In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two World Wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. Worse Than a Monolith demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy--combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries--divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of conflict, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, Thomas Christensen explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control. Reviewing newly available archival material, Christensen examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars. While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, he investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S.-China security relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ten outstanding specialists in Chinese foreign policy draw on new theories, methods, and sources to examine China's use of force, its response to globalization, and the role of domestic politics in its foreign policy.

In 1952, John T. “Jack” Downey, a twenty-three-year-old CIA officer from Connecticut, was shot down over Manchuria during the Korean War. The pilots died in the crash, but Downey and his partner Richard “Dick” Fecteau were captured by the Chinese. For the next twenty years, they were harshly interrogated, put through show trials, held in solitary confinement, placed in reeducation camps, and toured around China as political pawns. Other prisoners of war came and went, but Downey and Fecteau’s release hinged on the United States acknowledging their status as CIA assets. Not until Nixon’s visit to China did Sino-American relations thaw enough to secure Fecteau’s release in 1971 and Downey’s in 1973. Lost in the Cold War is the never-before-told story of Downey’s decades as a prisoner of war and the efforts to bring him home. Downey’s lively and gripping memoir—written in secret late in life—interweaves horrors and deprivation with humor and the absurdities of captivity. He recounts his prison experiences: fearful interrogations, pantomime communications with his guards, a 3,000-page overstuffed confession designed to confuse his captors, and posing for “show” photographs for propaganda purposes. Through the eyes of his captors and during his tours around China, Downey watched the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the drastic transformations of the Mao era. In interspersed chapters, Thomas J. Christensen, an expert on Sino-American relations, explores the international politics of the Cold War and tells the story of how Downey and Fecteau’s families, the CIA, the U.S. State Department, and successive presidential administrations worked to secure their release.

This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States. Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare.

Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, this title explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent.

At no time in American history has an understanding of the role and the art of diplomacy in international relations been more essential than it is today. Both the history of U.S. diplomatic relations and the current U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century are major topics of study and interest across the nation and around the world. Spanning the entire history of American diplomacy—from the First Continental Congress to the war on terrorism to the foreign policy goals of the twenty-first century—Guide to U.S. Foreign Policy traces not only the growth and development of diplomatic policies and traditions but also the shifts in public opinion that shape diplomatic trends. This comprehensive, two-volume reference shows how the United States gained "the strength of a giant" and also analyzes key world events that have determined the United States’ changing relations with other nations. The two volumes’ structure makes the key concepts and issues accessible to researchers: The set is broken up into seven parts that feature 40 topical and historical chapters in which expert writers cover the diplomatic initiatives of the United States from colonial times through the present day. Volume II’s appendix showcases an A-to-Z handbook of diplomatic terms and concepts, organizations, events, and issues in American foreign policy. The appendix also includes a master bibliography and a list of presidents; secretaries of state, war, and defense; and national security advisers and their terms of service. This unique reference highlights the changes in U.S. diplomatic policy as government administrations and world events influenced national decisions. Topics include imperialism, economic diplomacy, environmental diplomacy, foreign aid, wartime negotiations, presidential influence, NATO and its role in the twenty-first century, and the response to terrorism. Additional featured topics include the influence of the American two-party system, the impact of U.S. elections, and the role of the United States in international organizations. Guide to U.S. Foreign Policy is the first comprehensive reference work in this field that is both historical and thematic. This work is of immense value for researchers, students, and others studying foreign policy, international relations, and U.S history. ABOUT THE EDITORS Robert J. McMahon is the Ralph D. Mershon Professor of History in the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University. He is a leading historian of American diplomatic history and is author of several books on U.S. foreign relations. Thomas W. Zeiler is professor of history and international affairs at the University of Colorado at Boulder and is the executive editor of the journal Diplomatic History.

After a war breaks out, what factors influence the warring parties' decisions about whether to talk to their enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? How do we get from only fighting to also talking? In The Costs of Conversation, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that states are primarily concerned with the strategic costs of conversation, and these costs need to be low before combatants are willing to engage in direct talks with their enemy. Specifically, Mastro writes, leaders look to two factors when determining the probable strategic costs of demonstrating a willingness to talk: the likelihood the enemy will interpret openness to diplomacy as a sign of weakness, and how the enemy may change its strategy in response to such an interpretation. Only if a state thinks it has demonstrated adequate strength and resiliency to avoid the inference of weakness, and believes that its enemy has limited capacity to escalate or intensify the war, will it be open to talking with the enemy. Through four primary case studies—North Vietnamese diplomatic decisions during the Vietnam War, those of China in the Korean War and Sino-Indian War, and Indian diplomatic decision making in the latter conflict—The Costs of Conversation demonstrates that the costly conversations thesis best explains the timing and nature of countries' approach to wartime talks, and therefore when peace talks begin. As a result, Mastro's findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for war duration and termination, as well as for military strategy, diplomacy, and mediation.