A customs union is more effective than a free trade area for diluting the power of interest groups.

This title was first published in 2000: This work examines the hemispheric diplomacy after the Summits of the America in Miami (December 1994) and Santiago (April 1998), focusing on the strengthening of the South American position in the FTAA negotiations and the Brazilian proposal for a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). The book also looks at the implications of the preceding analysis for regional integration theory and international relations theory. The conclusion looks beyond "open regionalism" and considers three scenarios for US-South American relations after the Santiago Summit. First reassertion of US hegemony and signing of an FTAA agreement on schedule, second, erosion of US hegemony but continuing negotiations between North and South America for a "distant" FTAA, and finally, breakdown of the FTAA negotations and emergence of SAFTA as an alternative to the FTAA.

Incorporating intermediate inputs into a small-union general-equilibrium model, this paper first develops the welfare economics of preferential trading under the rules of origin (ROO) and then demonstrates that the ROO could improve the political viability of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Two interesting outcomes are derived. First, a welfare reducing FTA that was rejected in the absence of the ROO becomes feasible in the presence of these rules. Second, a welfare improving FTA that was rejected in the absence of the ROO is endorsed in their presence, but upon endorsement it becomes welfare inferior relative to the status quo.

This book presents a comprehensive view of recent developments in the theory of international trade agreements and political economy, by focusing on research by Raymond Riezman. This pioneering work introduced terms of trade effects and strategic behavior to the theory of international trade agreements. This is complemented by a careful analysis of how politics affects international trade agreements. The book brings together work which focuses on the question of why international trade agreements occur and what forms they take.

Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.

Exploring regionalism from a political economic perspective, this text investigates why regional arrangements are formed, the conditions under which these arrangements solidify, and why they take on different institutional forms.