Wittgenstein and Normative Inquiry examines the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy for ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, and religion. It analyzes the intellectual contexts which shaped Wittgenstein's normative thought, traces his influences, and presents contemporary uses of his philosophy in normative fields. The chapters focus on the nature of normative inquiry. Together, they present a Wittgensteinian approach to normative inquiry, which, while broad and contested, stands in contrast to dominant deductive approaches. Arguing to normative conclusions by showing family resemblances, drawing analogies, using persuasion, appealing to naturalist arguments, authors and Wittgensteinians discussed by them expand our notion of normative inquiry.

"Wittgenstein and Normative Inquiry" examines the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy for ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, and religion. It analyzes the intellectual contexts which shaped Wittgenstein's normative thought, traces his influences, and presents contemporary uses of his philosophy in normative fields. The chapters focus on the nature of normative inquiry. Together, they present a Wittgensteinian approach to normative inquiry, which, while broad and contested, stands in contrast to dominant deductive approaches. Arguing to normative conclusions by showing family resemblances, drawing analogies, using persuasion, appealing to naturalist arguments, authors and Wittgensteinians discussed by them expand our notion of normative inquiry.

A distinctive feature of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work after 1930 was his turn to a conception of philosophy as a form of social inquiry, John G. Gunnell argues, and Thomas Kuhn's approach to the philosophy of science exemplified this conception. In this book, Gunnell shows how these philosophers address foundational issues in the social and human sciences, particularly the vision of social inquiry as an interpretive endeavor and the distinctive cognitive and practical relationship between social inquiry and its subject matter. Gunnell speaks directly to philosophers and practitioners of the social and human sciences. He tackles the demarcation between natural and social science; the nature of social phenomena; the concept and method of interpretation; the relationship between language and thought; the problem of knowledge of other minds; and the character of descriptive and normative judgments about practices that are the object of inquiry. Though Wittgenstein and Kuhn are often criticized as initiating a modern descent into relativism, this book shows that the true effect of their work was to undermine the basic assumptions of contemporary social and human science practice. It also problematized the authority of philosophy and other forms of social inquiry to specify the criteria for judging such matters as truth and justice. When Wittgenstein stated that "philosophy leaves everything as it is," he did not mean that philosophy would be left as it was or that philosophy would have no impact on what it studied, but rather that the activity of inquiry did not, simply by virtue of its performance, transform the object of inquiry.

Argues that Wittgenstein, though himself often silent on particular ethical matters, gives us immense resources for understanding the aims appropriate to any philosophical ethics. This work re-examines some of the landmarks in the history of moral philosophy in order to cast contemporary ethical philosophy in a fresh light.

The essays collected in this volume explore some of the themes that have been at the centre of recent debates within Wittgensteinian scholarship. In opposition to what we are tentatively inclined to think, the articles of this volume invite us to understand that our need to grasp the essence of ethical and religious thought and language will not be achieved by metaphysical theories expounded from such a point of view, but by focusing on our everyday forms of expression.

The most complete edition yet published of Wittgenstein’s 1929 lecture includes a never-before published first draft and makes fresh claims for its significance in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. The first available print publication of all known drafts of Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics Includes a previously unrecognized first draft of the lecture and new transcriptions of all drafts Transcriptions preserve the philosopher’s emendations thus showing the development of the ideas in the lecture Proposes a different draft as the version read by Wittgenstein in his 1929 lecture Includes introductory essays on the origins of the material and on its meaning, content, and importance

Cheryl Misak offers a strikingly new view of the development of philosophy in the twentieth century. Pragmatism, the home-grown philosophy of America, thinks of truth not as a static relation between a sentence and the believer-independent world, but rather, a belief that works. The founders of pragmatism, Peirce and James, developed this idea in more (Peirce) and less (James) objective ways. The standard story of the reception of American pragmatism in England is that Russell and Moore savaged James's theory, and that pragmatism has never fully recovered. An alternative, and underappreciated, story is told here. The brilliant Cambridge mathematician, philosopher and economist, Frank Ramsey, was in the mid-1920s heavily influenced by the almost-unheard-of Peirce and was developing a pragmatist position of great promise. He then transmitted that pragmatism to his friend Wittgenstein, although had Ramsey lived past the age of 26 to see what Wittgenstein did with that position, Ramsey would not have like what he saw.