My interest in X-Efficiency (XE) dates back to 1978. At the time, I was writing the dissertation for my Ph. D. at Washington State University. My dissertation was concerned with the role of attitudes in the school-to-work transition among young men. I was advised by Professor Millard Hastay (a member of my committee) to look at Leibenstein's "new" book, Beyond Economic Man. One of the things that caught my attention was his be havioral description of (selective) rationality. It seemed that Leibenstein's behavioral description of a (selectively) rational individual was very similar to what psychologists such as Abraham Maslow were reporting as being the product of a particular motivational system. In other words, I was im pressed with the idea that what Leibenstein was referring to as X-ineffi ciency was being discussed by psychologists as "the way it (often) is. " So from the beginning I always considered the concept of X-(in)efficiency to be a valuable one for understanding human behavior. I have since come to believe that this is particularly true when considering behavior in non market environments, i. e. , within the firm. Work on this book, however, can most realistically said to have started with work which I began in 1982 while I was a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University. Professor Leibenstein suggested that I consider how some em pirical evidence which was being cited as evidence for the role of property rights might also be consistent with XE theory.

What is X-Inefficiency The term "X-inefficiency" is a notion that is utilized in the field of economics to describe situations in which businesses have internal inefficiency, which ultimately leads to greater production costs than are necessary for a specific output. This inefficiency is the consequence of a number of causes, including inefficient production processes, outdated technology, poor management, and a lack of competition, which ultimately leads to reduced profitability and higher pricing for customers. Harvey Leibenstein is the one who first presented the idea of X-inefficiency. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: X-inefficiency Chapter 2: Economies of scale Chapter 3: Microeconomics Chapter 4: Monopoly Chapter 5: Oligopoly Chapter 6: Perfect competition Chapter 7: Index of economics articles Chapter 8: Profit maximization Chapter 9: Yield (finance) Chapter 10: Efficiency Chapter 11: Marginal cost Chapter 12: Production-possibility frontier Chapter 13: Production function Chapter 14: Allocative efficiency Chapter 15: Managerial economics Chapter 16: Isoquant Chapter 17: Productive efficiency Chapter 18: Stochastic frontier analysis Chapter 19: Production (economics) Chapter 20: Profit (economics) Chapter 21: Monopoly price (II) Answering the public top questions about x-inefficiency. (III) Real world examples for the usage of x-inefficiency in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of X-Inefficiency.

The efficient markets hypothesis has been the central proposition in finance for nearly thirty years. It states that securities prices in financial markets must equal fundamental values, either because all investors are rational or because arbitrage eliminates pricing anomalies. This book describes an alternative approach to the study of financial markets: behavioral finance. This approach starts with an observation that the assumptions of investor rationality and perfect arbitrage are overwhelmingly contradicted by both psychological and institutional evidence. In actual financial markets, less than fully rational investors trade against arbitrageurs whose resources are limited by risk aversion, short horizons, and agency problems. The book presents and empirically evaluates models of such inefficient markets. Behavioral finance models both explain the available financial data better than does the efficient markets hypothesis and generate new empirical predictions. These models can account for such anomalies as the superior performance of value stocks, the closed end fund puzzle, the high returns on stocks included in market indices, the persistence of stock price bubbles, and even the collapse of several well-known hedge funds in 1998. By summarizing and expanding the research in behavioral finance, the book builds a new theoretical and empirical foundation for the economic analysis of real-world markets.