Conservation payments lead to improvement in environmental quality only if farmers and ranchers who receive them adopt conservation practices that would not have been adopted without the payment. When a voluntary payment causes a change in practice(s) that lead(s) to improved environmental quality, these changes are "additional." We estimate this "additionality" for a number of common conservation practices that are frequently supported by existing conservation programs. We find that the level of additionality varies by practice and that additionality is high for structural and vegetative practices while the risk of nonadditionality appears to be higher for management practices. While the risk of nonadditionality cannot be completely eliminated, it can be reduced. We discuss a number of approaches to managing nonadditionality in both conservation programs and environmental offset programs.

Conservation payments lead to improvement in environmental quality only if farmers and ranchers who receive them adopt conservation practices that would not have been adopted without the payment. When a voluntary payment causes a change in practice(s) that lead(s) to improved environmental quality, these changes are "additional." We estimate this "additionality" for a number of common conservation practices that are frequently supported by existing conservation programs. We find that the level of additionality varies by practice and that additionality is high for structural and vegeta-tive practices while the risk of nonadditionality appears to be higher for management practices. While the risk of nonadditionality cannot be completely eliminated, it can be reduced. We discuss a number of approaches to managing nonadditionality in both conservation programs and environmental offset programs.

The Federal Government spent more than $6 billion in FY 2013 on voluntary conservation payment programs to encourage the adoption of a wide range of conservation practices that address multiple environmental and resource conservation goals. Conservation payments can also come from private industry, particularly in the context of an agricultural offset market established as part of a cap-and-trade system designed to reduce nutrient or greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Payments help improve environmental quality only if farmers and ranchers who receive them adopt conservation practices that would not have been adopted without the payment. When a voluntary payment causes a change in practice(s) that leads to improved environmental quality, these changes are "additional." For any type of voluntary payment, there is some risk that the farmers or ranchers who receive them would have adopted the required practice(s), even without the payment. This study measures additionality for a number of common conservation practices typically supported by voluntary conservation payments and examines ways to increase additionality. Figures and tables. This is a print on demand report.

This paper examines the development of US agricultural policy and considers how it has affected US consumers and producers, as well as how US programs affect foreign producers and consumers within the context of the United States’ obligations under the World Trade Organization. Throughout its history, the United States has supported the farm sector through a myriad of policies affecting prices, production, and farm incomes. Although many of the policies put in place during the New Deal legislation in the 1930s were seen as temporary at the time, most have persisted in one form or another to the present day. And while many would argue that the form and function of today’s agricultural programs are less distortionary than before, the level of support provided to the sector is several billion dollars annually.