Cursory allusions to the relation between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are common in philosophical literature, but there has been little in the way of serious and comprehensive commentary on the relationship of their ideas. Genia Sch?nbaumsfeld closes this gap and offers new readings of Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of philosophy and religious belief. Chapter one documents Kierkegaard's influence on Wittgenstein, while chapters two and three provide trenchant criticisms of two prominent attempts to compare the two thinkers, those by D. Z. Phillips and James Conant. In chapter four, Sch?nbaumsfeld develops Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's concerted criticisms of certain standard conceptions of religious belief, and defends their own positive conception against the common charges of 'irrationalism' and 'fideism'. As well as contributing to contemporary debate about how to read Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's work, A Confusion of the Spheres addresses issues which not only concern scholars of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, but anyone interested in the philosophy of religion, or the ethical aspects of philosophical practice as such.

To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency among adherents of different faith traditions to invoke asymmetric explanations of the religious value or salvific status of the home religion vis-à-vis all others. Attributions of good/bad religious luck and exclusivist dismissal of the significance of religious disagreement are the central phenomena that the book studies. Part I lays out a taxonomy of kinds of religious luck, a taxonomy that draws upon but extends work on moral and epistemic luck. It asks: What is going on when persons, theologies, or purported revelations ascribe various kinds of religiously-relevant traits to insiders and outsiders of a faith tradition in sharply asymmetric fashion? “I am saved but you are lost”; “My religion is holy but yours is idolatrous”; “My faith tradition is true, and valued by God, but yours is false and valueless.” Part II further develops the theory introduced in Part I, pushing forward both the descriptive/explanatory and normative sides of what the author terms his inductive risk account. Firstly, the concept of inductive risk is shown to contribute to the needed field of comparative fundamentalism by suggesting new psychological markers of fundamentalist orientation. The second side of what is termed an inductive risk account is concerned with the epistemology of religious belief, but more especially with an account of the limits of reasonable religious disagreement. Problems of inductively risky modes of belief-formation problematize claims to religion-specific knowledge. But the inductive risk account does not aim to set religion apart, or to challenge the reasonableness of religious belief tout court. Rather the burden of the argument is to challenge the reasonableness of attitudes of religious exclusivism, and to demotivate the “polemical apologetics” that exclusivists practice and hope to normalize.

The Illusion of Doubt confronts one of the most important questions in philosophy: what can we know? The radical sceptic's answer is 'not very much' if we cannot prove that we are not subject to (permanent) deception. This book shows that the radical sceptical problem is an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation.

In 1795 London, Jonathan Absey of the Home Office pursues dual investigations into French espionage in Britain and the still unsolved murder of his teenage daughter, a pursuit that leads to a bizarre society of astronomers called the Company of Titius whose quest for a long-lost star leads ever closer to his own probe. A first novel. 75,000 first printing.

Since the publication of its first edition, this book has served as one of the few available on the classical Adams spectral sequence, and is the best account on the Adams-Novikov spectral sequence. This new edition has been updated in many places, especially the final chapter, which has been completely rewritten with an eye toward future research in the field. It remains the definitive reference on the stable homotopy groups of spheres. The first three chapters introduce the homotopy groups of spheres and take the reader from the classical results in the field though the computational aspects of the classical Adams spectral sequence and its modifications, which are the main tools topologists have to investigate the homotopy groups of spheres. Nowadays, the most efficient tools are the Brown-Peterson theory, the Adams-Novikov spectral sequence, and the chromatic spectral sequence, a device for analyzing the global structure of the stable homotopy groups of spheres and relating them to the cohomology of the Morava stabilizer groups. These topics are described in detail in Chapters 4 to 6. The revamped Chapter 7 is the computational payoff of the book, yielding a lot of information about the stable homotopy group of spheres. Appendices follow, giving self-contained accounts of the theory of formal group laws and the homological algebra associated with Hopf algebras and Hopf algebroids. The book is intended for anyone wishing to study computational stable homotopy theory. It is accessible to graduate students with a knowledge of algebraic topology and recommended to anyone wishing to venture into the frontiers of the subject.

The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard brings together some of the most distinguished contemporary contributors to Kierkegaard research together with some of the more gifted younger commentators on Kierkegaard's work. There is significant input from scholars based in Copenhagen's Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, as well as from philosophers and theologians from Britain, Germany, and the United States. Part 1 presents some of the philological, historical, and contextual work that has been produced in recent years, establishing a firm basis for the more interpretative essays found in following parts. This includes looking at the history of his published and unpublished works, his cultural and social context, and his relation to Romanticism, German Idealism, the Church, the Bible, and theological traditions. Part 2 moves from context and background to the exposition of some of the key ideas and issues in Kierkegaard's writings. Attention is paid to his style, his treatment of ethics, culture, society, the self, time, theology, love, irony, and death. Part 3 looks at the impact of Kierkegaard's thought and at how it continues to influence philosophy, theology, and literature. After an examination of issues around translating Kierkegaard, this section includes comparisons with Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, as well as examining his role in modern theology, moral theology, phenomenology, postmodernism, and literature.

What would you do if you disappear into the earth’s Core to find a new civilization? A civilization with plans to use you, to annihilate humanity? What if it was too late to realize that you were taking bullets for the one behind the trigger? Would you sacrifice what you must-who you must? How will you choose between what you know, and what you feel? “I can’t live a lie. I can’t run from my life.” Jacelyn and the Cruman Prince and the Mantlanian Princess choose to stand and fight. To change what must be changed, save what must be saved...and destroy what must be destroyed in the Earth. Will they remain like stars that never saw the sky? Or will they become legends whose names will never die?