After narrowing modestly in 2013, the global scale of current account imbalances, and of excess imbalances, held steady in 2014. Over the last several years, while the country composition of imbalances has rotated somewhat, overall there has been little progress on reducing excess imbalances. Excess deficits narrowed in some cases, but widened in others; progress on reducing excess surpluses has stalled. An unfinished policy agenda to reduce excess imbalances remains. Efforts by both surplus and deficit economies would be mutually reinforcing and support growth. Several significant recent developments will affect external positions in 2015: sharply lower oil prices, cyclical divergence and different monetary policies among the major economies, and related currency movements. Those developments do not overturn the previous pattern of excess imbalances and associated policy agenda, but they will have significant effects and raise new issues.

The external sector assessments use a wide range of methods, including the External Balance Assessment (EBA) developed by the IMF’s Research Department to estimate desired current account balances and real exchange rates (see Annex I of the 2015 External Sector Report, also IMF Working Paper WP/13/272 for a complete description of the EBA methodology). In all cases, the overall assessment is based on the judgment of IMF staff drawing on the inputs provided by these model estimates and other analysis and the estimates are subject to uncertainty. The assessments discuss a broad range of external indicators: the current account, the real effective exchange rate, capital and financial accounts flows and measures, FX intervention and reserves and the foreign asset or liability position. The individual economy assessments are discussed with the respective authorities as a part of bilateral surveillance.

The external sector assessments use a wide range of methods, including the External Balance Assessment (EBA) developed by the IMF’s Research Department to estimate desired current account balances and real exchange rates (see Annex I of the 2015 External Sector Report, also IMF Working Paper WP/13/272 for a complete description of the EBA methodology). In all cases, the overall assessment is based on the judgment of IMF staff drawing on the inputs provided by these model estimates and other analysis and the estimates are subject to uncertainty. The assessments discuss a broad range of external indicators: the current account, the real effective exchange rate, capital and financial accounts flows and measures, FX intervention and reserves and the foreign asset or liability position. The individual economy assessments are discussed with the respective authorities as a part of bilateral surveillance.

After narrowing in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and remaining broadly unchanged in recent years, global imbalances increased moderately in 2015, amid a reconfiguration of current accounts and exchange rates. Shifts in 2015 were driven primarily by the uneven strength of the recovery in advanced economies, the redistributive effects of the sharp fall in commodity prices, and tighter external financing conditions for emerging markets (EMs). A relatively stronger U.S. outlook led to a further appreciation of the USD and a depreciation of the yen and the euro. The sharp decline in commodity prices, reflecting both supply shocks and concerns about rebalancing and growth in China, brought about a significant redistribution of income from commodity exporters to importers, and a weakening of commodity exporters’ currencies. Meanwhile, heightened global risk aversion, contributed to softer capital inflows and depreciation pressures in many EMs. This moderate widening of current account imbalances was largely driven by systemic economies. Surpluses in Japan, the euro area and China grew, supported by improved terms of trade and currency depreciation, while the current account deficit in the U.S. widened amid the steep appreciation of the USD. These widening imbalances were only partially offset by narrowing surpluses in large oil exporters and smaller deficits in vulnerable EMs and some euro area debtor countries. Similarly, excess imbalances expanded in 2015. External positions in the U.S. and Japan moved from being broadly in line with fundamentals to being “moderately weaker” and “moderately stronger”, respectively. This was partly offset by a further narrowing of excess deficits in vulnerable EMs and euro area debtor countries. Meanwhile, excess surpluses persisted among the larger surplus countries, some of which remain “substantially stronger” than fundamentals (Germany, Korea). Currency movements since end-2015 helped to partially reverse the trends observed last year, although market volatility following the result of the U.K. referendum to leave the European Union have led to a strengthening of the USD and yen along with a weakening of the sterling, euro, and EM currencies. The implications for external assessments going forward, especially for the U.K. and the euro area, remains uncertain and will likely depend on how the transition is managed and on what new arrangements are adopted. With output below potential in most countries, and limited policy space in many, balancing internal and external objectives will require careful policy calibration. In general, a more balanced policy mix that avoids excessive reliance on policies with significant demanddiverting effects is necessary, with greater emphasis on demand-supportive measures and structural reforms. Surplus countries with fiscal space have a greater role to play in supporting global demand while reducing external imbalances. Global collective policy action, especially if downside risks materialize, would also help address global demand weakness while mitigating its effects on external imbalances.

