The U.S. Army has a long record of fielding innovations that not only have enhanced its effectiveness on the battlefield but also sometimes had an impact far beyond warfare. General Editor Jon T. Hoffman has brought together eleven authors who cover the gamut from the invention of the M1 Garand rifle between the world wars through the development of the National Training Center in the 1980s. While many books lay out theories about the process of innovation or detail the history of a large-scale modernization, the collection of fourteen essays in A History of Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace fills a different niche in the literature. This work is neither a historical account of how the Army has adapted over time nor a theoretical look at models that purport to show how innovation is best achieved. Instead, it captures a representative slice of stories of soldiers and Army civilians who have demonstrated repeatedly that determination and a good idea often carry the day in peace and war. Despite the perception of bureaucratic inertia, the institution's long history of benefiting from the inventiveness of its people indicates that it is an incubator of innovation after all.

The U.S. Army has a long record of fielding innovations that not only have enhanced its effectiveness on the battlefield but also sometimes had an impact far beyond warfare. General Editor Jon T. Hoffman has brought together eleven authors who cover the gamut from the invention of the M1 Garand rifle between the world wars through the development of the National Training Center in the 1980s. While many books lay out theories about the process of innovation or detail the history of a large-scale modernization, the collection of fourteen essays in A History of Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace fills a different niche in the literature. This work is neither a historical account of how the Army has adapted over time nor a theoretical look at models that purport to show how innovation is best achieved. Instead, it captures a representative slice of stories of soldiers and Army civilians who have demonstrated repeatedly that determination and a good idea often carry the day in peace and war. Despite the perception of bureaucratic inertia, the institution's long history of benefiting from the inventiveness of its people indicates that it is an incubator of innovation after all.

The U.S. Army has a long record of fielding innovations that not only have enhanced its effectiveness on the battlefield but also sometimes had an impact far beyond warfare. General Editor Jon T. Hoffman has brought together eleven authors who cover the gamut from the invention of the M1 Garand rifle between the world wars through the development of the National Training Center in the 1980s. While many books lay out theories about the process of innovation or detail the history of a large-scale modernization, the collection of fourteen essays in A History of Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace fills a different niche in the literature. This work is neither a historical account of how the Army has adapted over time nor a theoretical look at models that purport to show how innovation is best achieved. Instead, it captures a representative slice of stories of soldiers and Army civilians who have demonstrated repeatedly that determination and a good idea often carry the day in peace and war. Despite the perception of bureaucratic inertia, the institution's long history of benefiting from the inventiveness of its people indicates that it is an incubator of innovation after all.

In the last decades, the United States Army has often been involved in missions other than conventional warfare. These include low-intensity conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and nation-building efforts. Although non-conventional warfare represents the majority of missions executed in the past sixty years, the Army still primarily plans, organizes, and trains to fight conventional ground wars. Consequently, in the last ten years, there has been considerable criticism regarding the military’s inability to accomplish tasks other than conventional war. Failed states and the threat they represent cannot be ignored or solved with conventional military might. In order to adapt to this new reality, the U.S. Army must innovate. This text examines the conditions that have allowed or prevented the U.S. Army to innovate for nation-building effectively. By doing so, it shows how military leadership and civil-military relations have changed. Nation-building refers to a type of military occupation where the goal is regime change or survival, a large number of ground troops are deployed, and both military and civilian personnel are used in the political administration of an occupied country, with the goals of establishing a productive economy and a stable government. Such tasks have always been a challenge for the U.S. military, which is not normally equipped or trained to undertake them. Using military effectiveness as the measurement of innovative success, the book analyzes several U.S. nation-building cases, including post World War II Germany, South Korea from 1945-1950, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By doing so, it reveals the conditions that enabled military innovation in one unique case (Germany) while explaining what prevented it in the others. This variation of effectiveness leads to examine prevailing military innovation theories, threat-based accounts, quality of military organizations, and civil-military relations. This text comes at a critical time as the U.S. military faces dwindling resources and tough choices about its force structure and mission orientation. It will add to the growing debate about the role of civilians, military reformers, and institutional factors in military innovation and effectiveness.

Addresses how military organizations confront the problem of adapting under the trying, terrifying conditions of war.

