The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), newest of the six U.S. Department of Defense geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), was created in 2007 amid great controversy in both Africa and the United States over its location and mission. Over the last 5 years, AFRICOM has matured greatly, overcoming much of the initial resistance from African stakeholders through careful public messaging, and by addressing most of the U.S. interagency concerns about the Command's size and proper role within the U.S. national security/foreign policy community. This Letort Paper describes the geostrategic, operational, and intellectual changes that explain why AFRICOM was created, and debunks three myths about AFRICOM: that it was created to "exploit" Africa's oil and gas riches, "blocks" China's rise in Africa, and that France "opposes" AFRICOM. The author concludes by raising five issues that are important to AFRICOM's future: 1) allocated forces to carry out short-term training engagements in Africa; 2) preference to emerging democracies in the selection of the Command's partner-nations; 3) the desirability of regional approaches in Africa, including helping the African Union and its Regional Economic Communities to establish standby brigades; 4) the location of the Command's headquarters, which should remain in Stuttgart, Germany, for operational efficiency; and, 5) the need to carry out a top-down "right-sizing" exercise at AFRICOM during a time of severe budget constraints and a real risk for the United States of "strategic insolvency."

Africa is a continent of growing economic, social, political, and geostrategic importance. The establishment of a new Combatant Command for Africa -- AFRICOM -- marks an important milestone in the evolution of relations between the United States and the governments of Africa. Through AFRICOM, the U.S. Department of Defense will consolidate the efforts of three existing command headquarters as it seeks a more stable environment for political and economic growth in Africa. In line with this goal, AFRICOM is pioneering a bold new method of military engagement focused on war prevention, interagency cooperation, and development rather than on traditional war fighting. The author contends that to achieve its goals vis-à-vis the African security landscape, AFRICOM must depart from the model of U.S. military operations on the continent since September 11, 2001. Using case studies from North and East Africa, the author argues that by amalgamating threats, overemphasizing "hard" counterterrorism initiatives, and intertwining military operations with humanitarianism, AFRICOM's predecessors have harmed U.S. strategic interests. In line with this conclusion, he offers policy recommendations to maximize AFRICOM's potential for future success.

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), newest of the six U.S. Department of Defense geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), was created in 2007 amid great controversy in both Africa and the United States over its location and mission. Over the last 5 years, AFRICOM has matured greatly, overcoming much of the initial resistance from African stakeholders through careful public messaging, and by addressing most of the U.S. interagency concerns about the Command's size and proper role within the U.S. national security/foreign policy community. This Letort Paper describes the geostrategic, operational, and intellectual changes that explain why AFRICOM was created, and debunks three myths about AFRICOM: that it was created to "exploit" Africa's oil and gas riches, "blocks" China's rise in Africa, and that France "opposes" AFRICOM. The author concludes by raising five issues that are important to AFRICOM's future: 1) allocated forces to carry out short-term training engagements in Africa; 2) preference to emerging democracies in the selection of the Command's partner-nations; 3) the desirability of regional approaches in Africa, including helping the African Union and its Regional Economic Communities to establish standby brigades; 4) the location of the Command's headquarters, which should remain in Stuttgart, Germany, for operational efficiency; and, 5) the need to carry out a top-down "right-sizing" exercise at AFRICOM during a time of severe budget constraints and a real risk for the United States of "strategic insolvency."

This book discusses the systematic expansion of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) across the continent of Africa. This book posits that AFRICOM expansion in Africa is part of a broader system of accumulation based on a government-business-media (GBM) complex. Applying the concept at both structural and descriptive levels, the GBM complex is a function of the synergy between the state’s quest for power, businesses’ need for expansion, and the informational and hegemonic functions of media actors. The United States’ GBM complex in Africa is supported—and in some locations spearheaded—by its military, with dispossessing effects on local actors. Drawing from African case studies, analytical accounts and empirical case studies, this book explores AFRICOM’s role within this broader strategy. The volume maps both the methods and the scope of this expansion, as well as local resistance to this process, and comprises perspectives from the five regions of Africa, key sub-regional organizations and voices from Africa’s regional hegemons. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, strategic studies, African politics and International Relations.