The key to any successful strategic campaign begins with an analysis of both the friendly and threat strategic center of gravity. This analysis drives the development of the campaign plan by familiarizing planners with an understanding of how both belligerents organize, fight, and make decisions. Consequently, the improper identification or miscalculation of the center of gravity will lead to the misapplication of the elements of national power and ultimately to a campaign plan that will not meet the stated strategic objectives. While Joint and service doctrine/manuals generally agree on a common definition of center of gravity, considerable discrepancies still exist regarding the specific nature of center of gravity and its relationship to critical vulnerabilities. Dr. Joe Strange, a professor at the Marine Corps University, makes a recommendation for defining this relationship. He has developed a model that bridges the gap between the center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities by identifying critical capabilities and critical requirements. Dr. Strange posits that it is necessary to understand the center of gravity, critical capability, critical requirement, and critical vulnerability relationship in order to grasp fully the environment in which this campaign will take place. This model will be used for this analysis. The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, to determine a workable definition of terrorism and how this definition applies to the new religiously based terrorism the world witnessed on 11 September; second, to conduct a comprehensive strategic level center of gravity analysis that will identify the relative strength and weaknesses of the U.S. led coalition and the al Qaeda terrorist network and; third, to present potential friendly and enemy response strategies.

The key to any successful strategic campaign begins with an analysis of both the friendly and threat strategic center of gravity. This analysis drives the development of the campaign plan by familiarizing planners with an understanding of how both belligerents organize, fight, and make decisions. Consequently, the improper identification or miscalculation of the center of gravity will lead to the misapplication of the elements of national power and ultimately to a campaign plan that will not meet the stated strategic objectives. While Joint and service doctrine/manuals generally agree on a common definition of center of gravity, considerable discrepancies still exist regarding the specific nature of center of gravity and its relationship to critical vulnerabilities. Dr. Joe Strange, a professor at the Marine Corps University, makes a recommendation for defining this relationship. He has developed a model that bridges the gap between the center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities by identifying critical capabilities and critical requirements. Dr. Strange posits that it is necessary to understand the center of gravity, critical capability, critical requirement, and critical vulnerability relationship in order to grasp fully the environment in which this campaign will take place. This model will be used for this analysis. The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, to determine a workable definition of terrorism and how this definition applies to the new religiously based terrorism the world witnessed on 11 September; second, to conduct a comprehensive strategic level center of gravity analysis that will identify the relative strength and weaknesses of the U.S. led coalition and the al Qaeda terrorist network and; third, to present potential friendly and enemy response strategies.

As history has shown, it is important to correctly identify the nature of a war in which one is engaged so that an appropriate strategy can be developed to win the war. As the United States enters the fourth year in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), it is important to examine three issues that are crucial for winning the war: first, a re-assessment of the GWOT as a war against global insurgency rather than a war against terrorism; second, an analysis of the concept of the center of gravity as it relates to the GWOT; and third, an examination of potential enemy and friendly centers of gravity and their impact on the conduct of the war. Through this examination of the GWOT, the author hopes to point out some possible shortcomings of current U.S. strategy and provide possible alternatives that could be followed to ensure victory in the shortest time and at the lowest possible cost.

Presents the deep subject-matter understanding gained by a mid-career Air Force officer who as a Research Fellow engaged in a year-long quest for insight into asymmetric conflict analysis and synthesis. He acquired a first-hand appreciation of how intelligence can more systematically build and employ a capability to gain ground in this challenging environment. He presents his formulation in an accessible, systematic manner that makes it suitable as a handbook for practitioners at any level. Goes well beyond any existing guidance yet assembled in on e package.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the United States of September 2002 stated that defending the Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government and that the primary threat is from terrorists. The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is a test of our national will and one that requires the employment of all the nation's instruments of power. However before we can employ instruments of power against an enemy it must be determined clearly against what sources of their strength and weakness are we directing our power. We must be certain that we are targeting that one critical source of strength their strategic center of gravity. The NSS states that the GWOT is against a politically motivated network of terrorists with global reach and not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. This means that unlike prior enemies there is no clear state for the U.S. to direct its national powers against but instead a loose organization of groups. Without a dear idea of what is the unifying factor(s) for these terrorist groups their center(s) of gravity or the source(s) of their power there exists a possibility that our national power employment efforts may be misdirected marginalized or even counterproductive. If the grand strategy is silent on this unifying power issue it leaves the components of the federal government to decide for themselves the enemy's centers of gravity on the strategic operational and tactical level. This lends itself to misdirection if diverse and conflicting centers of gravity are determined but not coordinated by U.S elements. The purpose of this paper is fourfold: first to analyze the issue of centers of gravity to determine if it is possible that ideology can be a center of gravity (COG); second to determine if ideology is the COG for global terrorists; third to identify which ideology is that unifying ideology; fourth to present response strategies against the determined center(s) of gra7.

In contrast with previous wars aimed at overcoming ideologies such as fascism in World War II or communism in the Cold War, the current “Global War on Terrorism” represents the first American war aimed at a means to an end vice the end itself. Without doubt, the increased ambiguousness of the adversary in this war presents new and more complex challenges in successfully assessing the Clausewitzian dictum of center of gravity. Previously, it was sufficient to pronounce a nation's military, or its leadership, or its national wealth as its center of gravity, and having identified such, a suitable set of objectives could be fashioned to damage or destroy an adversary's ability to wage war or his will to fight. However, a war against terrorism demands that one go much further. It is not enough to target any particular terrorist group's tangible critical factors, such as money, manpower, and bases in the efforts to eliminate that organization. In addition, one must stamp out the very reason that group came into being in the first place, or at least mitigate their influence on their constituent (or non-constituent) audiences. Therefore, the true center of gravity in this conflict can be none other than the connection between a terror organization and its popular base; the true center of gravity is its message.