Pakistani Assistance For The Anti-Government Of India Activities Was Not Due To Only Its Revanchist Spirit Following Its Loss Of East Pakistan But For Keeping Itsmilitary Preoccupied With Internal Security Duties Thereby Trying To Neutralize The Superiority Of The Indian Armed Forces. Such A Policy Could Ultimately Weaken The Unity Of India Just As The Bleeding Of Soviet Troops In Afghanistan Contributed To The Break-Up Of Ussr. Terrorism Is An Absolute Evil And Has To Be Treated As Such.

While the war on terrorism may have provided the rationale for the latest U.S. engagement with Pakistan, the present relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is at the crossroads of many other issues, such as Pakistan¿s own reform efforts, America¿s evolving strategic relationship with South Asia, democracy in the Muslim world, and the dual problems of religious extremism and nuclear proliferation. This report examines the history and present state of U.S.-Pakistan relations, addresses the key challenges the two countries face, and concludes with specific policy recommendations for ensuring the relationship meets the needs of both the U.S. and Pakistan.

Veteran Pakistani journalist and commentator Zahid Hussain explores Pakistan's complex political power web and the consequences of Musharraf's decision to support America's drive against jihadism, which essentially took Pakistan to war with itself. Conducting exclusive interviews with key players and grassroots radicals, Hussain pinpoints the origin of the jihadi movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the long-standing and often denied links between militants and Pakistani authorities, the weaknesses of successive elected governments, and the challenges to Musharraf's authority posed by politico-religious, sectarian, and civil society elements within the country. The jihadi madrassas of Pakistan are incubators of the most feared terrorists in the world. Although the country's "war on terror" has so far been a stage show, a very real battle is looming, the outcome of which will have grave implications for the future security of the world.

The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.

Compares the reasons for and the responses to the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan since October 2001. Also examines the lack of security and the support of insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1970s that explain the rise of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Explores the border tribal areas between the two countries and how they influence regional stability and U.S. security. Explains the implications of what happened during this 10-year period to provide candid insights on the prospects and risks associated with bringing a durable stability to this area of the world.

Mumbai 26/11 saw a mix of commando-style attacks typical of the special forces of an army and indiscriminate killing of civilians typical of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Pakistani jihadi organization. The meticulous planning, the thorough training of the 10 LeT terrorists, who carried it out, and the close co-ordination of the attacks from the command and control of the LeT had the stamp of Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, both of which the LeT has a close relationship with. The LeT terrorists attacked a mix of targets—innocent Indian civilians in public places, Jewish people in a religious-cum-cultural centre and members of the Indian and foreign social and business elite in two five-star hotels. The attacks on the Jewish centre and the hotels lasted over 60 hours and were continuously telecast live by the TV channels. The success of the terrorist attacks, mounted from the sea, highlighted once again the serious deficiencies in India’s national security apparatus and the role of Pakistan in the spread of terrorism across the world. Have we drawn the right lessons in respect of both? Can the Indian people now expect at least a more robust counter-terrorism policy to prevent another 26/11?