In this paper we study the effects of policies of financial repression on long term growth and try to explain why optimizing governments might want to repress the financial sector. We also explain why inflation may be negatively related to growth, even though it does not affect growth directly. We argue that the main reason why governments repress the financial sector is that this sector is the source of "easy" resources for the public budget The source of revenue stemming from this intervention is modeled through the inflation tax. Our model has the implication that financial development reduces money demand. Hence, if the government allows for financial development the inflation tax base, and the chance to collect seigniorage, is reduced. To the extent that the financial sector increases the efficiency of the allocation of savings to productive investment, the choice of the degree of financial development will have real effects on the saving and investment rate and on the growth rate of the economy. We show that in countries where tax evasion is large the government will optimally choose to repress the financial sector in order to increase seigniorage taxation. This policy will then reduce the efficiency of the financial sector, increase the costs of intermediation, reduce the amount of investment and reduce the steady state rate of growth of the economy. Financial repression will therefore be associated with high tax evasion, low growth and high inflation.

High public debt often produces the drama of default and restructuring. But debt is also reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers via negative or belowmarket real interest rates. After WWII, capital controls and regulatory restrictions created a captive audience for government debt, limiting tax-base erosion. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debt when accompanied by inflation. For the advanced economies, real interest rates were negative 1⁄2 of the time during 1945–1980. Average annual interest expense savings for a 12—country sample range from about 1 to 5 percent of GDP for the full 1945–1980 period. We suggest that, once again, financial repression may be part of the toolkit deployed to cope with the most recent surge in public debt in advanced economies.

Financial repression (legal restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, capital movements, and other financial operations) was widely used in the past but was largely abandoned in the liberalization wave of the 1990s, as widespread support for interventionist policies gave way to a renewed conception of government as an impartial referee. Financial repression has come back on the agenda with the surge in public debt in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and some countries have reintroduced administrative ceilings on interest rates. By distorting market incentives and signals, financial repression induces losses from inefficiency and rent-seeking that are not easily quantified. This study attempts to assess some of these losses by estimating the impact of financial repression on growth using an updated index of interest rate controls covering 90 countries over 45 years. The results suggest that financial repression poses a significant drag on growth, which could amount to 0.4-0.7 percentage points.

These essays bring together a progression in monetary theory. The major theme that runs through all of the chapters is that in order to do monetary economics well in general equilibrium, it helps to have a good money demand underlying the theory. A proper underlying money demand sets up arguably the best foundation from which to make extensions of monetary economics from the basic model. At the same time that money demand is modelled, this also “endogenizes” the velocity of money. This has been a challenge in the literature that these essays solve and then use to extend basic neoclassical growth and business cycle theory. Solving this problem, in a way that is a natural, direct, and “micro-founded” extension of the standard monetary theory is the first major contribution of the collection. The second major contribution is the extension of the neoclassical monetary models, using this solution, to reinvigorate classic issues of monetary economics and take them to the frontier.

This paper analyzes long-term exchange rate modeling. The paper reviews the literature that tests for a unit root in real exchange rates and the closely related work on testing for a unit root in the residual from a regression of the nominal exchange rate on relative prices. It argues that the balance of evidence is supportive of the existence of some form of long-term exchange rate relationship. The paper highlights that the form of this relationship, however, does not accord exactly with a traditional representation of the long-term exchange rate.

This book provides a systematic and coherent framework for understanding the interactions between the micro and macro dimensions of economic adjustment policies; that is, it explores short-run macroeconomic management and structural adjustment policies aimed at promoting economic growth. It emphasizes the importance of structural microeconomic characteristics in the transmission of policy shocks and the response of the economy to adjustment policies. It has particular relevance to the economics of developing countries. The book is directed to economists interested in an overview of the economics of reform; economists in international organizations, such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank, dealing with development; and economists in developing countries. It is also a text for advanced undergraduate students pursuing a degree in economic policy and management and students in political science and public policy.

Why we need to heed the lessons of high inflation Today's global economy, with most developed nations experiencing very low inflation, seems a world apart from the "Great Inflation" that spanned the late 1960s to early 1980s. Yet, in this book, Brigitte Granville makes the case that monetary economists and policymakers need to keep the lessons learned during that period very much in mind, lest we return to them by making the same mistakes we made in the past. Granville details the advances in macroeconomic thinking that gave rise to the "Great Moderation"—a period of stable inflation and economic growth, which lasted from the mid-1980s through the most recent financial crisis. She makes the case that the central banks' management of monetary policy—hinging on expectations and credibility—brought about this period of stability, and traces the roots of this success back to the eighteenth-century foundations of modern monetary thought. Tackling fundamental questions such as the causes of inflation and its relation to unemployment and growth, the natural rate of inflation hypothesis, the fiscal theory of the price level, and the proper goals of central banks, the book aims above all to demonstrate the dangers of forgetting the role of credibility in establishing sound monetary policy. With the lessons of the past firmly in mind, Granville presents stimulating ideas and proposals about inflation-targeting principles, which provide tools for present-day monetary authorities dealing with the forces of globalization, mercantilism, and reserve accumulation.