To assist in moving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planning and execution forward from a fixed target and deliberate planning focus to one centered on emerging targets, the authors propose enhancing the collection management process with a strategies-to-tasks and utility framework. By linking collection targets to operational tasks, objectives, and the top-level commander's guidance with relative utilities, planning for the daily intelligence collections and real-time retasking for ad hoc ISR targets could be enhanced. When current tools are modified to provide this information, planners will be able to link collection targets to top-level objectives for better decision making and optimization of low-density, high-demand collection assets. Similarly, on the Air Operations Center (AOC) floor, intelligence officers will be better able to deal with time-sensitive, emerging targets by rapidly comparing the value of collecting an ad hoc collection with the value of collecting opportunities already planned. To handle the ISR demands posed by the rapidly changing battlefield of the future, this new, more-capable framework may be needed for making the best use of intelligence capabilities against emerging collection opportunities. Future research will focus on quantifying the advantages of this approach in comparison with the current process.

Lingel et al. present alternative methods to approach U.S. Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasking and the command and control processes and assess the outcome of different information-collection strategies. They develop new assessment techniques and operational strategies to improve the use of ISR assets in dynamic environments.

The RAND Corporation's Collection Operations Model (COM) is a stochastic, agent-based simulation tool designed to support the analysis of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) processes and scenarios. Written for the System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation modeling environment, the COM is used to study processes that require the real-time interaction of many players and to answer questions about force mix, system effectiveness, concepts of operations, basing and logistics, and capability-based assessment. It can represent thousands of autonomous, interacting platforms and explore the capabilities of a wide range of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Through its flexible and friendly text-based input tables, the model represents a wide array of sensor capabilities, target properties, terrain and weather effects, and resource limitations. Its final output is a minute-by-minute account of each agent's changing operational picture. Since 2005, the COM has been used to model counterinsurgency, counterpiracy, and maritime surveillance scenarios and two major combat operations, and to study ad hoc collections, sensor cueing, dynamic retasking, and resource allocation. RAND has planned a number of upgrades to the COM, including the addition of space-based assets; a more robust model of sensor data fusion; communications modules that more accurately represent the advantages of a networked force; a more realistic representation of C3ISR workflow; sensor capability to generate false positives; and agent capability to practice deception. These extensions and enhancements are intended to result in a COM that can represent the entire C3ISR process specifically and network-centric operations in general.

"This study comprises a qualitative analysis with a within-case and across-case methodology that seeks to understand the significance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) strategy at the operational level of war. The study accomplishes three tasks: first, it develops a taxonomy for evaluating ISR strategy within the Clausewitzian tradition; second, it applies the taxonomy to three historical cases within the Mediterranean Theater in the Second World War; and third, it contributes to the education of ISR professionals by providing examples of how operational leaders orchestrated a vast intelligence machine to achieve operational results. The study concludes that successful ISR strategies, balanced and effectively integrated with the overall operational plan through the commander’s intent, are integral to the overall success or failure of an operational plan. Successful ISR strategy acts as a general force multiplier by increasing a nation’s military effectiveness that can hasten victory or forestall defeat. Conversely, unsuccessful ISR strategy generally reduces operational effectiveness that can thwart victory or hasten defeat. The study fills a gap in the body of knowledge by providing a framework to understand why ISR strategies succeed or fail, explains the fundamental principles underpinning the development of ISR strategy, and explains how ISR strategists can best set the conditions for future success at the operational level of war"--Abstract.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities have expanded situation awareness for U.S. forces, provided for more precise combat effects, and enabled better decision making both during conflicts and in peacetime, and reliance on ISR capabilities is expected to increase in the future. ISR capabilities are critical to 3 of the 12 Service Core Functions of the U.S. Air Force: namely, Global Integrated ISR (GIISR) and the ISR components of Cyberspace Superiority and Space Superiority, and contribute to all others. In response to a request from the Air Force for ISR and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, the National Research Council formed the Committee on Examination of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability Planning and Analysis (CP&A) Process. In this report, the committee reviews the current approach to the Air Force corporate planning and programming process for ISR capability generation; examines carious analytical methods, processes, and models for large-scale, complex domains like ISR; and identifies the best practices for the Air Force. In Capability Planning and Analysis to Optimize Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Investments, the current approach is analyzed and the best practices for the Air Force corporate planning and programming processed for ISR are recommended. This report also recommends improvements and changes to existing analytical tools, methods, roles and responsibilities, and organization and management that would be required to ensure the Air Force corporate planning and programming process for ISR is successful in addressing all Joint, National, and Coalition partner's needs.

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Advisory Group was asked to examine the use of operations research (OR) methods to support Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) decision making within the DoD. The DSB was asked to survey the departments and agencies to determine how much OR is being performed; assess how the results of OR are being used in decision making; recommend a test cases(s) for using OR methodologies; and recommend steps DoD can take to institutionalize the use of OR in future DoD decision making. Illustrations.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-0, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations, is the Air Force's keystone doctrinal publication on global integrated ISR and defines how the Service plans and conducts these operations to enable Joint Operations. It compiles the best practices of how an Airman conducts and employs ISR capabilities and why global integrated ISR is unique. The three chapters define global integrated ISR, the command relationships and authorities that enable it, and how these operations are planned and conducted. Chapter One, Fundamentals of Global Integrated ISR Operations, describes global integrated ISR, answering What is global integrated ISR? and how it is implemented to support the Air Force and its missions? It focuses on: the definition of global integrated ISR; the Airman's perspective; global integrated ISR as a service core function (SCF); basic global integrated ISR principles; and policy and guidance for global integrated ISR operations. It also outlines how cross-domain integration and global integrated ISR are linked. Finally, it introduces the Air Force process of planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination (PCPAD). Chapter Two, Command and Organization of Global Integrated ISR Forces, discusses the command and organization of Air Force global integrated ISR forces. It discusses the roles of commanders in regards to the planning and execution of global integrated ISR operations. It outlines the roles and responsibilities of global integrated ISR linked personnel within and outside of the ISR Division of the Air Operations Center (AOC). It discusses global integrated ISR presentation of forces considerations and guidance to include remote and distributed operations. It provides an overview of the roles of global integrated ISR associated personnel within different Air Force echelons and mission sets. It details the special relationships required for specific missions and the roles in homeland and counterdrug operations, and irregular warfare considerations. Chapter Three, The Global Integrated ISR Process, answers the question, how does the Air Force perform global integrated ISR operations? This section defines the various intelligence disciplines and their subsets. It discusses the different types of guidance to be considered when planning global integrated ISR operations. It outlines the multiple types of ISR resources that are available for employment. It outlines the Air Force global integrated ISR process of PCPAD. Finally, it describes the different methodologies that PCPAD supports and the types of global integrated ISR products created. The principal audience for this publication is all Airmen, both uniformed and civilian. It is the defining document for ISR operations in the United States Air Force.