Who is accountable under international law for the acts committed by armed opposition groups? In today's world the majority of political conflicts involve non-state actors attempting to exert political influence (such as overthrowing a government or bringing about secession). Notwithstanding their impact on the course of events, however, we often know little about these groups, and even less about how to treat their actions legally. In this award-winning scholarship, Liesbeth Zegveld examines the need to legally identify the parties involved when internal conflicts arise, and the reality of their demands for rights. Her study draws upon international humanitarian law, human rights law and international criminal law to consider a fundamental question: who is accountable for the acts committed by non-state actors, or for the failure to prevent or repress these acts? This study will be of interest to academics, postgraduate students and professionals involved with armed conflict and international relations.

Today the majority of the armed conflicts around the world are fought between States and armed groups, rather than between States. This changed conflict landscape creates an imperative to clarify the obligations of armed groups under international law. While it is generally accepted that armed groups are bound by international humanitarian law, the question of whether they are also bound by human rights law is controversial. This book brings significant new understanding to the question of whether and when armed groups might be bound by human rights law. Its conclusions will benefit international law academics, legal practitioners and political scientists and anthropologists working on issues related to rebel governance and civil wars. This book addresses the debate on this topic by employing a theoretical, historical, and comparative analysis that spans international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international human rights law. Embedding these different perspectives in public international law, this book brings several key points of clarification to the legal framework. Firstly, the book draws upon social science literature on armed conflict to present a new viewpoint on the role that human rights law plays vis-a-vis international humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts. Secondly, the book sheds light on the circumstances in which armed groups acquire obligations under human rights law. It brings illumination to these topics by combining historical and comparative research on belligerency, insurgency, and international humanitarian law with a theoretical analysis of legal personality under international law. In the final part of the book, the author tests the four most utilised theories of how armed groups are bound by human rights law, examining whether armed groups can be bound by virtue of (i) treaty law (ii) control of territory (iii) international criminal law and (iv) customary international law. In the book's conclusions, the author presents final remarks that are designed to provide concrete guidance on how the issue of armed groups and human rights law can be dealt with more thoroughly in practice.

The number of non-state actors, in the past not accountable for committing international crimes or violating human rights, is proliferating rapidly. Their ways of operating evolve, with some groups being increasingly fragmented and others organizing transnationally or in cyber space. As non-state armed groups are involved in the vast majority of todays armed conflicts and crisis situations, a new and increasingly important question has to be raised as to whether, and at what point, these groups are bound by international law and thereby accountable for their acts. Breaking new ground in addressing international human rights law, international criminal law, and international humanitarian law in one swoop, Rodenhäusers text will be essential to academics and practitioners alike.

This book analyzes civil wars over the past twenty years and examines what motivates some rebel groups to abide by international law.

The central question of this pioneer work on the responsibility of non-state actors (NSAs) and the consequences thereof, is: To whom are such actors, in particular armed opposition groups and business corporations, accountable for their actions in armed conflict and in peace times? Does responsibility in international law apply to these NSAs qua groups? While much has been written about NSAs’ rights and participation in the global theatre as well as the responsibility of the state and international organisations for wrongful acts by NSAs, scant attention has been paid to questions of NSA organizational responsibility, in spite of their potential to wreak international havoc. This volume offers innovative insights into this unexplored territory by analyzing responsibility questions from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.