Canadians consider the period between the Second World War and the unification of the armed services in 1968 as a “golden age,” a time when their army dropped the shackles of its imperial past and emerged as a truly national peacekeeping force. In this landmark book, Peter Kasurak draws on recently declassified documents to show that this era was in fact clouded by the army’s failure to loosen the grasp of British army culture, produce its own doctrine, and advise political leaders effectively. The discrepancy between the army’s goals and the Canadian state’s aspirations as a peacemaker in the postwar world resulted in a series of civilian-military crises that ended only when the scandal of the Somalia Affair in 1993 forced reform. Kasurak offers an illuminating account of the organizational growing pains that wracked the Canada’s army as it evolved into a force that could reflect the aspirations of both its country and military leadership.

This landmark book dispels the idea that the period between the Second World War and the unification of the armed services in 1968 constituted the Canadian Army's "golden age." Drawing on recently declassified documents, Peter Kasurak depicts an era clouded by the military leadership's failure to loosen the grasp of British army culture, produce its own doctrine, and advise political leaders effectively. The discrepancy between the army's goals and the Canadian state's aspirations as a peacemaker in the postwar world resulted in a series of civilian-military crises that ended only when the scandal of the Somalia Affair in 1993 forced reform.

While American national security policy has grown more interventionist since the Cold War, Washington has also hoped to shape the world on the cheap. Misled by the stunning success against Iraq in 1991, administrations of both parties have pursued ambitious aims with limited force, committing the country's military frequently yet often hesitantly, with inconsistent justification. These ventures have produced strategic confusion, unplanned entanglements, and indecisive results. This collection of essays by Richard K. Betts, a leading international politics scholar, investigates the use of American force since the end of the Cold War, suggesting guidelines for making it more selective and successful. Betts brings his extensive knowledge of twentieth century American diplomatic and military history to bear on the full range of theory and practice in national security, surveying the Cold War roots of recent initiatives and arguing that U.S. policy has always been more unilateral than liberal theorists claim. He exposes mistakes made by humanitarian interventions and peace operations; reviews the issues raised by terrorism and the use of modern nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons; evaluates the case for preventive war, which almost always proves wrong; weighs the lessons learned from campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; assesses the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia; quells concerns about civil-military relations; exposes anomalies within recent defense budgets; and confronts the practical barriers to effective strategy. Betts ultimately argues for greater caution and restraint, while encouraging more decisive action when force is required, and he recommends a more dispassionate assessment of national security interests, even in the face of global instability and unfamiliar threats.

This AFCHO monograph covers USAF participation in the national guided missile program that slowly evolved between the closing months of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War. The first generation of missile projects laid the groundwork for a later and much more successful range of weapons. Navaho and Rascal proved the technologies that were later used for the AGM-28 Hound Dog and AGM-69 SRAM missiles. These same technologies later gave birth to the current generation of cruise missiles. These can be seen as a successful implementation of the design concepts first developed in the late 1940s. Today, in the second decade of the 21st century, pilotless aircraft are a widely used and deadly part of the American airborne arsenal. Technology has caught up with the visions of those who had conceived the first generation of guided missiles in the 1940s.

In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.