Ilie Bădescu and Joseph Livni follow the footsteps of two giants who pioneered the field: H. H. Stahl of Romania, who studied the sociology of communal societies, and D. J. Elazar of the United States, who studied the political science of covenantal societies. This collection sheds light on obscure corners of the field, gathering up thoughts and concepts of many other sources of past and contemporary research in the field. In this volume, the reader will find answers to difficult questions like: How did acephalous societies penetrate civilization? How did they manage to preserve their egalitarian ethos? Why did powerful hierarchies work in partnership with them? And, most importantly, how did covenantal societies work around the constraints of a civilized reality? The history of civilization consists of various degrees of stratified configurations ranging from oligarchic city states to powerful pyramidal empires.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can make a vital contribution to public health and health systems but harnessing their potential is complex in a Europe where government-CSO relations vary so profoundly. This study is intended to outline some of the challenges and assist policy-makers in furthering their understanding of the part CSOs can play in tandem and alongside government. To this end it analyses existing evidence and draws on a set of seven thematic chapters and six mini case studies. They examine experiences from Austria Bosnia-Herzegovina Belgium Cyprus Finland Germany Malta the Netherlands Poland the Russian Federation Slovenia Turkey and the European Union and make use of a single assessment framework to understand the diverse contexts in which CSOs operate. The evidence shows that CSOs are ubiquitous varied and beneficial and the topics covered in this study reflect such diversity of aims and means: anti-tobacco advocacy food banks refugee health HIV/AIDS prevention and cure and social partnership. CSOs make a substantial contribution to public health and health systems with regards to policy development service delivery and governance. This includes evidence provision advocacy mobilization consensus building provision of medical services and of services related to the social determinants of health standard setting self-regulation and fostering social partnership. However in order to engage successfully with CSOs governments do need to make use of adequate tools and create contexts conducive to collaboration. To guide policy-makers working with CSOs through such complications and help avoid some potential pitfalls the book outlines a practical framework for such collaboration. This suggests identifying key CSOs in a given area; clarifying why there should be engagement with civil society; being realistic as to what CSOs can or will achieve; and an understanding of how CSOs can be helped to deliver.

Drawing on data from ethnographic fieldwork among civic activists and identifying a range of domestic and international socio-political contexts, Refractions of Civil Society in Turkey explores different perceptions of civil society in Turkey and pursues the general question of why civil society holds such power to move those who evoke it.

This book attempts to reveal Karl Marx’s philosophical critique of the social being in capitalist societies from the text of Capital. Marxists’ different understandings of Capital in different historical periods reveal the rich meaning of Capital, which plays an important role in promoting Marxian philosophy. These different modes of interpretation also mean that the understanding of Capital is endless, because re-reading of Capital will always open up a new realm for the interpretation of Marxian philosophy. Since the financial crisis in 2008, Capital has once again become a hot topic in academic fields. However, in these new interpretations, there is no fundamental breakthrough in the illustration of Marx’s thought, because some either stick to the discussions in pure economic fields, some the revision of Marx’s manuscripts from the perspective of literature compilation, others the role of Engels’ edition. The popularity of Capital mainly stays in a certain emotion and in the internal requirements of critical reflection on capitalist society.

The book begins with familiar designs found all around and inside us (such as the ‘trees’ of river basins, human lungs, blood and city traffic). It then shows how all flow systems are driven by power from natural engines everywhere, and how they are endlessly shaped because of freedom. Finally, Professor Bejan explains how people, like everything else that moves on earth, are driven by power derived from our “engines” that consume fuel and food, and that our movement dissipates the power completely and changes constantly for greater access, economies of scale, efficiency, innovation and life. Written for wide audiences of all ages, including readers interested in science, patterns in nature, similarity and non-uniformity, history and the future, and those just interested in having fun with ideas, the book shows how many “design change” concepts acquire a solid scientific footing and how they exist with the evolution of nature, society, technology and science.

"Structure and rules are, in fact, central to the answer. Workplace interactions are constrained by economic power and necessity, and often by legal regulation. They exist far from the civic ideal of free and equal citizens voluntarily associating for shared ends. Yet it is the very involuntariness of these interactions that helps to make the often-troubled project of racial integration comparatively successful at work. People can be forced to get along - not without friction, but often with surprising success.".

The history of the United States in the last thirty years, its preoccupation with the Vietnam War and the devastating affects of that war on the psyche of this nation is evidence of a foreign policy tragedy. Foreign policy tragedy brings domestic tragedy in its wake. The purpose of this study is to work out why the approaches to social revolution--and that is what the Vietnam War was about--have been wrong on both sides of the ideological spectrum the last thirty years in the U.S., point out why they were wrong, point to where they were wrong, and point to the consequences of acting in a society when the perceptions are in certain respects wrong. Let me sum up my perception on what went wrong in Vietnam. It was a Right wing war fought on Left wing premises. It was a war that could not have been won because those who designed it would not or could not win it--but were also afraid of losing it. It was a war that was wrongly perceived by both sides of the ideological spectrum. The Liberal argument was that America tried everything and still' lost it! The Conservative argument was that it could have been won if the opposition had not tied their hands, keeping them from an all out effort that would have been required to win it. The war was started in earnest by the Liberals under Kennedy. The strategy was to roll up the enemy by hitting on the peasant and through it, cut off the leaders. Pacification, education, re-education, indoctrination, and the introduction of self-defense' techniques to the South Vietnamese peasants was meant to stop the revolution exported from the North in its tracks. The U.S. policy was predicated on the assumption that the peasants really had something to do with the ruling functions of the North Vietnamese revolution after Thermidor; that after the onset of Thermidor--after the institutionalization' of the revolution--in Hanoi, the revolution' was still revolution. The Liberal' approach has believed that revolution is tantamount to Mao's view of it in China--peasants all immersed in the revolutionary process as fish in the sea'. And so you would have to drain the very ocean itself to stop it. Our' approach to the post revolutionary process is that after' the onset of Thermidor in a society, revolution' is a bunch of terror informed super bureaucrats at the center' of a society increasingly cut off from the periphery. In a post revolutionary society, it is the leaders that matter--not the fish in the sea'. So bombing the small fish' into fish soup hell in response--as did the West' in Vietnam in that war--every tree, every outhouse, every shack, and every village, until they drop so much ordinance that the entire region is brain dead from defoliants and pockmarks and natural calamities, while leaving the center' untouched, would seem insane. Yet that was the policy in Vietnam of America. And then nothing happened! Nothing happened week after week, year after year except that America itself was being driven mad doing the same thing, and expecting it to come out different. That, as the President-elect said in 1993, was and is insanity. But what choice did they all have? The pro-war liberal American leadership that designed the war in Vietnam did not dare bomb Hanoi, the capitol of North Vietnam, for fear of triggering World War III with Red China and with Soviet Russia--both of whose client North Vietnam was. So they tied their own hands, figuring that by coming through the back door, fish in the sea' style, piece by piece, nobody will notice in China and Russia; ergo no World War III. So they took a strategy that was insane, and made a virtue out of its necessity. They tied their own hand! And then they blamed the opposition for forcing them to fight with their hands tied behind their backs. On the other h