In the modern administrative state, hundreds if not thousands of officials wield powers that can be used to the benefit or detriment of individuals and corporations. When the exercise of these powers is challenged, a great deal can be at stake. Courts are confronted with difficult questions about how to apply the general principles of administrative law in different contexts. Based on a comparative theoretical analysis of the allocation of authority between the organs of government, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law provides courts with a methodology to apply no matter how complex the subject matter. The firm theoretical foundation of deference is fully exposed and a comprehensive doctrine of curial deference is developed for application by courts in judicial review of administrative action. A wide scope is urged, spanning the whole spectrum of government regulation, thereby ensuring wide access to public law remedies.

This book investigates judicial deference to the administration in judicial review, a concept and legal practice that can be found to a greater or lesser degree in every constitutional system. In each system, deference functions differently, because the positioning of the judiciary with regard to the separation of powers, the role of the courts as a mechanism of checks and balances, and the scope of judicial review differ. In addition, the way deference works within the constitutional system itself is complex, multi-faceted and often covert. Although judicial deference to the administration is a topical theme in comparative administrative law, a general examination of national systems is still lacking. As such, a theoretical and empirical review is called for. Accordingly, this book presents national reports from 15 jurisdictions, ranging from Argentina, Canada and the US, to the EU. Constituting the outcome of the 20th General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, held in Fukuoka, Japan in July 2018, it offers a valuable and unique resource for the study of comparative administrative law.

In recent years, the question whether judges should defer to administrative decisions has attracted considerable interest amongst public lawyers throughout the common law world. This book examines how the common law of judicial review has responded to the development of the administrative state in three different common law jurisdictions – the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada – over the past 100 years. This comparison demonstrates that the idea of judicial deference is a valuable feature of modern administrative law, because it gives lawyers and judges practical guidance on how to negotiate the constitutional tension between the democratic legitimacy of the administrative state and the judicial role in maintaining the rule of law.

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Deference is perhaps the most important concept and practice in law. It lies at the core of every system of precedent, appellate review, federalism, and separation of powers, all of which center on how one actor should deal with previous decisions. Oddly enough, deference is also one of the most under-analyzed and under-theorized legal concepts and practices, perhaps because its applications are so varied. This book's goal is to provide a definition of deference and a vocabulary for discussing it that can be used to describe, explain, and/or criticize deference in all of its manifestations, including some manifestations that are not always identified by legal actors as instances of deference. This project does not seek to prescribe whether and how any legal system should apply deference in any specific circumstance or to critique any particular deference doctrines. Rather, it aims to bring the concept of deference to the forefront of legal discussion; to identify, catalogue, and analyze at least the chief among its many applications; to set forth the many and varied rationales that can be and have been offered in support of deference in different legal contexts; and thereby to provide a vocabulary and conceptual framework that can be employed in future projects, whether those projects are descriptive or prescriptive.

Ronald Dworkin once imagined law as an empire and judges as its princes. But over time, the arc of law has bent steadily toward deference to the administrative state. Adrian Vermeule argues that law has freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons. In area after area, judges and lawyers, working out the logical implications of legal principles, have come to believe that administrators should be granted broad leeway to set policy, determine facts, interpret ambiguous statutes, and even define the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. Agencies have greater democratic legitimacy and technical competence to confront many issues than lawyers and judges do. And as the questions confronting the state involving climate change, terrorism, and biotechnology (to name a few) have become ever more complex, legal logic increasingly indicates that abnegation is the wisest course of action. As Law’s Abnegation makes clear, the state did not shove law out of the way. The judiciary voluntarily relegated itself to the margins of power. The last and greatest triumph of legalism was to depose itself.

This thesis examines three interrelated issues. The first concerns a question about the status of administrative law, namely whether administrative officials have authority to determine what the law requires under a democratic constitution. Historically, this question has not been adequately addressed in public law scholarship because neither Diceyan constitutional theory nor common law doctrine has been traditionally receptive to administrative law. In this thesis, I argue that there are good reasons for people to respect the legal authority of administrative officials and their decisions. Those reasons are rooted in respect for the democratic process by which administrative officials are empowered, and respect for the various forms of expertise that administrative officials possess.The second issue concerns the doctrinal aspect of administrative law. If there are good reasons for believing that administrative officials have legitimate legal authority, then those same reasons suggest that judges should respect administrative legal decisions. In order to better understand how the relevant reasons for respecting administrative decisions alter the practice of judicial review, I compare and contrast the traditional doctrine of jurisdictional review with the doctrine of curial deference. This comparison shows that the doctrine of curial deference provides a superior account of the legitimate legal authority of administrative officials, and that this account makes a practical difference for the practice of judicial review.The third issue concerns whether the doctrine of curial deference can be reconciled with the rule of law. Assuming that there are good reasons for respecting administrative decisions, how can judges both respect an administrative decision while ensuring that it is consistent with the rule of law? I argue that judges can both respect administrative decisions and maintain the rule of law by requiring administrative officials to justify their decisions adequately in light of public reasons which are both patent and latent in existing legal materials.