Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.

This book deals with the political and legal issues of the Korean question in the United Nations. This is the first in-depth analysis of the meaning and effects of the Korean problem in UN politics. The book discusses the UN's role in the management of the Korean problem, the effects of the Korean war, South-North Korea's rivalry over the issues of their legitimacy and international representation, the problems of the Korean armistice agreement, and prospects for the four-party peace talks. It also examines North Korea's nuclear program and structural famine as the new concerns of the international community in the post Cold-War era. This study is intended as one of the important readings for researchers, scholars and students in the fields of international law, international organizations and international relations.

Each vol. in 3 pts.: Periodicals; Subject list; Index by series.

This study undertakes to examine the aerial interdiction activities conducted against the enemy railway system by United Nations’ forces during the Korean War, June 1950-July 1953. It has three major goals: (1) to compile a concise history of these interdiction activities; (2) to evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts as it might relate to the conduct of the total war effort; and (3) to make recommendations pertaining to the future conduct of aerial interdiction.