A Sceptical Theory of Scientific Inquiry: Problems and Their Progress presents a distinctive re-interpretation of Popper’s ‘critical rationalism’, displaying the kind of spirit found at the L.S.E. before Popper’s retirement. It offers an alternative to interpretations of critical rationalism which have emphasised the significance of research programmes or metaphysics (Lakatos; Nicholas Maxwell), and is closer to the approach of Jagdish Hattiangadi. Briskman gives priority to methodological argument rather than logical formalisms, and takes further his own work on creativity. In addition to offering an important contribution to the understanding of critical rationalism, the book contains interesting engagements with Michael Polanyi and the Meno Paradox. This volume also contains an introduction by the editor, which situates Briskman’s work in the history of the interpretation of ‘critical rationalism’.

"A Sceptical Theory of Scientific Inquiry: Problems and Their Progress presents a distinctive re-interpretation of Popper's 'critical rationalism', displaying the kind of spirit found at the L.S.E. before Popper's retirement. It offers an alternative to interpretations of critical rationalism which have emphasised the significance of research programmes or metaphysics (Lakatos; Nicholas Maxwell), and is closer to the approach of Jagdish Hattiangadi. Briskman gives priority to methodological argument rather than logical formalisms, and takes further his own work on creativity. In addition to offering an important contribution to the understanding of critical rationalism, the book contains interesting engagements with Michael Polanyi and the Meno Paradox. This volume also contains an introduction by the editor, which situates Briskman's work in the history of the interpretation of 'critical rationalism'"--

Must there be a single right interpretation of a particular cultural entity? In his book Michael Krausz considers this question in such representative cultural practices as music, visual art, history, and cross-cultural understanding. Krausz advances two main theses. First, he argues, the notion that there must be a single right interpretation in cultural practices—the "singularist" view—is misplaced. Without acceding to an interpretive anarchism, he embraces the "multiplist" view that cultural practices characteristically allow a multiplicity of ideally admissible interpretations. In his discussion Krausz critically outlines the maneuvers available to both singularists and multiplists. Second, Krausz notes that singularists characteristically construe their objects-of-interpretation along realist lines, and multiplists along constructionist lines. But, he argues, these associations are not necessary: the singularist condition is not guaranteed by realism, nor the multiplist by constructionism. Krausz holds that the question of interpretive ideals is detachable from the dispute between realists and constructionists. Addressing topics of intense concern within mainstream analytic philosophy and in many other areas of cultural investigation, Rightness and Reasons will be rewarding reading for aestheticians, musicologists, art historians, literary theorists, historiographers, and anthropologists.

Issue for Mar. 1981 contains index for Jan.-Mar. 1981 in microfiche form.

A clear, original and systematic introduction to philosophy of science which examines the theories of Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend before proposing a new, temperate rationalist perspective.