The attempt to justify morality comes from our concern about how we should live. It intends to tell us what we should do by showing that there are reasons for doing it. This dissertation examines how we can succeed in justifying morality rationally after investigating what it is to provide a rational basis for 'being moral' and why we seek to do it. We find in the theory of rational choice a framework which is very useful for the justification of morality. However, an examination of projects based on rational choice theory reveals that even if one adopts that framework, he is doomed to failure if he interprets reason only instrumentally. Non-instrumental rationality is primarily concerned with the rationality of ends, which can be construed in terms of Kant's conception of practical reason. With help of the rational choice framework understood non-instrumentally we can make clear how reason motivates us to moral actions and why we should follow reason.

Michael Moehler develops a novel multilevel social contract theory tailored to the conditions of societies that are deeply morally pluralistic. Such societies must cope with a variety of values and traditions: Moehler defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation.

Is it rational to be moral? How do rationality and morality fit together with being human? These questions are at the heart of David Schmidtz's exploration of the connections between rationality and morality. This inquiry leads into both metaethics and rational choice theory, as Schmidtz develops conceptions of what it is to be moral and what it is to be rational. He defends a fairly expansive conception of rational choice, considering how ends as well as means can be rationally chosen and explaining the role of self-imposed constraints in a rational life plan. His moral theory is dualistic, ranging over social structure as well as personal conduct and building both individual and collective rationality into its rules of recognition for morals. To the "why be moral" question, Schmidtz responds that being moral is rational, but he does not assume we have reasons to be rational. Instead, Schmidtz argues that being moral is rational in a particular way and that beings like us in situations like ours have reasons to be rational in just that way. This approach allows him to identify decisive reasons to be moral; at the same time, it explains why immorality is as prevalent as it is. This book thus offers a set of interesting and realistic conclusions about how morality fits into the lives of humanly rational agents operating in an institutional context like our own.

The Handbook of Business Ethics: Philosophical Foundations is a standard interdisciplinary reference handbook in the field of business ethics. Articles by notable philosophers and economists examine fundamental concepts, theories and questions of business ethics: Are morality and self-interest compatible? What is meant by a just price? What did the Scholastic philosophers think about business? The handbook will cover the entire philosophical basis of business ethics. Articles range from historical positions such as Aristotelianism, Kantianism and Marxism to systematic issues like justice, religious issues, rights and globalisation or gender. The book is intended as a reference work for academics, students (esp. graduate), and professionals.

The marriage of neuroscience and the science of choice behaviour gave birth to neuroeconomics. Jan de Jong explores this new discipline, investigating the relationship between choice behaviour and brain activity, and the light that this sheds on our systems of reasoning.

The assumption that rewards and punishments influence our choices between different courses of action underlies economic, sociological, psychological, and legal thinking about human action. Hence, the notion of a reasoning criminal--one who employs the same sorts of cognitive strategies when contemplating offending as they and the rest of us use when making other decisions--might seem a small contribution to crime control. This conclusion would be mistaken. This volume develops an alternative approach, termed the "rational choice perspective," to explain criminal behavior. Instead of emphasizing the differences between criminals and non-criminals, it stresses some of the similarities. In particular, while the contributors do not deny the existence of irrational and pathological components in crimes, they suggest that the rational aspects of offending should be explored. An international group of researchers in criminology, psychology, and economics provide a comprehensive review of original research on the criminal offender as a reasoning decision maker. While recognizing the crucial influence of situational factors, the rational choice perspective provides a framework within which to incorporate and locate existing theories about crime. In doing so it also provides both a new agenda for research and sheds a fresh light on deterrent and prevention policies.

Michael Moehler develops a novel multilevel social contract theory. In contrast to existing theories in the liberal tradition, it does not merely assume a restricted form of reasonable moral pluralism, but is tailored to the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies which may be populated by liberal moral agents, nonliberal moral agents, and, according to the traditional understanding of morality, nonmoral agents alike. Moehler draws on the history of the social contract tradition, especially the work of Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Rawls, and Gauthier, as well as on the work of some of the critics of this tradition, such as Sen and Gaus. Moehler's two-level contractarian theory holds that morality in its best contractarian version for the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies entails Humean, Hobbesian, and Kantian moral features. The theory defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure, compared to violent conflict resolution, mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply morally pluralistic societies. The theory minimizes the problem of compliance in morally diverse societies by maximally respecting the interests of all members of society. Despite its ideal nature, the theory is, in principle, applicable to the real world and, for the conditions described, most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral diversity, is unattainable. If Rawls' intention was to carry the traditional social contract argument to a higher level of abstraction, then the two-level contractarian theory brings it back down to earth.