Henry S. Bradsher, whose 1983 study of the Afghanistan situation was widely praised, sheds new light on the entire period of Afghan Communism, from its origins in the 1950s to the collapse of the Najibullah regime in 1992. Extensive interviewing, a wide range of source materials, and access to Soviet archives make this a comprehensive account.

Analysing policy documents from nine counterinsurgency wars, Elias asks why powerful militaries have difficulty managing local partners. Revealing a critical political dynamic in military interventions, this book will appeal to academics and policymakers addressing counterinsurgency issues in foreign policy, security studies and political science.

The Soviet war in Afghanistan was a grueling debacle that has striking lessons for the twenty-first century. In The Great Gamble, Gregory Feifer examines the conflict from the perspective of the soldiers on the ground. In gripping detail, he vividly depicts the invasion of a volatile country that no power has ever successfully conquered. A riveting account as seen through the eyes of the men who fought in the war, The Great Gamble tells an unforgettable story full of drama, action, and political intrigue whose relevance in our own time is greater than ever.

This monumental book examines Afghan society in conflict, from the 1978 communist coup to the fall of Najibullah, the last Soviet-installed president, in 1992. This edition, newly revised by the author, reflects developments since then and includes material on the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. It is a book that now seems remarkably prescient. Drawing on two decades of research, Barnett R. Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan, provides a fascinating account of the nature of the old regime, the rise and fall of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and the troubled Mujahidin resistance. He relates all these phenomena to international actors, showing how the interaction of U.S. policy and Pakistani and Saudi Arabian interests has helped to create the challenges of today. Rubin puts into context the continuing turmoil in Afghanistan and offers readers a coherent historical explanation for the country’s social and political fragmentation. Praise for the earlier edition: "This study is theoretically informed, empirically grounded, and gracefully written. Anyone who wants to understand Afghanistan’s troubled history and the reasons for its present distress should read this book.” —Foreign Affairs "This is the book on Afghanistan for the educated public.” —Political Science Quarterly

The United Nations mediator for the Afghanistan conflict and a foreign policy analyst provide their own interpretations of the negotiations that helped to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. They describe how the ideological hard line taken by the Reagan administration prolonged the conflict.

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides a compelling perspective on the far-reaching hazards of military intervention. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that a withdrawal from Afghanistan should occur as soon as possible. The Soviet Union's senior leadership had become aware that their strategy was unraveling, their operational and tactical methods were not working, and the sacrifices they were demanding from the Soviet people and military were unlikely to produce the forecasted results. Despite this state of affairs, operations in Afghanistan persisted and four more years passed before the Soviets finally withdrew their military forces. In No Miracles, Michael Fenzel explains why and how that happened, as viewed from the center of the Soviet state. From that perspective, three sources of failure stand out: poor civil-military relations, repeated and rapid turnover of Soviet leadership, and the perception that Soviet global prestige and influence were inexorably tied to the success of the Afghan mission. Fenzel enumerates the series of misperceptions and misjudgments that led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tracing the hazards of their military intervention and occupation. Ultimately, he offers a cautionary tale to nation states and policymakers considering military intervention and the use of force.

The story of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is well known: the expansionist Communists overwhelmed a poor country as a means of reaching a warm-water port on the Persian Gulf. Afghan mujahideen upset their plans, holding on with little more than natural fighting skills, until CIA agents came to the rescue with American arms. Humiliated in battle, the Soviets hastily retreated. It's a great story, writes Rodric Braithwaite. But it never happened. The Russian conscripts suffered badly from mismanagement and strategic errors, but they were never defeated on the battlefield, and withdrew in good order. In this brilliant, myth-busting account, Braithwaite - the former British ambassador to Moscow - challenges much of what we know about the Soviets in Afghanistan. He provides an inside look at this little-understood episode, using first-hand accounts and piercing analysis to show the war as it was fought and experienced by the Russians. The invasion, he writes, was a defensive response to a chaotic situation in the Soviets' immediate neighbor. They intended to establish a stable, friendly government, secure the major towns, and train the police and armed forces before making a rapid exit. But the mission escalated, as did casualties. In fact, the Soviet leadership decided to pull out a year before the first Stinger missile was used in combat. Braithwaite does not, of course, paint the occupation as a Russian triumph. To the contrary, he illustrates the searing effect of the brutal conflict on soldiers, their families, and the broader public, as returning veterans - the Afgansty of the title - struggled to regain their footing back home. A fine writer as well as an expert, Braithwaite carries readers through these complex and momentous events, capturing those violent and tragic days as no one has done before.