We examine a comprehensive sample of firms that dismantle their staggered board in favor of annual director elections. We focus on the period following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act of late 2002 and we find 465 instances between 2003 and 2010. Investor reaction to these decisions is muted but nonetheless significantly positive at the 5% level. We find that the type shareholder activism is of considerable importance in determining the form of this self-imposed governance reform: when the change is pushed by aggressive hedge fund activists the board is more likely to embrace annual elections immediately and the markets react very favorably to the change, but if the change is pushed by non-binding shareholder proposals, the response is to drag out the change as much as possible and the markets are commensurately unimpressed. Moreover, our sample firms are substantially more likely to be taken over in the ensuing two years when the shift to annual director elections is pushed by activist hedge funds.

This report documents the extent to which activism pushes corporations to implement annual elections and compares the influence different forms of activism.

This report documents the extent to which activism pushes corporations to implement annual elections and compares the influence different forms of activism.

Hedge Fund Activism begins with a brief outline of the research literature and describes datasets on hedge fund activism.

This book explores the regulatory challenges of public company shareholder activism. Around the world, policy makers, practitioners and academics debate how best to regulate shareholder activism. Using Australia as a case study, the book examines key issues raised by this debate. With a market structure and legal settings that are conducive to activism, Australia makes an ideal case study and provides a fresh comparative perspective on the regulatory debate about shareholder activism, which tends to be dominated by US-focused analysis and commentary. The book presents empirical evidence which reveals that Australian activism is a significant and multifaceted phenomenon, undertaken by different types of activists pursuing varying strategies and supported by a range of complementary market developments. The book uses this evidence to develop comparative insights and explore internationally topical issues, including: - activists' willingness to use interventionist governance rights; - the role of intermediaries such as proxy advisers in facilitating activism; - institutional investor stewardship; and - the risks of collective shareholder activism. This book provides an important comparative perspective on the topic of shareholder activism. It is an essential resource for policy makers, practitioners and academics interested in the regulatory implications of shareholder activism.

This book offers a succinct, practical guide for understanding what some have referred to as shareholder democracy--efforts to facilitate and increase shareholder voting power within the corporation. In the past few years there has been a surge in shareholder activism that has had a profound impact on the corporation. Shareholders and other activists have sought to increase shareholders' voting power within the corporation based largely on the belief that increasing shareholder power will increase director and officer accountability, thereby helping to curb corporate misconduct and improve corporate performance. However, there is intense debate regarding whether increased shareholder power can achieve such objectives and whether increased shareholder power will negatively impact the corporation. This book is the first to provide a concise, but comprehensive look at the various ways in which shareholders have sought to enhance their voting power and influence within the corporation. In addition to examining shareholder activism, this book highlights and analyzes the debate regarding the propriety of increased shareholder power. This book also analyzes the impact of recent developments aimed at facilitating shareholder power such as majority voting, say on pay, and proxy access. This book will serve as a useful tool not only for those who desire a straight-forward analysis of shareholder rights and activism, but also for those seeking a reference guide on an issue of growing importance to corporate law and corporate governance.

Corporate law and corporate governance have been at the forefront of regulatory activities across the world for several decades now, and are subject to increasing public attention following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance provides the global framework necessary to understand the aims and methods of legal research in this field. Written by leading scholars from around the world, the Handbook contains a rich variety of chapters that provide a comparative and functional overview of corporate governance. It opens with the central theoretical approaches and methodologies in corporate law scholarship in Part I, before examining core substantive topics in corporate law, including shareholder rights, takeovers and restructuring, and minority rights in Part II. Part III focuses on new challenges in the field, including conflicts between Western and Asian corporate governance environments, the rise of foreign ownership, and emerging markets. Enforcement issues are covered in Part IV, and Part V takes a broader approach, examining those areas of law and finance that are interwoven with corporate governance, including insolvency, taxation, and securities law as well as financial regulation. The Handbook is a comprehensive, interdisciplinary resource placing corporate law and governance in its wider context, and is essential reading for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers in the field.