Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language presents the Tractatus as a work of mystic theology intended to direct the reader to a transcendental plane from which human existence can be viewed from the divine perspective. More than any other work on Wittgenstein, this study integrates text material with personal biographical information, especially information dealing with his spiritual and psychological states. The result is a fresh, coherent, and extremely illuminating picture of Wittgenstein, successfully avoiding the pitfalls of either psychological reductionism or unfaithfulness to the text. It is bold without being reckless, passionately argued without being doctrinaire, and makes a very powerful and persuasive case for its main thesis.

Austere and uncompromising, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein had no use for the avant-garde art works of his own time. He refused to formulate an aesthetic, declaring that one can no more define the "beautiful" than determine "what sort of coffee tastes good". And yet many of the writers of our time have understood, as academic theorists generally have not, that Wittgenstein is "their" philosopher. How do we resolve this paradox? Marjorie Perloff, our foremost critic of twentieth-century poetry, argues that Wittgenstein has provided writers with a radical new aesthetic, a key to recognizing the inescapable strangeness of ordinary language. Wittgenstein's ladder is an apt figure for this radical aesthetic, and not just in its ordinariness as an object. The movement "up" this ladder can never be more than what Wittgenstein's contemporary, Gertrude Stein, called "Beginning again and again". Wittgenstein shows us, too, that we cannot climb the same ladder twice: the use of language, the context in which words and sentences appear, defines their meaning, which changes with every repetition. Wittgenstein's aesthetic brooks no theory, no essentialism, no metalanguage - only a practice, a mode of operation, fragmentary and elliptical.

The author's purpose in this volume is to present the relevance of the ideas of Wittgenstein to those interested in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. He focuses on both the earlier work centred around the "Tractatus" and the later work of the "Philosophical Investigations".

The essays collected in this volume explore some of the themes that have been at the centre of recent debates within Wittgensteinian scholarship. In opposition to what we are tentatively inclined to think, the articles of this volume invite us to understand that our need to grasp the essence of ethical and religious thought and language will not be achieved by metaphysical theories expounded from such a point of view, but by focusing on our everyday forms of expression.

The central claim of this book is that, early and late, Wittgenstein modelled his approach to existential meaning on his account of linguistic meaning. A reading of Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy sets up Bearn's reading of the existential point of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Bearn argues that both books try to resolve our anxiety about the meaning of life by appeal to the deep, unutterable essence of the world. Bearn argues that as Wittgenstein's and Nietzsche's thought matured, they both separately came to believe that the answer to our existential anxiety does not lie beneath the surfaces of our lives, but in our acceptance--Nietzsche's "Yes"--of the groundless details of those surfaces themselves: the wonder of the ordinary

Wittgenstein’s Intentions, first published in 1993, presents a series of essays dedicated to the great Wittgenstein exegete John Hunter. The problematic topics discussed are identified not only by Wittgenstein’s own philosophical writings, but also by contemporary scholarship: areas of ambiguity, perhaps even confusion, as well as issues which the father of analytic philosophy did not himself address. The difficulties involved in speaking cogently about religious belief, suspicion, consciousness, the nature of the will, the coincidence of our thoughts with reality, and transfinite numbers are all investigated, as well as a variety of other intriguing questions: why can’t a baby pretend to smile? How do I know what I was going to say? Wittgenstein’s Intentions is an invaluable resource for students of Wittgenstein as well as scholars, and opens up a wide horizon of philosophical questioning for those as yet unfamiliar with this style of reasoning.