Over the past two decades, potential adversaries have developed a wide array of means to disrupt or deny the United States and its allies access to space capabilities that are essential to their security and military operations. This situation and deepening great-power tensions have given new urgency to understanding the counterspace strategies of potential adversaries and how they can be deterred from attacking U.S. and allied space assets or be dissuaded from even developing certain counterspace capabilities. There is no broadly agreed-on framework on the nature and requirements of deterrence in space operations. This report presents such a framework. The authors begin by identifying several foundational principles of deterrence and then consider what lessons pursuit of deterrence in other domains--nuclear and cyber--have for deterrence in space. They examine the nature and requirements of deterrence in the space domain, what constitutes success in space deterrence, what thresholds might lead to a failure of deterrence, and selected national approaches to space deterrence--by China, Russia, France, Japan, and India. Integrating all these components, the authors present three archetypes for space deterrence and consider questions about their application. They conclude that a comprehensive approach to space deterrence is likely to be most successful and should be tailored to address the distinct risk calculus and informational needs of various adversaries across the phases of conflict. Strategic messaging, selective revelation of space capabilities, and development of norms of responsible space behavior can also help deter attacks on space systems.

"If the United States wishes to sustain the strategic advantages provided by outer space, then it needs a “way” to tailor activities across instruments of national power for space deterrence. This research studied the historiography of deterrence, United States deterrence policies (1950 to 1962), the historiography of the militarization of space (1940s to 1990s), and the evolution of space strategic principles for insights that built a space deterrence framework for strategists and policy makers. The proposed framework emphasizes the interaction of denial and punishment ideas across the competition continuum. Subsequently, activities across the instruments of national power and domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber) converge to deter incendiary actions that could render space systems ineffective. A key implication is the United States needs to initiate or bolster space cooperation with allies, partners, and adversaries to achieve a strong denial mechanism that remains supported by a complementary punishment-threat mechanism."--Abstract.

This book, Space Capstone Publication Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, is capstone doctrine for the United States Space Force and represents our Service's first articulation of an independent theory of spacepower. This publication answers why spacepower is vital for our Nation, how military spacepower is employed, who military space forces are, and what military space forces value. In short, this capstone document is the foundation of our professional body of knowledge as we forge an independent military Service committed to space operations. Like all doctrine, the SCP remains subject to the policies and strategies that govern its employment. Military spacepower has deterrent and coercive capacities - it provides independent options for National and Joint leadership but achieves its greatest potential when integrated with other forms of military power. As we grow spacepower theory and doctrine, we must do so in a way that fosters greater integration with the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It is only by achieving true integration and interdependence that we can hope to unlock spacepower's full potential.

This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.

Space stability appears to be eroding as a growing number of states acquire the ability to degrade or destroy U.S. space assets. The United States needs a coordinated national space deterrence strategy designed to operate on both sides of a potential adversary's cost-benefit decision calculus. Future research will determine the most effective and affordable mix of strategies, policies, and systems for strengthening space deterrence.

The authors examine the application of classical deterrence theory to the space domain and argue that to build a tailored deterrence strategy for China in space, China's own objectives should be considered.

This book examines the rise of great power competition in space, including the relevant and practical space strategies for China, Russia, the United States, and other countries. The work discusses the concepts and writings of past strategists, such as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz, in relation to warfare initiated in or extending into space. This analysis underscores why polities initiate war based upon an assessment of fear, honor, and interest, and explains why this will also be true of war in space. Based upon the timeless strategic writings of the past, the book uncovers the strategy of space warfare, along with the concepts of deterrence, dissuasion, and the inherent right of self-defense, and outlines strategies for great, medium, and emerging space powers. Additionally, it highlights changes needed to space strategy based upon the Law of Armed Conflict, norms of behavior, and Rules of Engagement. The work also examines advancements and emerging trends in the commercial space sector, as well as what these changes mean for the implementation of a practical space strategy. Given the rise of great power competition in space, this work presents a space strategy based upon historical experience. This book will be of much interest to students of space policy, strategic studies, and International Relations.