International IDEA’s Annual Review of Constitution-Building provides a retrospective account of constitutional transitions around the world, the issues that drive them, and their implications for national and international politics. This seventh edition covers events in 2019. Because this year marks the end of a decade, the first chapter summarizes a series of discussions International IDEA held with international experts and scholars throughout the year on the evolution of constitution-building over the past 10 years. The edition also includes chapters on challenges with sustaining constitutional pacts in Guinea and Zimbabwe; public participation in constitutional reform processes in The Gambia and Mongolia; constitutional change and subnational governance arrangements in Tobago and the Autonomous Region of Bangsamoro; the complexities of federal systems and negotiations on federal state structures in Myanmar and South Sudan; and the drawing (and redrawing) of the federal map in South Sudan and India. Writing at the mid-way point between the instant reactions of the blogosphere and academic analyses that follow several years later, the authors provide accounts of ongoing political transitions, the major constitutional issues they give rise to, and the implications of these processes for democracy, the rule of law and peace.

A starting point for the study of the English Constitution and comparative constitutional law, The Law of the Constitution elucidates the guiding principles of the modern constitution of England: the legislative sovereignty of Parliament, the rule of law, and the binding force of unwritten conventions.

Regional organizations play an increasingly important role in strengthening and upholding the rule of law. Regional organizations are also increasingly seeking to strengthen constitutional governance in their member states by developing regulatory frameworks that reject and sanction unconstitutional transfers of power and attempts to remain in power unconstitutionally. This publication presents and discusses the initiatives and actions in the field of rule of law and constitution building by regional organizations. It also highlights their achievements, their limitations and the challenges they face, and puts forward policy recommendations for consideration.

This publication is designed to assist United Nations staff who provide human rights advice to States, which undertake to amend an existing constitution or write a new one. It should also be of use to States that undertake constitutional reform, including political leaders, policymakers, legislators and those entrusted to draft constitutional amendments or a new constitution. Further this publication should also facilitate advocacy efforts by civil society to ensure that human rights are properly reflected in constitutional amendments or new constitutions. Finally, this publication, along with the international human rights instruments, should not only provide a standard to measure whether constitutional amendments or a new constitution has appropriately reflected human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also assist in evaluating whether the processes used in constitutional reform are consistent with international procedural norms"--Introduction, page 1.

Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.