Yoram Dinstein's influential textbook is an indispensable guide to the legal issues of war and peace, armed attack, self-defence and enforcement measures taken under the aegis of the Security Council. This fifth edition incorporates recent treaties such as the Kampala amendments of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, new case law from the International Court of Justice and other tribunals, and contemporary doctrinal debates. Several new supplementary sections are also included, which take into account recent conflicts around the world, and consideration is given to new resolutions of the Security Council. With many segments having been rewritten to reflect recent State practice, this book remains a wide-ranging and highly readable introduction to the legal issues surrounding war and self-defence.

Oil is the world's single most important commodity and its political effects are pervasive. Jeff D. Colgan extends the idea of the resource curse into the realm of international relations, exploring how countries form their foreign policy preferences and intentions. Why are some but not all oil-exporting 'petrostates' aggressive? To answer this question, a theory of aggressive foreign policy preferences is developed and then tested, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Petro-Aggression shows that oil creates incentives that increase a petrostate's aggression, but also incentives for the opposite. The net effect depends critically on its domestic politics, especially the preferences of its leader. Revolutionary leaders are especially significant. Using case studies including Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, this book offers new insight into why oil politics has a central role in global peace and conflict.

This report was prepared for the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression at the 8th session of Preparatory Commission, held in September-October 2001. The paper consists of four parts relating to: the Nuremberg tribunal; tribunals establish pursuant to Control Council Law number 10; the Tokyo tribunal; and the United Nations. Annexes contain tables regarding aggression by a State and individual responsibility for crimes against peace. The paper seeks to provide an objective, analytical overview of the history and major developments relating to aggression, both before and after the adoption of the UN Charter.

In 1932 Einstein asked Freud, ‘Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war?’ Freud answered that war is inevitable because humans have an instinct to self-destroy, a death instinct which we must externalize to survive. But nearly four decades of study of aggression reveal that rather than being an inborn drive, destructiveness is generated in us by experiences of excessive psychic pain. In War is Not Inevitable: On the Psychology of War and Aggression, Henri Parens argues that the death-instinct based model of aggression can neither be proved nor disproved as Freud’s answer is untestable. By contrast, the ‘multi-trends theory of aggression’ is provable and has greater heuristic value than does a death-instinct based model of aggression. When we look for causes for war we turn to history as well as national, ethnic, territorial, and or political issues, among many others, but we also tend to ignore the psychological factors that play a large role. Parens discusses such psychological factors that seem to lead large groups into conflict. Central among these are the psychodynamics of large-group narcissism. Interactional conditions stand out: hyper-narcissistic large-groups have, in history, caused much narcissistic injury to those they believe they are superior to. But this is commonly followed by the narcissistically injured group’s experiencing high level hostile destructiveness toward their injury-perpetrator which, in time, will compel them to revenge. Among groups that have been engaged in serial conflicts, wars have followed from this psychodynamic narcissism-based cyclicity. Parens details some of the psychodynamics that led from World War I to World War II and their respective aftermath, and he addresses how major factors that gave rise to these wars must, can, and have been counteracted. In doing so, Parens considers strategies by which civilization has and is constructively preventing wars, as well as the need for further innovative efforts to achieve that end.

A gripping behind-the-scenes account of the dramatic legal fight to hold leaders personally responsible for aggressive war On July 17, 2018, starting an unjust war became a prosecutable international crime alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Instead of collective state responsibility, our leaders are now personally subject to indictment for crimes of aggression, from invasions and preemptions to drone strikes and cyberattacks. The Crime of Aggression is Noah Weisbord's riveting insider's account of the high-stakes legal fight to enact this historic legislation and hold politicians accountable for the wars they start. Weisbord, a key drafter of the law for the International Criminal Court, takes readers behind the scenes of one of the most consequential legal dramas in modern international diplomacy. Drawing on in-depth interviews and his own invaluable insights, he sheds critical light on the motivations of the prosecutors, diplomats, and military strategists who championed the fledgling prohibition on unjust war--and those who tried to sink it. He untangles the complex history behind the measure, tracing how the crime of aggression was born at the Nuremberg trials only to fall dormant during the Cold War, and he draws lessons from such pivotal events as the collapse of the League of Nations, the rise of the United Nations, September 11, and the war on terror. The power to try leaders for unjust war holds untold promise for the international order, but also great risk. In this incisive and vitally important book, Weisbord explains how judges in such cases can balance the imperatives of justice and peace, and how the fair prosecution of aggression can humanize modern statecraft.

Six years after the rendering of the Nuremberg Judgment world conditions are not such as to encourage a study on what constituted its principal innovation in the legal field: the punishment of the authors of aggressive war. The war alliance against the Axis Powers which was the political basis of the Nuremberg Trial and of the United Nation~ Organisation has broken up. Mutual fear, threats and accusations and a gigantic armament race are the dominating factors in international life during the cold war period, and the minds of statesmen, military men and lawyers alike are more preoccupied with the problem of how to win a possible third world war than with that of preventing its occurrence and avoiding responsibility for its outbreak. While the survival of their freedom and civilization is at stake, the nations seem more intent on preparing for what is vaguely and equivocally called 'self-defence' than on accepting and assuring the reign of law. The strain of the protracted struggle in Korea, moreover, seems to turn the first experiment with military sanctions against an aggressor into a classic game of power politics. It is not surprising that in such circumstances little energy is displayed in efforts to implement the principles to which the United Nations pledged themselves in Nuremberg, and that many statesmen and lawyers seem prepared to abandon, at least for the near future, the precedent of the time of alliance, expression of confidence in the victory of law over force.