On 19 December 1997 SilkAir Flight 185, a Boeing 737-300, operated by SilkAir, Singapore, on its way from Jakarta to Singapore, crashed at about 16:13 local time into the Musi river near Palembang, South Sumatra. All 97 passengers and seven crew members were killed. Prior to the sudden descent from 35,000 feet, the flight data recorders stopped recording at different times. There were no mayday calls transmitted from the airplane prior or during the rapid descent. The weather at the time of the crash was fine.

During takeoff from runway 02 at Tamanrasset Aguenar aerodrome in Southern Algeria, on Thursday 6 March 2003, the left engine of a Boeing 737-200 from Air Algerie suffered a contained burst. The airplane swung to the left. The Captain took over the controls. The airplane lost speed progressively, stalled and crashed, with the landing gear still extended, about one thousand six hundred and forty-five meters from the takeoff point, to the left of the runway extended centerline. The crew of six and 96 of the 97 passengers were killed in the accident. The accident was caused by the loss of an engine during a critical phase of flight, the non-retraction of the landing gear after the engine failure, and the Captain, the PNF, taking over control of the airplane before having clearly identified the problem.

On 28 December 2014 an Airbus A320-216 aircraft registered as PK-AXC was cruising at 32,000 feet on a flight from Juanda Airport, Surabaya, Indonesia to Changi Airport, Singapore with total occupants of 162 persons. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF). The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) recorded that many master cautions activated following the failure of the Rudder Travel Limiter which triggered Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) message of AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS. The crew tried repeatedly to reset the computers but the autopilot and auto-thrust disengaged and the flight control reverted to Alternate Law. The investigation showed that the loss of electricity and the RTLU failure were caused by a cracked solder joint. All occupants of the plane were killed in the accident.

On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, lost a cargo door as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 355 persons aboard. As a result of the incident nine of the passengers were ejected from the airplane and lost at sea. The cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990. The probable cause of this accident was a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747.

On October 31, 1999, EgyptAir flight 990, a Boeing 767-366ER crashed into the Atlantic Ocean 60 miles south of Nantucket, Massachusetts. All 217 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. According to the NTSB the impact with the Atlantic Ocean was a result of the relief first officer's flight control inputs. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the accident is a result of the relief first officer's flight control inputs. The reason for the relief first officer's actions was not determined.

On October 31, 1999, EgyptAir flight 990, a Boeing 767-366ER, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean 60 miles south of Nantucket, Massachusetts. All 217 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. According to the Egyptian Investigation Team a mechanical defect is the most likely cause of the accident, there is no credible evidence to support a conclusion that the First Officer intentionally dove the airplane into the ocean in fact.

Each suicide is as unique as the individuals involved, especially if one examines the nature of the act and to what extent these acts can be viewed as a theatrical performance. Focusing on the dramatic aspects of suicide may seem tangential to the physical and mental pain experienced by those who try to kill themselves, but dramatic aspects often provide important clues for understanding the mental state of suicidal individuals. David Lester and Steven Stack investigate what happens in the weeks, days and hours before a suicide when the suicidal individual must make decisions and formulate the script for his or her suicidal act. The editors argue that these choices may help us understand and prevent other suicides and stimulate new and innovative research in this important area. Through twenty-five substantive chapters, including both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this book offers insights into suicide as a dramatic act, with chapters on the intended audience, the suicide note, the location and method chosen, and cultural scripts, including suicide-by-cop, sati, seppuku, and duels. The contributors to this volume argue that psychological, social, and cultural factors influence these choices and that the decisions made by the individual are important for understanding the mental state of the person choosing to die by suicide.