Almost immediately after Israel declared its independence in 1948, it began to benefit from a unique series of scientific and military exchanges with France. These exchanges, arranged for the most part outside normal diplomatic channels, were in conflict with the official pro-Arab position of the French government, and also ran counter to Israel's leanings toward the United States, Britain, and the Commonwealth countries. They thus indicated the beginnings of a "tacit alliance"—a relationship of mutual cooperation and support based on no official government contract. Sylvia Kowitt Crosbie traces the rise of the France-Israel friendship from its informal beginnings through its peak at the time of the Sinai Campaign, the Suez crisis, and the joint Anglo-French invasion of Egypt to its abrupt end in 1967 during the aftermath of the Arab- Israeli June War. The author studies the problem from the standpoint of the interplay of international politics as it affected the Middle East, at the regional level of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in terms of the domestic politics of the two partners of the alliance. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Almost immediately after Israel declared its independence in 1948, it began to benefit from a unique series of scientific and military exchanges with France. These exchanges, arranged for the most part outside normal diplomatic channels, were in conflict with the official pro-Arab position of the French government, and also ran counter to Israel's leanings toward the United States, Britain, and the Commonwealth countries. They thus indicated the beginnings of a "tacit alliance"--a relationship of mutual cooperation and support based on no official government contract. Sylvia Kowitt Crosbie traces the rise of the France-Israel friendship from its informal beginnings through its peak at the time of the Sinai Campaign, the Suez crisis, and the joint Anglo-French invasion of Egypt to its abrupt end in 1967 during the aftermath of the Arab- Israeli June War. The author studies the problem from the standpoint of the interplay of international politics as it affected the Middle East, at the regional level of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in terms of the domestic politics of the two partners of the alliance. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Almost immediately after Israel declared its independence in 1948, it began to benefit from a unique series of scientific and military exchanges with France. These exchanges, arranged for the most part outside normal diplomatic channels, were in conflict with the official pro-Arab position of the French government, and also ran counter to Israel's leanings toward the United States, Britain, and the Commonwealth countries. They thus indicated the beginnings of a "tacit alliance"--a relationship of mutual cooperation and support based on no official government contract. Sylvia Kowitt Crosbie traces the rise of the France-Israel friendship from its informal beginnings through its peak at the time of the Sinai Campaign, the Suez crisis, and the joint Anglo-French invasion of Egypt to its abrupt end in 1967 during the aftermath of the Arab- Israeli June War. The author studies the problem from the standpoint of the interplay of international politics as it affected the Middle East, at the regional level of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in terms of the domestic politics of the two partners of the alliance. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

How are alliances made? In this book, Stephen M. Walt makes a significant contribution to this topic, surveying theories of the origins of international alliances and identifying the most important causes of security cooperation between states. In addition, he proposes a fundamental change in the present conceptions of alliance systems. Contrary to traditional balance-of-power theories, Walt shows that states form alliances not simply to balance power but in order to balance threats. Walt begins by outlining five general hypotheses about the causes of alliances. Drawing upon diplomatic history and a detailed study of alliance formation in the Middle East between 1955 and 1979, he demonstrates that states are more likely to join together against threats than they are to ally themselves with threatening powers. Walt also examines the impact of ideology on alliance preferences and the role of foreign aid and transnational penetration. His analysis show, however, that these motives for alignment are relatively less important. In his conclusion, he examines the implications of "balance of threat" for U.S. foreign policy.