Transnational private regulation (TPR) is a growing phenomenon. It creates new markets and dissolves old ones. TPR contributes to the regulation of existing markets, it increases the protection of fundamental rights and it enables or disables communities to participate in global rule making. The standing of TPR and its role regulatory control continues to grow. TPR presents new characteristics departing from more conventional forms of domestic self-regulation. It reflects a transfer of regulatory power from the domestic to the transnational and from the public to the private sphere with significant distributional consequences. The Report addresses the development of transnational private regulation in three macro-areas: financial markets, consumer protection and fundamental rights. It encompasses 11 case studies focusing on four dimensions: legitimacy, quality, effectiveness and enforcement.

Most recent studies on transnational private regulation have limited themselves to the examination of a single regime, industry or sector. This book fills a gap in the current literature, offering a rich comparative study of the institutional design of transnational private regulation in the fields of advertising and food safety. The author provides original insights in the practice of enforcing transnational private regulation and its interplay with courts and administrative authorities. The book's findings, drawn from jurisdictions in the European Union, help identify circumstances in which administrative enforcement may strengthen private enforcement mechanisms, illuminate the role of courts in enforcing transnational private regulation, and inform current theoretical understandings of the function of public enforcement capacity in private regulatory regimes. This book will appeal to scholars and students of regulation and enforcement, as well as policy makers and lawmakers concerned with advertising and food safety regulation.

'Globalization pushes the boundaries of markets. Alongside the greater "goods" of transnational economic activity come the "bads" of unregulated conduct. This important book looks to the new frontiers of legal intervention to make sure that global markets do not run riot over important public values. The signal contribution is not the search for ever higher levels of transnational authority – the susperstates of a brave new world – but empowering numerous private actors to enforce legal norms in our fast-changing economic environment.' – Samuel Issacharoff, New York University, School of Law, US This book addresses the different mechanisms of enforcement deployed in transnational private regimes vis-à-vis those in the field of public transnational law. Enforcement represents a key dimension in measuring the effectiveness and legitimacy of transnational private regulation. This detailed book shifts the focus from rule-making to enforcement and compliance, and moves from a vertical analysis to a comparative sectoral analysis. Both public and private transnational regulation fall under the scrutiny of the authors, and the book considers the effectiveness of judicial models of enforcement – under international law and through national courts – and of non-judicial means. Comparisons are drawn across sectors including international commercial law, labor law, finance, Internet regulation and advertising. Enforcement of Transnational Regulation will appeal to scholars of both private and public law, regulation and comparative law. It will also prove a stimulating and challenging read for policy-makers and law-makers.

Transnational regulations, often established by private bodies, play a large and important role in the international political economy. This paper makes two contributions to the literature on transnational regulation. First, governments and international organization often legitimate the delegation of regulatory authority to transnational private bodies with efficiency gains. It is rare, however, that the alleged gains are empirically examined, which requires a comparative analysis vis-à-vis other regulatory regimes. I contrast rule-making for manufactured goods and financial reporting, where a single transnational private body is the clear focal point for rule-making at the international level, with purely domestic regulatory regimes and the prior attempts to establish international product and financial standards through negotiations between governments or public regulators. I show that the shift to transnational (private) regulation indeed brought real, substantial gains in the effectiveness and efficiency of rule-making. Second, I scrutinize the distributional consequences of transnational private regulation, which I submit are closely related to the efficiency gains. Here, the existing literature focuses on the distribution of the financial costs and benefits of specific rules among those who are the targets of such rules, given a particular regulatory regime. Institutional complementarity theory provides a powerful analytical framework for examining such distributional effects. In this paper, I push the framework further to examine the distributional consequences of the shift to transnational private regulation. I argue that this shift has persistent structural consequences for the relative power of a broad range of stakeholders (both within and across countries) and thus for their regulatory capabilities.

Document from the year 2017 in the subject Law - Civil / Private / Trade / Anti Trust Law / Business Law, grade: A, language: English, abstract: The major problem associated with the regulation of transnational mergers, which affect several national markets, is the allocation of jurisdiction. Each country concerned may wish to exert jurisdiction and apply its national competition law to regulate the anti-competitive effects a merger may have in its territory. However, this approach may lead to risks of inconsistent decisions regarding the legality of mergers. Indeed, the national competition laws applied by the regulating authorities may diverge in several aspects, which raise the likelihood of inconsistency. The authors advocates the creation of an international merger control framework (IMCF) for the regulation of transnational mergers. This framework will rest on an informal and a formal pillar. The former includes non-legally binding competition principles. Consistency of these principles with the concepts of legitimacy and efficiency, as well as the presence of peer reviews and assistance programmes, should lower the risk of non-implementation. The formal pillar includes bilateral cooperation agreements which apply to merger affecting the countries which have concluded the agreements. As essential pre-condition for the application of bilateral agreements, the level of cooperation achieved by such agreements should be at least equal to that ensured by the informal pillar. The last part of the study addresses and examines the long and complex processes in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions. M&A arbitration faces certain difficulties during the transaction. Such difficulties the author seeks to underline. Two main problems of arbitration in M&A transactions, particullarly, have been covered. Firstly, the problem of consent in consolidation of parallel proceedings during M&A transactions, and, secondly parties' consent that validate arbitration agreem

The Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation: Conceptual and Constitutional Debates presents an extensive treatment of the constitutional dimensions of transnational private regulation, including its sources of power and modes of accountability. Represents the first extensive treatment of the phenomenon of transnational private regulation Offers conceptual and theoretical innovation in considering the significance of transnational private regulation and its relationship to governmental activity in hybrid regimes Analyzes constitutional issues surrounding the emergence of transnational private regulation