invasion of French Northwest Africa in November of 1942 was a gamble. It exposed American inexperience. That inexperience went from Roosevelt on down to the soldier in the foxhole. Half-trained men were pitted against Vichy France and didn’t know whether to expect open arms or open fire. Later, those same inexperienced men would meet Rommel at the Kasserine Pass. This naivete was exhibited by both men and leaders. Torch was Eisenhower’s first major operation--a gigantic airlift and sealift preceded by months of intrigue. The outcome of the campaign settled several air power issues and revealed many lessons. The battles fought by the United States forces during the North African Campaign of 1942 and 1943, particularly the Battle for the Kasserine Pass in February 1943, were a breaking and testing ground for much of the employment of those forces during the remainder of the Second World War. Three air power key lessons were learned on the North African battlefield. First was the need for coordination between air and ground forces. Second was the folly of sending untrained airmen into combat. Third was the importance of tactical air targeting by ground force commanders.

The hastily mounted invasion of French Northwest Africa in November of 1942 was a gamble. It exposed American inexperience. That inexperience went from Roosevelt on down to the soldier in the foxhole. Half-trained men were pitted against Vichy France and didn't know whether to expect open arms or open fire. Later, those same inexperienced men would meet Rommel at the Kasserine Pass. This naivete was exhibited by both men and leaders. Torch was Eisenhower's first major operation--a gigantic airlift and sealift preceded by months of intrigue. The outcome of the campaign settled several air power issues and revealed many lessons. The battles fought by the United States forces during the North African Campaign of 1942 and 1943, particularly the Battle for the Kasserine Pass in February 1943, were a breaking and testing ground for much of the employment of those forces during the remainder of the Second World War. Three air power key lessons were learned on the North African battlefield. First was the need for coordination between air and ground forces. Second was the folly of sending untrained airmen into combat. Third was the importance of tactical air targeting by ground force commanders.

"When the Axis fores were finally driven from North Africa in May 1943, over 250,000 were taken prisoner, as many as had surrendered to the Russians at Stalingrad. It was a major victory and a crucial stepping-stone to the future invasion of Italy and France." "Yet, just a year before, the Allies had been facing one disaster after another. In North Africa, the Eighth Army's terrible defeat at Gazala represented Britain's nadir. Slowly but surely, however, the Allies began to turn the tide. This crucial period was a time of learning for both America and Britain and, by the end of the Tunisian campaign they had finally gained material but also certain tactical advantages over Germany, particularly in the air war. As this book shows, the development of a tactical air force - principles that are still used to this day - were founded over the skies of North Africa." "And yet this is also a book about the men - and women - who found themselves caught up in this struggle, people drawn from all parts of the globe and brought together to make up these polyglot Allied forces: British and American, Nepalese and Punjabi, South African and Australian, Maori and Zulu, and from all ranks and all services."--BOOK JACKET.