Just a sample of the contents ... contains over 2,800 total pages .... PROSPECTS FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN CYBERSPACE Cyberwarfare and Operational Art CYBER WARFARE GOVERNANCE: EVALUATION OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE OFFENSIVE USE OF CYBER Cyber Attacks and the Legal Justification for an Armed Response UNTYING OUR HANDS: RECONSIDERING CYBER AS A SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER Effects-Based Operations in the Cyber Domain Recommendations for Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense MILLENNIAL WARFARE IGNORING A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: THE NEED TO CREATE A SEPARATE BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR CYBER WARFARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER WARFARE LESSONS FROM THE FRONT: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN CYBER WARFARE ADAPTING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE TO CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF HACKTIVIST BASED INSURGENCIES Addressing Human Factors Gaps in Cyber Defense Airpower History and the Cyber Force of the Future How Organization for the Cyber Domain Outpaced Strategic Thinking and Forgot the Lessons of the Past THE COMMAND OF THE TREND: SOCIAL MEDIA AS A WEAPON IN THE INFORMATION AGE SPYING FOR THE RIGHT REASONS: CONTESTED NORMS IN CYBERSPACE AIR FORCE CYBERWORX REPORT: REMODELING AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND & CONTROL THE CYBER WAR: MAINTAINING AND CONTROLLING THE “KEY CYBER TERRAIN” OF THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN WHEN NORMS FAIL: NORTH KOREA AND CYBER AS AN ELEMENT OF STATECRAFT AN ANTIFRAGILE APPROACH TO PREPARING FOR CYBER CONFLICT AIR FORCE CYBER MISSION ASSURANCE SOURCES OF MISSION UNCERTAINTY Concurrency Attacks and Defenses Cyber Workforce Retention Airpower Lessons for an Air Force Cyber-Power Targeting ¬Theory IS BRINGING BACK WARRANT OFFICERS THE ANSWER? A LOOK AT HOW THEY COULD WORK IN THE AIR FORCE CYBER OPERATIONS CAREER FIELD NEW TOOLS FOR A NEW TERRAIN AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE CYBER ENVIRONMENT Learning to Mow Grass: IDF Adaptations to Hybrid Threats CHINA’S WAR BY OTHER MEANS: UNVEILING CHINA’S QUEST FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE THE ISLAMIC STATE’S TACTICS IN SYRIA: ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN SHIFTING A PEACEFUL ARAB SPRING INTO TERRORISM NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: THE KEY TO A MORE AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY TO COMBAT TERRORISM THOUGHTS INVADE US: LEXICAL COGNITION AND CYBERSPACE The Cyber Threat to Military Just-In-Time Logistics: Risk Mitigation and the Return to Forward Basing PROSPECTS FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN CYBERSPACE Cyberwarfare and Operational Art CYBER WARFARE GOVERNANCE: EVALUATION OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE OFFENSIVE USE OF CYBER Cyber Attacks and the Legal Justification for an Armed Response UNTYING OUR HANDS: RECONSIDERING CYBER AS A SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER Effects-Based Operations in the Cyber Domain Recommendations for Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense MILLENNIAL WARFARE IGNORING A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: THE NEED TO CREATE A SEPARATE BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR CYBER WARFARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER WARFARE LESSONS FROM THE FRONT: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN CYBER WARFARE ADAPTING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE TO CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF HACKTIVIST BASED INSURGENCIES Addressing Human Factors Gaps in Cyber Defense Airpower History and the Cyber Force of the Future How Organization for the Cyber Domain Outpaced Strategic Thinking and Forgot the Lessons of the Past THE COMMAND OF THE TREND: SOCIAL MEDIA AS A WEAPON IN THE INFORMATION AGE SPYING FOR THE RIGHT REASONS: CONTESTED NORMS IN CYBERSPACE AIR FORCE CYBERWORX REPORT: REMODELING AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND & CONTROL THE CYBER WAR: MAINTAINING AND CONTROLLING THE “KEY CYBER TERRAIN” OF THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN WHEN NORMS FAIL: NORTH KOREA AND CYBER AS AN ELEMENT OF STATECRAFT AN ANTIFRAGILE APPROACH TO PREPARING FOR CYBER CONFLICT AIR FORCE CYBER MISSION ASSURANCE SOURCES OF MISSION UNCERTAINTY Concurrency Attacks and Defenses Cyber Workforce Retention