Global current account imbalances were broadly unchanged in 2016, with minor shifts adding to the reconfiguration under way since 2013. The fall in commodity prices, uneven cyclical recoveries in systemic economies, and differences in policy responses contributed to the rotation of imbalances. Current account surpluses of oil-exporting economies, as a group, shifted from large surpluses to small deficits, while deficits in emerging and developing economies narrowed markedly. At the same time, surpluses and deficits in key advanced economies widened. These trends were generally supported by real exchange rate movements. Overall excess current account imbalances (i.e., deficits or surpluses that deviate from desirable levels) represented about one-third of total global imbalances in 2016, remaining broadly unchanged since 2013, although increasingly concentrated in advanced economies. In particular, excess imbalances narrowed in emerging and developing economies, led by a smaller excess surplus in China and smaller excess deficits in others (Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey). This narrowing, however, was accompanied by a widening of excess imbalances in some advanced economies. The persistence of large excess surpluses in several advanced economies (e.g. Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden) remains a distinguishing feature of the constellation of imbalances, an issue that is explored in greater detail in this year’s report. Persistent global excess imbalances suggest that automatic adjustment mechanisms are weak. While the rotation of excess imbalances toward advanced economies—with deficits increasingly concentrated in the United States and United Kingdom—likely entails lower deficit-financing risks in the near term, the increased concentration of deficits in a few economies carries greater risks of disruptive trade policy actions. Diverging stock positions coupled with continued overreliance on demand from debtor countries could also pose risks to global growth and raise the likelihood of disruptive adjustments down the road. With nearly-closed output gaps in most systemic economies, addressing external imbalances in a growth-friendly fashion requires a recalibration of the policy mix in deficit and surplus economies alike. Excess deficit countries should move forward with fiscal consolidation, while gradually normalizing monetary policy in tandem with inflation developments. Excess surplus economies with fiscal space should reduce their reliance on easy monetary policy and allow for greater fiscal stimulus. Where monetary policy is constrained from playing a role, as in individual euro area members, fiscal and structural policies to facilitate relative price adjustments should take priority. Meanwhile, structural policies in excess surplus countries should focus on lifting distortions that constrain domestic demand or limit trade competition; while in excess deficit economies, policies should be directed to improving external competitiveness and overall saving. Protectionist and mercantilist policies should be avoided as they are detrimental to global growth.

The sizeable increase in income inequality experienced in advanced economies and many parts of the world since the 1990s and the severe consequences of the global economic and financial crisis have brought distributional issues to the top of the policy agenda. The challenge for many governments is to address concerns over rising inequality while simultaneously promoting economic efficiency and more robust economic growth. The book delves into this discussion by analyzing fiscal policy and its link with inequality. Fiscal policy is the government’s most powerful tool for addressing inequality. It affects households ‘consumption directly (through taxes and transfers) and indirectly (via incentives for work and production and the provision of public goods and individual services such as education and health). An important message of the book is that growth and equity are not necessarily at odds; with the appropriate mix of policy instruments and careful policy design, countries can in many cases achieve better distributional outcomes and improve economic efficiency. Country studies (on the Netherlands, China, India, Republic of Congo, and Brazil) demonstrate the diversity of challenges across countries and their differing capacity to use fiscal policy for redistribution. The analysis presented in the book builds on and extends work done at the IMF, and also includes contributions from leading academics.

Produced since 2012, the IMF’s annual External Sector Report analyzes global external developments and provides multilaterally consistent assessments of external positions, including current accounts, real exchange rates, external balance sheets, capital flows, and international reserves, of the world’s largest economies, representing over 90 percent of global GDP. Chapter 1 discusses the evolution of global external positions in 2020, external developments throughout the COVID-19 crisis, and policy priorities for reducing excess imbalances over the medium term. Chapter 2 analyzes how the unprecedented fiscal support provided in response to the COVID-19 crisis has affected external positions at the individual and global level. It also focuses on how withdrawal of such support will impact external positions in the medium term. Chapter 3, “Individual Economy Assessments,” provides details on the different aspects of the overall external assessment and associated policy recommendations for 30 economies. This year’s report and associated external assessments are based on the latest vintage of the External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology and on data and IMF staff projections as of June 30, 2021.