Osprey's study of gas warfare tactics that were employed during World War I (1914-1918). Battlefield Gas was first employed in April 1915 at the village of Langemarck near Ypres. At 1700 hours the Germans released a five mile-wide cloud of 168 tons of chlorine gas from 520 cylinders, causing panic and death in the French and Algerian trenches. Despite initial widespread condemnation and disgust, its use rapidly spread with all the armies entering into the race to produce gases, new ways to use them, and protective measures including masks and warning systems. For the first time in detail, this book charts the development of gas as a battlefield weapon and the steps taken to counter it. Delivery methods, including the use of artillery, the consequences of changing wind direction, and infantry advancing into an area just gassed, are all covered alongside key milestones in its introduction and usage. With an abundant array of artwork and photographs illustrating the gas masks, insignia, and protective clothing of the protagonists, this book conveys the horror of the gas attack and reveals the practical challenges for soldiers struggling to cope with this new form of warfare. Conveying the reality behind the iconic Sargent painting of a column of blindfolded gas casualties, it is a fascinating survey of one of the darkest facets of 20th century warfare.

This Leavenworth Paper chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front. Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures.

This Leavenworth Paper chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front. Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures. In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question." General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction. Over 50 percent of the Total Army's Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. This Leavenworth Paper was prepared by the USAA Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of requests from USAA Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. Despite originally being published in 1984, this Leavenworth Paper also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed.

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

Palazzo's study is convincing in demonstrating that the British military command was not, contrary to the common belief, unwilling to adapt innovations in technology for use on the battlefield."-Virginia Quarterly Review.