We develop a New Keynesian model with household heterogeneity and bounded rationality in the form of cognitive discounting. The interaction of household heterogeneity and bounded rationality generates amplification of monetary and fiscal policy through indirect general equilibrium effects while simultaneously ruling out the forward guidance puzzle and remaining stable at the effective lower bound. Thus, the model can account for recent empirical findings on the transmission mechanisms and effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. When abstracting from either household heterogeneity or bounded rationality the model fails to do so. Our framework nests a broad range of existing models, none of which can be consistent with all these empirical facts simultaneously. According to our model, central banks have to increase interest rates more strongly than in the rational model after an inflationary supply shock to fully stabilize inflation. While fully stabilizing inflation keeps output at potential, higher real interest rates mainly benefit wealthy households and increase the cost of government debt, leading to a substantial increase in government debt and inequality. Our model thus indicates a more pronounced trade off between aggregate efficiency and price stability on one hand, and distributional consequences and fiscal sustainability on the other hand.

We analyze the optimal window length in the average inflation targeting rule within a Behavioral THANK model of Pfäuti and Seyrich (2022). The central bank faces an occasionally binding effective lower bound (ELB) or persistent supply shocks and can also use quantitative easing when we merge Pfäuti and Seyrich (2022) with Sims et al. (2020). We show that the optimal averaging period is infinitely long in the case of a conventional degree of myopia. However, finite yet long-lasting window lengths dominate for a higher cognitive discounting. We solve the model locally and globally to disentangle the effects of uncertainty about hitting the ELB in the future, leading to a downward inflation bias in the case of the global solution. Given the solution technique, the welfare loss difference is considerably decreasing in the degree of history dependence.Appendix available https://ssrn.com/abstract=4359563.

This paper presents a framework for analyzing how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy. The model is a tractable and parsimonious enrichment of the widely-used New Keynesian model – with one main new parameter, which quantifies how poorly agents understand future policy and its impact. That myopia parameter, in turn, affects the power of monetary and fiscal policy in a microfounded general equilibrium. A number of consequences emerge. (i) Fiscal stimulus or \helicopter drops of money" are powerful and, indeed, pull the economy out of the zero lower bound. More generally, the model allows for the joint analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy. (ii) The Taylor principle is strongly modified: even with passive monetary policy, equilibrium is determinate, whereas the traditional rational model yields multiple equilibria, which reduce its predictive power, and generates indeterminate economies at the zero lower bound (ZLB). (iii) The ZLB is much less costly than in the traditional model. (iv) The model helps solve the “forward guidance puzzle”: the fact that in the rational model, shocks to very distant rates have a very powerful impact on today's consumption and inflation: because agents are partially myopic, this effect is muted. (v) Optimal policy changes qualitatively: the optimal commitment policy with rational agents demands “nominal GDP targeting”; this is not the case with behavioral firms, as the benefits of commitment are less strong with myopic forms. (vi) The model is “neo-Fisherian” in the long run, but Keynesian in the short run: a permanent rise in the interest rate decreases inflation in the short run but increases it in the long run. The non-standard behavioral features of the model seem warranted by the empirical evidence.

Our very simple two agent New Keynesian model is highly stylised. It consists of an entrepreneur, who owns the economies' firms, consumes and saves, but does not work (or does not receive wage income), while the worker consumes and works, but cannot save. The allocation of the ability to save only to entrepreneurs instead of only workers differentiates our model from the only similarly simple model we are aware of Broer et al. (2016). As opposed to Broer et al. (2016), who additionally require the introduction of sticky wages in their saving-worker-nonsaving-entrepreneur-model we find that our heterogeneous agent version gives qualitatively quite similar impulse responses to a monetary policy shocks already in the baseline version with sticky-prices only. Quantitatively, the response of monetary policy is weaker in the heterogeneous agent model, hinting at the importance of (the correct representation of) heterogeneity for the transmission of monetary policy. Additionally, the model allows to consider distributional effects in the wake of a shock. They appear to be in line with empirics for monetary and preference shocks.

This paper introduces model uncertainty into a behavioral New Keynesian DSGE framework and derives robust optimal monetary policies. We build a heterogeneous agents DSGE model, where a fraction of agents behave according to some forms of bounded rationality (boundedly rational agents), while the reminder operate on the basis of expectations that are corrected on average (rational agents). We consider two potential mechanisms of expectations formation to generate beliefs. The central bank observes the aggregate economic dynamics, but it ignores the fraction of boundedly rational agents and/or the mechanism they use to form their expectations. Non-Bayesian robust control techniques are then adopted to minimize a welfare loss derived from the second-order approximation of agents' utilities. We account of model uncertainty considering both commitment and discretion regime.

In mainstream economics, and particularly in New Keynesian macroeconomics, the booms and busts that characterize capitalism arise because of large external shocks. The combination of these shocks and the slow adjustments of wages and prices by rational agents leads to cyclical movements. In this book, Paul De Grauwe argues for a different macroeconomics model--one that works with an internal explanation of the business cycle and factors in agents' limited cognitive abilities. By creating a behavioral model that is not dependent on the prevailing concept of rationality, De Grauwe is better able to explain the fluctuations of economic activity that are an endemic feature of market economies. This new approach illustrates a richer macroeconomic dynamic that provides for a better understanding of fluctuations in output and inflation. De Grauwe shows that the behavioral model is driven by self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism, or animal spirits. Booms and busts in economic activity are therefore natural outcomes of a behavioral model. The author uses this to analyze central issues in monetary policies, such as output stabilization, before extending his investigation into asset markets and more sophisticated forecasting rules. He also examines how well the theoretical predictions of the behavioral model perform when confronted with empirical data. Develops a behavioral macroeconomic model that assumes agents have limited cognitive abilities Shows how booms and busts are characteristic of market economies Explores the larger role of the central bank in the behavioral model Examines the destabilizing aspects of asset markets

The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses.