Historians have not convincingly explained modern capitalism's two major economic crises, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009. Accounting for Crises offers a new explanation, why both began and were more severe in the USA ('America'), based on an accounting interpretation of Marx's theory of crises. It explains their origins in capitalists' control of accumulation, which reveals important overlooked roles for Irving Fisher's accounting theory. This theory, by allowing discretion in accounts, in the context of falling rates of profit, encouraged 'swindling', overstating reported profits, and understating their risk, which facilitated and aggravated both crises. Framed by Fisher's theory, during the 1920s American accounting theorists justified discretion, which Creating the 'Big Mess' (the companion volume) concluded it management used to conservatively smooth earnings. Accounting for Crises shows that Fisher's theory , also underlays the popular new theory of investment that justified valuing shares using reported earnings, which encouraged their manipulation and legitimized 'speculation'. This, it argues, underlays America's exceptional late-1920s stock market boom, the 1929 Great Crash, and the depth and length of its Great Depression. Prominently associated with the boom, Fisher became unpopular after the crash, his name disappearing from public debate. Nevertheless, the book concludes, his theory hindered economic recovery, weakened 1930s reforms, undermined accounting regulation from the late-1930s, and following his rehabilitation from the late-1950s, underlies the Financial Accounting Standards Board's conceptual framework, which by allowing off-balance-sheet accounting for securitization-SPEs, fostered the 2007 'credit crunch' that triggered the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC).

Creating the 'Big Mess' and its sequel Accounting for Crises use Marx's theory of capitalism to explain why there is no generally accepted theory of financial accounting, and explore the consequences, by studying the history of American accounting theory from c.1900 to 2007. The answer, Creating the 'Big Mess', is first that while late-19th century British accounting principles, founded on the going-concern concept, provided an objective basis for holding management accountable to shareholders for its stewardship of capital, and were accepted by the nascent American profession, they are inchoate. Second, Irving Fisher's economic theory of accounting, based on the assertion that present value is the accountants' measurement ideal, which is subjective, framed early-20th century American accounting theory, which undermined British principles, making them incoherent. In an unregulated, pro-business environment, leading theorists, particularly Henry Rand Hatfield and William A. Paton, Jr., became authorities for management discretion, creating the 'big mess' Hatfield saw in late-1920s American accounting. Accounting for Crises examines the roles of Fisher's theory in promoting the speculation leading to the 1929 Great Crash, aggravating the Great Depression, hindering accounting regulation from the 1930s, producing the Financial Accounting Standard Board's conceptual framework, and facilitating the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis.

This book addresses the divide that exists between the reality of finance and the image it projects. A functioning financial system is an essential feature of a modern economy, providing it with money, credit, capital, and investments. Conversely, those who provide this essential service are neither respected nor trusted. The causes and consequences of this divide is explored using the British experience from 1800 to the present, drawing upon a mixture of factual evidence and contemporary fiction. Nothing of this scale has been attempted before and this is the product of 50 years of research.

In The Falling Rate of Profit and the Great Recession of 2007-2009, Peter H. Jones develops a new non-equilibrium interpretation of the labour theory of value Karl Marx builds in Capital. Applying this to US national accounting data, Jones shows that when measured correctly the profit rate falls in the lead up to the Great Recession, and for the main reason Marx identifies: the rising organic composition of capital. Jones also details a new theory of finance, which shows how cycles in the profit rate relate to stock market booms and slumps, and movements in the interest rate. He discusses the implications of the analysis and Marx and Engels’ work generally for a democratic socialist strategy.

The theory of crisis has always played a central role within Marxism, and yet has been one of the weakest theoretical elements of Marxist political economy, while Marx's own writings on crisis have been neglected. The recent publication of the last important manuscripts makes it possible for the first time to provide a complete and systematic account of Marx's theory of crisis.

The field of management and organizational history has reached a level of maturity that means an overview is long overdue. Written by a team of globally renowned scholars, this comprehensive companion analyses management and organizational history, reflecting on the most influential periods and highlighting gaps for future research. From the impact of the Cold War to Global Warming, it examines the field from a wide array of perspectives from humanities to the social sciences. Covering the entire spectrum of the field, this volume provides an essential resource for researchers of business and management.

Attempts to reclaim Marx's Capital from the myth of inconsistency. This book is intended for non-specialist readers, and shows that the inconsistencies are actually caused by misinterpretation; the temporal single-system interpretation eliminates all of the alleged inconsistencies.