No issue is more fateful for civilization than moral relativism. History knows not one example of a successful society which repudiated moral absolutes. Yet most attacks on relativism have been either pragmatic (looking at its social consequences) or exhorting (preaching rather than proving), and philosophers' arguments against it have been specialized, technical, and scholarly. In his typical unique writing style, Peter Kreeft lets an attractive, honest, and funny relativist interview a "Muslim fundamentalist" absolutist so as not to stack the dice personally for absolutism. In an engaging series of personal interviews, every conceivable argument the "sassy Black feminist" reporter Libby gives against absolutism is simply and clearly refuted, and none of the many arguments for moral absolutism is refuted.

Kelsen, Hans. What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957. [vi], 397 pp. Reprinted 2000 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN 1-58477-101-1. Cloth. New. $95. * Through the lens of science, Kelsen proposes a dynamic theory of natural law, examines Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines of justice, the idea of justice as found in the holy scriptures, and defines justice as "...that social order under whose protection the search for truth can prosper. 'My' justice, then, is the justice of freedom, the justice of peace, the justice of democracy-the justice of tolerance." (p. 24).

'Relativism versus absolutism' is one of the fundamental oppositions that have dominated reflections about science for much of its (modern) history. Often these reflections have been inseparable from wider social-political concerns regarding the position of science in society. Where does this debate stand in the philosophy and sociology of science today? And how does the 'relativism question' relate to current concerns with 'post truth' politics? In Relativism in the Philosophy of Science, Martin Kusch examines some of the most influential relativist proposals of the last fifties years, and the controversies they have triggered. He argues that defensible forms of relativism all deny that any sense can be made of a scientific result being absolutely true or justified, and that they all reject 'anything goes' - that is the thought that all scientific results are epistemically on a par. Kusch concludes by distinguishing between defensible forms of relativism and post-truth thinking.

Centore's work is an inquiry into the weaknesses and strengths of the two basic positions in ethics: the man-centered model and the God-centered model for deciding between right and wrong behavior. The philosophical paradigm for the man-centered approach is absolute relativism, while the paradigm for the God-centered approach is relative absolutism. Centore argues that the man-centered model in actual practice proves not to be realistic as an ethical guide, while the God-centered model, if properly understood, is the most useful approach. This work penetrates difficult ethical issues by examining human experience and reasoning in conjunction with actual choices of action. Although the God-centered approach is shown to be the most practical, Centore argues for a natural moral law that avoids any specific theology. Each chapter discusses the historical and theoretical background of the approaches and two possible compromises. The work is enlivened with examples of possible contexts in which moral decisions must take place. Various ethical dilemmas are presented with an examination of the potential consequences of applying either the atheistic or the theistic ethical approach. Centore's argument is complex, but he explains the elements clearly and his conclusion is strengthened by real-life cases and an extensive Bibliography.