The Peninsula Campaign and the Necessity of Emancipation

Recounts General McClellan's attempt to capture Richmond by advancing up the Virginia peninsula from Yorktown, and how the campaign failed when Confederate forces under General Robert E. Lee expelled the Union forces from the peninsula.

“Sears has finally unraveled the mystique of this complex, brilliant Civil War general . . . A fascinating story” (James M. McPherson, author of Battle Cry of Freedom). “Commander of the Northern army in the Civil War, Gen. George McClellan saw himself as God’s chosen instrument for saving the Union. Self-aggrandizing, with a streak of arrogant stubbornness, he set himself above President Lincoln, whom he privately called ‘the Gorilla.’ To ‘the young Napoleon,’ as McClellan’s troops dubbed him, abolition was an ‘accursed doctrine.’ Fond of conspiracy plots, he insisted that the Lincoln administration had traitorously conspired to set him up for military defeat. Although he constantly anticipated one big, decisive battle that would crush the South, he squandered one military opportunity after another, and, if Sears is correct, he was the worst strategist the Army of the Potomac ever had. Based on primary sources, letters, dispatch books, diaries, newspapers, this masterly biography is an astonishing portrait of an egotistical crank who could snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.” —Publishers Weekly “Engagingly written and thoroughly researched, Sears’s persuasive critique is the best and most complete biography of this controversial general.” —Library Journal “The best biography of McClellan ever published. Sears uses intensive research, including new material, to document the tormented, wasted military career of a talented man . . . The enigma of McClellan has never been explained so well . . . Historians should be grateful.” —The Washington Post Book World

Perhaps no other Union commander's legacy in the Civil War has been the subject of as much controversy as George B. McClellan's. Since the midpoint of this century, however, he has emerged as the complex general who, though gifted with administrative and organizational skills, was unable and unwilling to fight with the splendid army he had created. Thomas J. Rowland argues that this interpretation rests squarely within the context of general historical verdicts of the way in which the North eventually triumphed. Civil War scholars have found the quality of Union leadership in the early years of the war wanting, and that it was not until U.S. Grant and W.T. Sherman emerged that success was ensured. On the other hand, Grant and Sherman knew failure but were judged less harshly than was McClellan. In George B. McClellan and Civil War History, Rowland presents a framework in which early Civil War command can be viewed without direct comparison to that of the final two years.

As a result, Rafuse sheds light not only on McClellan's conduct on the battlefields of 1861-62 but on United States politics and culture in the years leading up to the Civil War.