"NATO structure has undergone various changes since the ratification of the alliance in 1949. Following WWII, the need for a strong, allied Western Europe was necessary to prevent further expansion and influence from the Soviet Union as the Cold War began. US military strategy at this time saw the need for a large number of US forces to support European allies from Soviet expansion. During the Cold War, US and European allies were facing contention over the number of US troops in Europe, burden sharing of security, and leadership over allied forces. The cost of keeping many forces in Europe and a reluctance to fully share military technology, intelligence, and equipment with allied nations waned on both the US domestically and allied partner nations. Following the Cold War, the US withdrew many of their forces and focused on simultaneously supporting the expansion of NATO, specifically towards Central and Eastern Europe. This allowed a US forward presence to remain but allowed new member nations to fill the void left behind from its Cold War peak. During this time the US began to share and hand over military commands to other partner nations. This restructure in the 1990s resulted in a narrower command structure and new military strategies. These strategies followed the premise that NATOs military units from partner nations are separable but not separate. This allows and set the precedence for the US military to operate independently or with other NATO member's militaries when conducting NATO operations. In order to bridge the various military units across their membership, NATO began to conduct exercises and update strategy to focus on shared equipment and doctrine amongst members. By the end of restructuring in the 1990s, NATO had forged shared responsibility and made progress towards shared, streamlined military leadership, but the US still ensured a forward-reaching presence and control over military operations."--Abstract.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last The sudden disintegration of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995 led to a series of violent armed ethnic conflicts that resulted in the deaths of more than a quarter-million civilians and almost 1.5 million refugees. Although NATO forces were able to end these conflicts and bring stability to most of the region, a brief flare-up occurred in 1998-99 in the autonomous province of Kosovo, which was part of Serbia. After a sustained bombing campaign against the Serbian aggressors, the United States Army entered the troubled province and eventually enforced a tenuous peace between the Kosovars and Serbs. This brief study chronicles the origins of U.S. involvement and the peace enforcement operation that followed through 2005. Military leaders, peace negotiators, military science, AP high school global studies students, and international relations students may find this resource helpful for research papers. Historians, especially military historians and political scientists may also be interested in this work. Related products: Yugoslavia From "National Communism" to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948-1990 (Book and CD-ROM) is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00252-0 Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Center of Military History can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1061 "

Scholarship on NATO is often preoccupied with key episodes in the development of the organisation and so, for the most part, has remained inattentive to theory. This book addresses that gap in the literature. It provides a comprehensive analysis of NATO through a range of theoretical perspectives that includes realism, liberalism and constructivism, and lesser-known approaches centred on learning, public goods, securitisation and risk. Focusing on NATO’s post-Cold War development, it considers the conceptualisation, purpose and future of the Alliance. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of international organisation, international relations, security and European Politics.

This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.