Persuasivo e humano para com a humanidade, este clássico da filosofia representa um dos mais significativos tratados de ética do século XIX. A Base da Moralidade oferece o exame mais completo de Schopenhauer de temas éticos tradicionais e articula uma forma descritiva de ética que contradiz as teorias prescritivas racionalmente baseadas. A partir de sua polêmica contra a ética do dever de Kant, Schopenhauer antecipa os críticos contemporâneos da filosofia moral. Argumentando que a compaixão forma a base da moralidade, ele esboça uma perspectiva sobre ética na qual paixão e desejo correspondem a diferentes personagens morais, comportamentos e visões de mundo. Em conclusão, Schopenhauer define sua metafísica da moral, empregando o idealismo transcendental de Kant para ilustrar tanto a interconectividade do ser quanto a afinidade de sua ética com o pensamento oriental. "Após considerações preliminares, em parte para mostrar a dificuldade do assunto, em parte para limpar o terreno (Parte I.), o tratado abre com uma crítica penetrante da Base Ética de Kant, do Princípio Principal de seu sistema e de suas formas derivadas. (Parte II, Capítulos I.-VI.) [4] A conclusão de Schopenhauer é que o Imperativo Categórico é uma teia muito habilmente tecida, mas na realidade nada mais que a velha base teológica disfarçada, sendo esta última o indispensável, embora invisível, prendedor de roupa para o primeiro; e que o tour de main de Kant de deduzir sua Teologia Moral da Ética é como inverter uma pirâmide. A teoria da Consciência é discutida a seguir (Capítulo VII). O elemento semi-sobrenatural que Kant introduziu sob a forma altamente dramática de um tribunal de justiça realizando uma sessão secreta no peito é examinado e eliminado; e Consciência é definida como o conhecimento que temos de nós mesmos por meio de nossos atos."

We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.

A/Moral Economics is an interdisciplinary historical study that examines the ways which social "science" of economics emerged through the discourse of the literary, namely the dominant moral and fictional narrative genres of early and mid-Victorian England. In particular, this book argues that the classical economic theory of early-nineteenth-century England gained its broad cultural authority not directly, through the well- known texts of such canonical economic theorists as David Ricardo, but indirectly through the narratives constructed by Ricardo's popularizers John Ramsey McCulloch and Harriet Martineau. By reexamining the rhetorical and institutional contexts of classical political economy in the nineteenth century, A/Moral Economics repositions the popular writings of both supporters and detractors of political economy as central to early political economists' bids for a cultural voice. The now marginalized economic writings of McCulloch, Martineau, Henry Mayhew, and John Ruskin, as well as the texts of Charles Dickens and J. S. Mill, must be read as constituting in part the entities they have been read as merely criticizing. It is this repressed moral logic that resurfaces in a range of textual contradictions--not only in the writings of Ricardo's supporters, but, ironically, in those of his critics as well.

O presente livro é o resultado das pesquisas realizadas em nível de mestrado e tem como objetivo mostrar como é possível interpretar a ligação, sistematicamente crucial, entre o fato da razão e o sentimento de respeito pela lei moral a partir da análise da figura do sentimento moral. Uma das ideias mais controversas entre os comentadores da ética kantiana é justamente saber que função pode desempenhar o sentimento moral, tendo em vista a pretensão de Kant de justificar um critério de avaliação moral baseado na ideia de validade intersubjetiva e universal. Como, então, pode a consciência moral ter influência na práxis e fazer com que o agente seja capaz de tomar interesse pelo agir moral, eis o tema desta investigação.

There is widespread agreement that schools should contribute to the moral development and character formation of their students. In fact, 80% of US states currently have mandates regarding character education. However, the pervasiveness of the support for moral and character education masks a high degree of controversy surrounding its meaning and methods. The purpose of this handbook is to supplant the prevalent ideological rhetoric of the field with a comprehensive, research-oriented volume that both describes the extensive changes that have occurred over the last fifteen years and points forward to the future. Now in its second edition, this book includes the latest applications of developmental and cognitive psychology to moral and character education from preschool to college settings, and much more.

Dale Dorsey considers one of the most fundamental questions in philosophical ethics: to what extent do the demands of morality have normative authority over us and our lives? Must we conform to moral requirements? Most who have addressed this question have treated the normative significance of morality as simply a fact to be explained. But Dorsey argues that this traditional assumption is misguided. According to Dorsey, not only are we not required to conform to moral demands, conforming to morality's demands will not always even be normatively permissible—-moral behavior can be (quite literally) wrong. This view is significant not only for understanding the content and force of the moral point of view, but also for understanding the basic elements of how one ought to live.