After the end of the Cold War and a failed mission in Somalia, the US decided to wash its hands of major military operations in Africa. Within the past few years, however, strategic interests in the region have grown, based largely on the threat of international terrorist group activities there. In 2007, the Bush Administration created a new military presence in Africa, AFRICOM (United States Africa Command), professed to be based not on occupying military or fixed bases, but rather on capacity building for and collaboration with African security forces. Some see AFRICOM as the answer to an African security system crippled by a lack of resources, widespread politicization and institutional weakness. Others claim the program is nothing more than a characteristic attempt by the US to secure its own interests in the region without regard to the actual needs of Africans. A variety of viewpoints on the debate, both from the US and Africa, come together in this collection to examine the objectives and activities of AFRICOM. The result provides the reader with a well-rounded picture of longstanding security challenges in Africa and what might be done to address them. -- Back cover.

On Feb. 6, 2007, the Bush Admin. announced the creation of a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM¿s establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among 3 commands: European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. The new command¿s area of responsibility includes all African countries except Egypt. Contents of this report: (1) Issues for Congress; (2) The DoD Proposal for a New Africa Command; (3) U.S. Strategic Interests in Africa; (4) U.S. Mil. Assistance and Security Cooperation in Africa: An Expanding Role; (5) Regional Perspectives; (6) Congressional Interest and Oversight Issues.

This book discusses the systematic expansion of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) across the continent of Africa. This book posits that AFRICOM expansion in Africa is part of a broader system of accumulation based on a government-business-media (GBM) complex. Applying the concept at both structural and descriptive levels, the GBM complex is a function of the synergy between the state’s quest for power, businesses’ need for expansion, and the informational and hegemonic functions of media actors. The United States’ GBM complex in Africa is supported—and in some locations spearheaded—by its military, with dispossessing effects on local actors. Drawing from African case studies, analytical accounts and empirical case studies, this book explores AFRICOM’s role within this broader strategy. The volume maps both the methods and the scope of this expansion, as well as local resistance to this process, and comprises perspectives from the five regions of Africa, key sub-regional organizations and voices from Africa’s regional hegemons. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, strategic studies, African politics and International Relations.

This book outlines the construction, interpretations and understanding of US strategy towards Africa in the early twenty-first century. No single issue or event in the recent decades in Africa has provoked so much controversy and unified hostility and opposition as the announcement by former President George W. Bush of the establishment of the United Stated Africa Command – AFRICOM. The intensity and sheer scale of the unprecedented unity of opposition to AFRICOM across Africa surprised many experts and lead them to ask why such a hostile reaction occurred. This book explores the conception of AFRICOM and the subsequent reaction in two ways. Firstly, the contributors critically engage with the creation and global imperatives for the establishment of AFRICOM and present an analytical outline of African security in relation to and within the context of the history of US foreign and security policy approaches to Africa. Secondly, the book has original chapter contributions by some of the key actors involved in the development and implementation of the AFRICOM project including Theresa Whelan, the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. This is not only an attempt to contribute to the academic and policy-relevant debates based on the views of those who are intimately involved in the design and implementation of the AFRICOM project but also to show, in their own words, that ‘America has no clandestine agenda for Africa’. This book will be of interest to students of US foreign policy/national security, strategic studies, international security and African politics. David J. Francis is Chair of African Peace & Conflict Studies in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford.

As Africa’s strategic importance has increased over the past decade and a half, United States security cooperation with the continent has expanded. The most visible dimension of this increased engagement was the establishment of the U.S. Military Command for Africa (AFRICOM). Some critics are skeptical of AFRICOM’s purpose and see the militarization of U.S. Africa policy while others question its effectiveness. Recognizing the link between development and security, AFRICOM represents a departure from the traditional organization of military commands because of its holistic approach and the involvement of the Department of State as well as other U.S. government stakeholders. Nevertheless, AFRICOM’s effort to combine security and development faces formidable conceptual and operational challenges in trying to ensure both American and African security interests. The human security perspective’s emphasis on issues that go beyond traditional state-centered security to include protecting individuals from threats of hunger, disease, crime, environmental degradation, and political repression as well as focusing on social and economic justice is an important component of security policy. At the same time, the threat of violent extremism heavily influences U.S. security cooperation with Africa. In this examination of the context of U.S.-African security relations, Robert J. Griffiths outlines the nature of the African state, traces the contours of African conflict, surveys the post-independence history of U.S. involvement on the continent, and discusses policy organization and implementation and the impact of U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan on the U.S.-Africa security relationship. Africa’s continuing geostrategic significance, the influence of China and other emerging markets in the region, and America’s other global engagements, especially in light of U.S. fiscal realities, demonstrate the complexity of U.S.-African security cooperation.

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), newest of the six U.S. Department of Defense geographic combatant commands (CCMDs), was created in 2007 amid great controversy in both Africa and the United States over its location and mission. Over the last 5 years, AFRICOM has matured greatly, overcoming much of the initial resistance from African stakeholders through careful public messaging, and by addressing most of the U.S. interagency concerns about the Command's size and proper role within the U.S. national security/foreign policy community. This Letort Paper describes the geostrategic, operational, and intellectual changes that explain why AFRICOM was created, and debunks three myths about AFRICOM: that it was created to "exploit" Africa's oil and gas riches, "blocks" China's rise in Africa, and that France "opposes" AFRICOM. The author concludes by raising five issues that are important to AFRICOM's future: 1) allocated forces to carry out short-term training engagements in Africa; 2) preference to emerging democracies in the selection of the Command's partner-nations; 3) the desirability of regional approaches in Africa, including helping the African Union and its Regional Economic Communities to establish standby brigades; 4) the location of the Command's headquarters, which should remain in Stuttgart, Germany, for operational efficiency; and, 5) the need to carry out a top-down "right-sizing" exercise at AFRICOM during a time of severe budget constraints and a real risk for the United States of "strategic insolvency."

In Feb. 2007, the Pres. announced the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a DoD command with a focus on strengthening U.S. security coop. with Africa, creating opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, and enhancing peace and security efforts on the continent. AFRICOM is designed to integrate DoD and non-DoD personnel into the command to stimulate greater coordination among U.S. gov¿t. agencies to achieve a more whole-of-gov¿t. approach. This testimony addresses: (1) the status of DoD¿s efforts to establish and fund AFRICOM; and (2) challenges that may hinder the command¿s ability to achieve interagency participation and a more integrated, whole-of-gov¿t. approach to DoD activities in Africa. Illus.