In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Beijing decided to review its plans for expanding nuclear power in China. It appears likely that China will shift its ambitious nuclear construction program away from older designs to modern technology provided by foreign vendors. Although there are no indications that China is reconsidering its decision to build two additional nuclear power reactors in Pakistan, which are based on technology Beijing will probably abandon domestically, the accident in Japan provides Beijing with an opportunity to pause and contemplate conditioning its cooperation with Pakistan on improvements in nuclear safety and security. During such a pause, Beijing could consider the possibility of developing within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) a criteria-based approach to nuclear cooperation with states lacking full-scope safeguards (FSS). This strategy would be invoked irrespective of other discussions about future NSG membership and criteria that might be considered in that context. A criteria-based approach would provide a roadmap for states without FSS, including Pakistan, to qualify for civil nuclear cooperation, thus placing China's current and future nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in an NSG process. The lynchpin in this approach is incentivizing China through the licensing of foreign reactor technology, so that China sees greater economic potential in achieving its longer-term ambition of becoming a nuclear exporter than in its shorter-term deals with Pakistan. Such an approach could help resolve persistent questions about the NSG's future, which were raised by the U.S.-India nuclear deal and by Russia's previous nuclear commerce with India. This strategy thus has the potential to resolve this issue in a way that strengthens the NSG, provides China with incentives to reconsider its cooperation with Pakistan, and gives Pakistan the international legitimacy it desperately seeks.

This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and nonproliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements, considering scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities.

This book suggests a new bargain between the NPT nuclear weapon states and the non-NPT nuclear weapons possessor states, mainly India and Pakistan, through a regional arrangement to help move towards universalization of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The author analyses nuclear proliferation drivers to understand why states acquire and justify possession of nuclear weapons even though most nuclear weapon states no longer are faced with an existential threat to their national security. This study also identifies various challenges being faced by the NPT based nuclear nonproliferation regime, which if left unaddressed, could unravel the nonproliferation regime. It also offers the history of confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, which could be a useful reference for negotiating a Regional Nonproliferation Regime (RNR) in the future.

As argued throughout this paper, in order to understand the complex reasons behind the lack of India–Pakistan NDS it is important to examine the causes of the enmity between them, the product of a historic rivalry largely based on territorial disputes. Whereas the United States and the former Soviet Union achieved relative stability at the nuclear level, their disdain for one another was channeled through proxy wars that increased instability at the sub-conventional level, as exemplified by the protracted Vietnam War. India and Pakistan, however, are locked into instability at the nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional levels, a situation made worse by their close geographical proximity and ongoing disputes over natural resources. In reality, the the small steps Delhi and Islamabad have taken over the last three decades – namely the half-hearted implementation of various confidence building measures (CBM) – have done little to promote NDS. The study identifies four prominent factors which could potentially improve India–Pakistan NDS: increased regional economic integration; domestic politics in favor of détente; a precedent of successful treaties; and the involvement of external arbiters in reducing South Asian nuclear deterrence instability.

Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents is a series that provides primary source documents and expert commentary on various topics relating to the worldwide effort to combat terrorism, as well as efforts by the United States and other nations to protect their national security interests. Volume 145, The North Korean Threat, examines the strategies adopted by the United States, China, and the international community in response to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. The volume includes a selection of documents chosen to illustrate developments in this area from 2010 through 2016, with commentary from series editor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. The documents in this volume include 2016 UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, Congressional Research Service reports covering various aspects of the U.S. response to North Korea's nuclear program, a U.S. Department of Defense report prepared for Congress on military and security developments related to North Korea, and a detailed description of the U.S. sanctions program against North Korea from the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents is a series that provides primary source documents and expert commentary on various topics relating to the worldwide effort to combat terrorism, as well as efforts by the United States and other nations to protect their national security interests. Volume 145, The North Korean Threat, examines the strategies adopted by the United States, China, and the international community in response to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. The volume includes a selection of documents chosen to illustrate developments in this area from 2010 through 2016, with commentary from series editor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. The documents in this volume include 2016 UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, Congressional Research Service reports covering various aspects of the U.S. response to North Korea's nuclear program, a U.S. Department of Defense report prepared for Congress on military and security developments related to North Korea, and a detailed description of the U.S. sanctions program against North Korea from the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

There is a high risk that someone will use, by accident or design, one or more of the 17,000 nuclear weapons in the world today. Many thought such threats ended with the Cold War or that current policies can prevent or contain nuclear disaster. They are dead wrong—these weapons, possessed by states large and small, stable and unstable, remain an ongoing nightmare. Joe Cirincione surveys the best thinking and worst fears of experts specializing in nuclear warfare and assesses the efforts to reduce or eliminate these nuclear dangers. His book offers hope: in the 1960s, twenty-three states had nuclear weapons and research programs; today, only ten states have weapons or are seeking them. More countries have abandoned nuclear weapon programs than have developed them, and global arsenals are just one-quarter of what they were during the Cold War. Yet can these trends continue, or are we on the brink of a new arms race—or worse, nuclear war? A former member of President Obama’s nuclear policy team, Cirincione helped shape the policies unveiled in Prague in 2009, and, as president of an organization intent on reducing nuclear threats, he operates at the center of debates on nuclear terrorism, new nuclear nations, and the risks of existing arsenals.