Intensifying geopolitical rivalries, rising defence spending and the proliferation of the latest military technology across Asia suggest that the region is set for a prolonged period of strategic contestation. None of the three competing visions for the future of Asian order – a US-led ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, a Chinese-centred order, or the ASEAN-inspired ‘Indo-Pacific Outlook’ – is likely to prevail in the short to medium term. In the absence of a new framework, the risk of open conflict is heightened, and along with it the need for effective mechanisms to maintain peace and stability. As Asia’s leaders seek to rebuild their economies and societies in the wake of COVID-19, they would do well to reflect upon the lessons offered by the pandemic and their applicability in the strategic realm. The societies that have navigated the crisis most effectively have been able to do so by putting in place stringent protective measures. Crisis-management and -avoidance mechanisms – and even, in the longer term, wider arms control – can be seen as the strategic equivalent of such measures, and as such they should be pursued with urgency in Asia to reduce the risks of an even greater calamity.

The rise or resurgence of revisionist, repressive and authoritarian powers threatens the Western, US-led international order upon which Germany’s post-war security and prosperity were founded. With Washington increasingly focused on China’s rise in Asia, Europe must be able to defend itself against Russia, and will depend upon German military capabilities to do so. Years of neglect and structural underfunding, however, have hollowed out Germany’s armed forces. Much of the political leadership in Berlin has not yet adjusted to new realities or appreciated the urgency with which it needs to do so. Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle argue that Germany’s current strategic culture is inadequate. It informs a security policy that fails to meet contemporary strategic challenges, thereby endangering Berlin’s European allies, the Western order and Germany itself. They contend that: Germany should embrace its historic responsibility to defend Western liberal values and the Western order that upholds them. Rather than rejecting the use of military force, Germany should wed its commitment to liberal values to an understanding of the role of power – including military power – in international affairs. The authors show why Germany should seek to foster a strategic culture that would be compatible with those of other leading Western nations and allow Germans to perceive the world through a strategic lens. In doing so, they also outline possible elements of a new security policy.

This volume is a collection based on the Royal Musical Association's Mozart Conference of 1991, the principal scholarly event in the English-speaking world in commemoration of the bicentenary. It includes essays placing Mozart in the context, in Salzburg and Vienna, in which he worked, explaining aspects of his life and work hitherto obscure; essays interpreting his instrumental music; and a substantial series of studies on different aspects of his operas, from Lucio Silla to La clemenza di Tito, with particular stress on the creative processes in the Da Ponte operas.

Examines the difficulty the US Armed Forces face in shifting their focus from preparing for regular wars, in which combat is separated from civil society, to irregular wars, in which combat is integrated with civil society. This book is useful for students of the US Armed Forces, politics, strategic studies and military history.

China�s nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. The arsenal has historically been small, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert, and married to a no-first-use doctrine � all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong�s oft-quoted remark that �nuclear weapons are a paper tiger� seems to be bluster or madness. China�s nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world�s most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China�s nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

Do piracy and maritime terrorism, individually or together, present a threat to international security, and what relationship if any exists between them? Piracy may be a marginal problem in itself, but the connections between organised piracy and wider criminal networks and corruption on land make it an element of a phenomenon that can have a weakening effect on states and a destabilising one on the regions in which it is found. Furthermore, it is also an aspect of a broader problem of disorder at sea that, exacerbated by the increasing pressure on littoral waters from growing numbers of people and organisations seeking to exploit maritime resources, encourages maritime criminality and gives insurgents and terrorists the freedom to operate. In this context, maritime terrorism, though currently only a low-level threat, has the potential to spread and become more effective in the event of political change on land. It is only by addressing the issue of generalised maritime disorder that the problems of piracy and maritime terrorism may be controlled in the long term.