The work done between 1955 and 1962 on helicopter armament and airmobile concepts provided the groundwork for large scale airmobile combat operations. Emphasis is placed on the role of the United States Continental Army Command, but Department of the Army and Transportation Corps activities are also considered.

U.S. Army aviation expanded dramatically in both size and breadth of activities after its inception in 1942, but much of its post-World War II history, particularly after the establishment of the Air Force as an independent service by the national Security Act of 1947, has been relatively neglected. Despite a certain amount of jockeying for position by both services, particularly in the early years after their separation, the Army was able to carve out a clear transport and operational combat role for its own air arm. "A History of Army Aviation - 1950-1962" examines the development of the Army's air wing, especially for air support of ground troops, both in terms of organization and in relation to the ongoing friction with the Air Force. After describing the rapid expansion of purely Army air power after 1950 and the accompanying expansion of aviation training, the book delves into the reorganization of aviation activities within a Directorate of Army Aviation. It also provides a valuable account of the successful development of aircraft armament, perhaps the most significant advance of this period. In particular, intensive experimentation at the Army Aviation School led to several practical weapons systems and helped to prove that weapons could be fired from rotary aircraft. This arming of the helicopter was to have a profound effect on both Army organization and combat doctrine, culminating in official approval of the armed helicopter by the Department of the Army in 1960. "A History of Army Aviation - 1950-1962" also explores the development of new aircraft between 1955 and 1962, including the UH-1 medical evacuation, transport, and gunship helicopter and the HC-1 cargo copter. In addition, the book discusses the Berlin Crisis of 1961 as an impetus for immediate and unexpected expansion of army aviation, quickly followed by the beginnings of intervention in Vietnam by the end of 1962.