This is an introduction for students of politics and society to the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and some topics in "ordinary-language" philosophy. It argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a revolutionary new conception of language, and hence a new and deeper understanding of ourselves and the world of human institutions and action. Language is seen as activity, and words as signals, rather than labels for classes of objects. The implications for the social sciences and for political action are wide-ranging and surprising. Questions of justice, for example, are seen to be neither just patterns of human behavior the social scientists can observe, nor the subjective expression of personal preference or passion, but the locus of rational judgement in accord with standards, different from the standards of science or mathematics but just as objective and resting on the same human foundations. The book ranges beyond topics usually treated in discussions of Wittgenstein to more difficult and important concerns such as "grammar" and "forms of life". After an initial explication relating Wittgenstein's ideas to those of several interpreters and critics, the author proceeds to applications of his thought to certain selected problems central to social science and political theory. These include the nature of explanation, the relationship between action and causation, validity in judgement, and the relationship between concepts and reality in the human world. The author also applies Wittgenstein's ideas to such specialized questions as what is "political" and the nature of power. The theme of human justice in relation to social problems, political action, and judgement pervades the book, appearing and reappearing at many points in the discussion.

Hanna Pitkin argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a revolutionary new conception of language, and hence a new and deeper understanding of ourselves and the world of human institutions and action.

In Wittgenstein and the Social Sciences, Robert Vinten takes a fresh look at the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the social sciences. He argues that although social sciences are quite different to the natural sciences, they are nonetheless properly called ‘sciences’. The book looks in detail at whether Wittgenstein can be claimed by conservatives, liberals, or socialists as their own. Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks and remarks about politics and culture are taken into account in deciding where to locate Wittgenstein in relation to various ideologies. In the final part of the book, Vinten considers how Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be of use in resolving or dissolving problems in the social sciences. Along the way, he critically assesses work from Perry Anderson, Terry Eagleton, Richard Rorty, and Chantal Mouffe in the light of Wittgenstein’s philosophical oeuvre. The book makes a compelling examination of how Wittgenstein’s work remains as relevant as ever to thinking about our cultural and political situation.

125.00 The recent cross-fruition between analytical philosophy and continental philosophical traditions has stimulated an intense interest in the philosophy of philosophy. At stake in the debate is our understanding of the role of philosophy and of the use of argument and reason in culture.Transformative Philosophy articulates a new conception of philosophy through a discussion of salient themes in the analytical tradition, in the work of the later Wittgenstein, and in critical theory. Wallgren traces the genealogy leading to the present impasse on the discourse of philosophy; discusses authors such as Quine, Peter Winch, Michael Dummett, and Ernst Tugendhat; and considers Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and of the private language argument. Drawing on an analysis of the relations between truth, communal agreement, and the role of the personal will in philosophical argumentation, Transformative Philosophy develops an image of philosophy as a transformative care for self and others. This work makes a great contribution to the study of philosophy and social theory

Searching for rigor and a clear grasp of the essential features of their objects of investigation, philosophers are often driven to exaggerations and harmful simplifications. According to Ludwig Wittgenstein's provocative suggestion, this has to do with confusions relating to the status of philosophical statements. The Struggle against Dogmatism elucidates his view that there are no theses, doctrines, or theories in philosophy. Even when this claim is taken seriously, explanations of what it means are problematic--typically involving a relapse to theses. This book makes Wittgenstein's philosophical approach comprehensible by presenting it as a response to specific problems relating to the practice of philosophy, in particular the problem of dogmatism. Although the focus of this book is on Wittgenstein's later work, Oskari Kuusela also discusses Wittgenstein's early philosophy as expressed in the Tractatus, as well as the relation between his early and later work. In the light of this account of Wittgenstein's critique of his early thought, Kuusela is able to render concrete what Wittgenstein means by philosophizing without theses or theories. In his later philosophy, Kuusela argues, Wittgenstein establishes a non-metaphysical (though not anti-metaphysical) approach to philosophy without philosophical hierarchies. This method leads to an increase in the flexibility of philosophical thought without a loss in rigor.