This book is volume one of a two-part series. Taken together, the two volumes of A Philosopher at War examine the political thought of the philosopher and archaeologist, R.G. Collingwood, against the background of the First and Second World Wars. Collingwood served in Admiralty Intelligence during the First World War and although he was not physically robust enough to play an active role in the Second World War, he was swift to condemn the policies of appeasement which he thought largely responsible for bringing it about. The author uses a blend of political philosophy, history and discussion of political policy to uncover what Collingwood says about the First World War, the Peace Treaty which followed it, and the crises which led to the Second World War in 1939, together with the response he mustered to it before his death in 1943. The aim is to reveal the kind of liberalism he valued and explain why he valued it. By 1940 Collingwood came to see that a liberalism separated from Christianity would be unable to meet the combined evils of Fascism and Nazism. How Collingwood arrived at this position, and how viable he finally considered it, is the story told in these volumes.

"A new history of the British appeasement of the Third Reich on the eve of World War II"--

On September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew back to London from his meeting in Munich with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. As he disembarked from the aircraft, he held aloft a piece of paper, which contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war with one another again. He had returned bringing “Peace with honour—Peace for our time.” Drawing on a wealth of archival material, acclaimed historian David Faber delivers a sweeping reassessment of the extraordinary events of 1938, tracing the key incidents leading up to the Munich Conference and its immediate aftermath: Lord Halifax’s ill-fated meeting with Hitler; Chamberlain’s secret discussions with Mussolini; and the Berlin scandal that rocked Hitler’s regime. He takes us to Vienna, to the Sudentenland, and to Prague. In Berlin, we witness Hitler inexorably preparing for war, even in the face of opposition from his own generals; in London, we watch as Chamberlain makes one supreme effort after another to appease Hitler. Resonating with an insider’s feel for the political infighting Faber uncovers, Munich, 1938 transports us to the war rooms and bunkers, revealing the covert negotiations and scandals upon which the world’s fate would rest. It is modern history writing at its best.

The Victorian period in Britain was an “age of reform.” It is therefore not surprising that two of the era’s most eminent intellects described themselves as reformers. Both William Whewell and John Stuart Mill believed that by reforming philosophy—including the philosophy of science—they could effect social and political change. But their divergent visions of this societal transformation led to a sustained and spirited controversy that covered morality, politics, science, and economics. Situating their debate within the larger context of Victorian society and its concerns, Reforming Philosophy shows how two very different men captured the intellectual spirit of the day and engaged the attention of other scientists and philosophers, including the young Charles Darwin. Mill—philosopher, political economist, and Parliamentarian—remains a canonical author of Anglo-American philosophy, while Whewell—Anglican cleric, scientist, and educator—is now often overlooked, though in his day he was renowned as an authority on science. Placing their teachings in their proper intellectual, cultural, and argumentative spheres, Laura Snyder revises the standard views of these two important Victorian figures, showing that both men’s concerns remain relevant today. A philosophically and historically sensitive account of the engagement of the major protagonists of Victorian British philosophy, Reforming Philosophy is the first book-length examination of the dispute between Mill and Whewell in its entirety. A rich and nuanced understanding of the intellectual spirit of Victorian Britain, it will be welcomed by philosophers and historians of science, scholars of Victorian studies, and students of the history of philosophy and political economy.

An engaging range of period texts and theme books for AS and A Level history. This book examines the key roles played by Adolf Hitler and Neville Chamberlain in the events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. It looks at Hitler's foreign-policy aims, why appeasement became British foreign policy and, most extensively, the role of Chamberlain and appeasement in the unfolding international crisis of the late 1930s. Using a wide range of primary sources, Frank McDonough offers a generally critical interpretation of Chamberlain and appeasement, and suggests that standing up to Hitler earlier may have prevented war. The book also features a detailed analysis of the historical debates surrounding the issue of appeasement.

Drawing on a wealth of previously unexamined material, this staggering account sheds new light on the Allies’ responsibility for a landmark agreement that had dire consequences. On returning from Germany on September 30, 1938, after signing an agreement with Hitler on the carve-up of Czechoslovakia, Neville Chamberlain addressed the British crowds: “My good friends…I believe it is peace for our time. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.” Winston Churchill rejoined: “You have chosen dishonor and you will have war.” P. E. Caquet’s history of the events leading to the Munich Agreement and its aftermath is told for the first time from the point of view of the peoples of Czechoslovakia. Basing his work on previously unexamined sources, including press, memoirs, private journals, army plans, cabinet records, and radio, Caquet presents one of the most shameful episodes in modern European history. Among his most explosive revelations is the strength of the French and Czechoslovak forces before Munich; Germany’s dominance turns out to have been an illusion. The case for appeasement never existed. The result is a nail-biting story of diplomatic intrigue, perhaps the nearest thing to a morality play that history ever furnishes. The Czechoslovak authorities were Cassandras in their own country, the only ones who could see Hitler’s threat for what it was, and appeasement as the disaster it proved to be. In Caquet’s devastating account, their doomed struggle against extinction and the complacency of their notional allies finally gets the memorial it deserves.

The 1930s policy of appeasement is still fiercely debated by historians, critics and contemporary political commentators, more than 70 years after the signing of the 1938 Munich Agreement. What is less well-understood, however, is the role of public opinion on the formation of British and French policy in the period between Munich and the outbreak of the Second World War; not necessarily what public opinion was but how it was perceived to be by those in power and how this contributed to the policymaking process. It therefore fills a considerable gap in an otherwise vast literature, seeking to ascertain the extent to which public opinion can be said to have influenced the direction of foreign policy in a crucial juncture of British and French diplomatic history. Employing an innovative and unique methodological framework, the author distinguishes between two categories of representation: firstly, 'reactive' representations of opinion, the immediate and spontaneous reactions of the public to circumstances and events as they occur; and secondly, 'residual' representations, which can be defined as the remnants of previous memories and experiences, the more general tendencies of opinion considered characteristic of previous years, even previous decades. It is argued that the French government of Édouard Daladier was consistently more attuned to the evolution of 'reactive' representations than the British government of Neville Chamberlain and, consequently, it was the French rather than the British who first pursued a firmer policy towards the European dictatorships. This comparative approach reveals a hitherto hidden facet of the diplomatic prelude to the Second World War; that British policy towards France and French policy towards Britain were influenced by their respective perceptions of public opinion in the other country. A sophisticated analysis of a crucial period in international history, this book will be essential reading for scholars of the origins of World War II, the political scenes of late 1930s Britain and France, and the study of public opinion and its effects on policy.