In order for all applications of airpower -- including counter-air, deep interdiction strike, air landing, and combat search and rescue -- to succeed, they must be informed by comprehensive data on targets. Moreover, it would be helpful if intelligence included the intentions and capabilities of opponents. Getting signals intelligence data to the cockpit and pilots for instantaneous use on the battlefield is the objective. Signals intelligence can provide needed information, but its collection, processing, analysis, and distribution is secretive. Consequently, an operator is slow to get even minimal data. Real-time signals intelligence support to the cockpit is an on-going challenge, but it is not as cosmic or fantasy-based as some believe. Three historical examples illustrate what can be done when operations and intelligence ensure that critical data reach the battlefield in a timely fashion.

"This study examines the evolution of near real-time intelligence support to air operations in three wars: Eighth Air Force operations during World War II, support to U.S. aircraft operating in "MiG Alley" over North Korea during the Korean War 1950-1954, and the "Teaball" weapons control center support to U.S. aircraft operating over North Vietnam during Linebacker II in 1972"--Introduction, P. 1.

The cross-border sharing of intelligence is fundamental to the establishment and preservation of security and stability. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was based in part on flawed intelligence, and current efforts to defeat al Qaeda would not be possible without an exchange of information among Britain, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the United States. While critical to national security and political campaigns, intelligence sharing can also be a minefield of manipulation and maneuvering, especially when secrecy makes independent verification of sources impossible. In The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, James Igoe Walsh advances novel strategies for securing more reliable intelligence. His approach puts states that seek information in control of other states' intelligence efforts. According to this hierarchical framework, states regularly draw agreements in which one power directly monitors and acts on another power's information-gathering activities-a more streamlined approach that prevents the dissemination of false "secrets." In developing this strategy, Walsh draws on recent theories of international cooperation and evaluates both historical and contemporary case studies of intelligence sharing. Readers with an interest in intelligence matters cannot ignore this urgent, timely, and evidence-based book.

This bibliography lists published and printed unit histories for the United States Air Force and Its Antecedents, including Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, Squadrons, Aviation Engineers, and the Women's Army Corps.

Ask an American intelligence officer to tell you when the country started doing modern intelligence and you will probably hear something about the Office of Strategic Services in World War II or the National Security Act of 1947 and the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency. What you almost certainly will not hear is anything about World War I. In World War I and the Foundations of American Intelligence, Mark Stout establishes that, in fact, World War I led to the realization that intelligence was indispensable in both wartime and peacetime. After a lengthy gestation that started in the late nineteenth century, modern American intelligence emerged during World War I, laying the foundations for the establishment of a self-conscious profession of intelligence. Virtually everything that followed was maturation, reorganization, reinvigoration, or reinvention. World War I ushered in a period of rapid changes. Never again would the War Department be without an intelligence component. Never again would a senior American commander lead a force to war without intelligence personnel on their staff. Never again would the United States government be without a signals intelligence agency or aerial reconnaissance capability. Stout examines the breadth of American intelligence in the war, not just in France, not just at home, but around the world and across the army, navy, and State Department, and demonstrates how these far-flung efforts endured after the Armistice in 1918. For the first time, there came to be a group of intelligence practitioners who viewed themselves as different from other soldiers, sailors, and diplomats. Upon entering World War II, the United States had a solid foundation from which to expand to meet the needs of another global hot war and the Cold War that followed.