The Ministry of Defence, one of the largest landowners in the UK, has strengthened its estate planning and achieved significant receipts from disposal of property but the changes are not yet sufficient to drive value for money for the taxpayer rigorously. While the defence estate primarily exists to support defence capabilities, the Department has not matched its focus on operational needs with enough attention to efficient use of its estate assets and to reducing costs. This report acknowledges that, between 1998 and 2008, the MOD identified and took opportunities to rationalise that part of its UK estate not needed for training, generating £3.4 billion from the sale of surplus property. Nevertheless, over the same period the Department reduced the number of civilian and military personnel three times faster than it reduced its built estate. This raises a clear question about whether there are opportunities to reduce the estate further and secure cost savings and further disposal receipts. The NAO also concludes that the Department's process for categorising sites is rightly driven by operational requirements but it does not give sufficient weight to other factors such as how heavily a site is used, running costs, or potential income from sale. The MOD also lacks sufficient data centrally to conduct the necessary analysis to help it reduce costs in a structured way. This report identified five categories of information needed to identify the scope for further estate rationalisation: operational importance; utilisation; condition; potential value; and running costs.

How public land has been stolen from us. Much has been written about Britain's trailblazing post-1970s privatization program, but the biggest privatization of them all has until now escaped scrutiny: the privatization of land. Since Margaret Thatcher took power in 1979, and hidden from the public eye, about 10 per cent of the entire British land mass, including some of its most valuable real estate, has passed from public to private hands. Forest land, defence land, health service land and above all else local authority land- for farming and school sports, for recreation and housing - has been sold off en masse. Why? How? And with what social, economic and political consequences? The New Enclosure provides the first ever study of this profoundly significant phenomenon, situating it as a centrepiece of neoliberalism in Britain and as a successor programme to the original eighteenth-century enclosures. With more public land still slated for disposal, the book identifies the stakes and asks what, if anything, can and should be done.

" ... some of the papers presented at the 1st International Conference on Defence Sites: Heritage and Future held in Portsmouth"--Preface.

On 7 July 2009 the Ministry of Defence announced its plan for a Strategic Defence Review to follow the 2010 General Election. The predecessor Defence Committee reported its views on the proposed Review in its fourth report of session 2009-10 (HC 53, ISBN 9780215543912). The current Defence Committee supports the recommendation in that report that the Review be broadened in scope in order to set the country's defence needs in a stronger foreign and security policy context. It is however recognised that the inclusion of broadly defined security concerns within the Review risks the dilution of the defence contribution. Immediate or short-term security issues and threats might dominate the Review to the exclusion of the medium to long-term defence assessments made by the MoD. The Government's need to tackle the deficit is understood yet there is concern at the possible consequences of the MoD's budget not being ring-fenced for the future, unlike those of the DFID and Department of Health. The capacity of the country even to sustain current in-use capabilities and therefore current operations could well be put at risk by the proposed cuts of between 10% and 20%. This report looks at these risks and the specific issues, including those of public consultation and the speed at which the Review process is being undertaken, involved

The Ministry of Defence (the Department) is responsible for over £42 billion of annual expenditure. It has failed to exercise the robust financial management necessary to control its resources effectively in the long term, and there is a shortfall in planned expenditure against likely funding of up to £36 billion over the next ten years. The Department's consistent pattern of planned overspend demonstrates serious organisational failings and a dangerous culture of optimism. There are systemic failings: a tendency towards financial over-commitment, weaknesses in the financial planning processes and a division in responsibilities and accountability for financial stewardship. The Accounting Officer has not discharged his responsibility to ensure that expenditure represents value for money, and there is no explicit financial strategy linking funding to priorities. When financial savings have to be found there is then no clear basis for determining where cuts should be made. The appointment of a professionally qualified Finance Director is welcomed. The defence estate is valued at over £20 billion, and costs an estimated £2.9 billion per year to run. The built estate in the UK has been reduced by 4.3% between 1998 and 2008, achieving £3.4 billion in sale receipts. But more of the estate should have been released. The Department does not assess its estate against clear objective criteria. The Department does not collect centrally the information and data that would allow it to manage its estate in an effective way. It appears to lack urgency in its plans to improve its information base.

The Department's approach to reducing its headcount has been largely in accordance with good practice and, up to now, it has acted in a way that is consistent with value for money. However, the urgent need for the Department to cut costs means it is having to cut its headcount in advance of planning in detail how it will operate in the future, thereby risking making current skills shortages worse. The Department plans to cut its civilian workforce by 29,000 and its armed forces by 25,000. To meet these targets, the MOD has started a redundancy programme and a Voluntary Early Release Scheme, both of which run in several tranches. The most recent estimates by the Department are that the process will cost £0.9 billion and produce £4.1 billion in cost reductions (just over £3 billion net). The potential savings fluctuate with the timing of the redundancy tranches (a delay of three months to the second military tranche has reduced savings from this tranche alone by an estimated £100 million to £138 million to 2015). The Department now has to reduce the numbers in the Army by a further 5,000 by 2015 but has not worked out in detail how it will do this. Delays to the process erode the level of potential savings as the Department continues to pay salaries, benefits and contributions to pensions. Without real changes to ways of working, cutting headcount is likely to result in the Department's doing less with fewer people or, alternatively, trying to do the same with greater risk

Ministry of Defence : The Governments expenditure plans 2005-06 To 2007-08