To avoid preparing to wage battles against our opponents in future wars, we should proactively and continuously influence the narrative identity structures of our potential opponents by using Strategic Communications (StratCom). This book argues that nations and societies of tolerance and pluralism (the so-called wonderful societies) should utilize StratCom to seduce their enemies, opponents, and potential opponents not only to behave in more tolerant ways, but above all to internalize peace, tolerance, and pluralism as essential values and guiding mental institutions of their identity structures. Winning Wars Before They Emerge will be of interest to students, lecturers and researchers of international relations and world politics, peace researchers, and information operations practitioners, as well as military personnel. War and the art of war are issue areas that have been widely dealt with in numerous books and widely taught in various universities and defense colleges/universities, but not from the perspective offered in this book.

The war for talent is heating up in emerging markets. Without enough “brain power,” multinationals can’t succeed in these markets. Yet they’re approaching the war in the wrong way—bringing in expats and engaging in bidding wars for hotshot local “male” managers. The solution is hiding in plain sight: the millions of highly educated women surging into the labor markets of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the United Arab Emirates. Increasingly, these women boast better credentials, higher ambitions, and greater loyalty than their male peers. But there’s a catch: Attracting and retaining talented women in emerging economies requires different strategies than those used in mature markets. Complex cultural forces – family-related “pulls,” such as daughterly duties to parents and in-laws, and work-related “pushes,” such as extreme hours and dangerous commutes – force women to settle for dead-end jobs, switch to the public sector, or leave the workforce entirely. In Winning the War for Talent in Emerging Markets, Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Ripa Rashid analyze these forces and present strategies for countering them, including: • Sustaining ambition through stretch opportunities and international assignments • Combating cultural bias by building an infrastructure for female leadership (networks, mentors, sponsors) • Introducing flexible work arrangements to accommodate family obligations • Providing safe transportation, such as employer-subsidized taxi services Drawing on groundbreaking research, amplified with on-the-ground examples from companies as diverse as Google, Infosys, Goldman Sachs, and Siemens, this book is required reading for all companies seeking to strengthen their talent pipeline in these rich and expanding markets.

One of BookPage's Best Books of 2020 “The detailed, nuanced, gripping account of that strange and complex journey offered in Robert Draper’s To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq is essential reading—now, especially now . . . Draper’s account [is] one for the ages . . . A must-read for all who care about presidential power.” —The Washington Post From the author of the New York Times bestseller Dead Certain comes the definitive, revelatory reckoning with arguably the most consequential decision in the history of American foreign policy--the decision to invade Iraq. Even now, after more than fifteen years, it is hard to see the invasion of Iraq through the cool, considered gaze of history. For too many people, the damage is still too palpable, and still unfolding. Most of the major players in that decision are still with us, and few of them are not haunted by it, in one way or another. Perhaps it's that combination, the passage of the years and the still unresolved trauma, that explains why so many protagonists opened up so fully for the first time to Robert Draper. Draper's prodigious reporting has yielded scores of consequential new revelations, from the important to the merely absurd. As a whole, the book paints a vivid and indelible picture of a decision-making process that was fatally compromised by a combination of post-9/11 fear and paranoia, rank naïveté, craven groupthink, and a set of actors with idées fixes who gamed the process relentlessly. Everything was believed; nothing was true. The intelligence failure was comprehensive. Draper's fair-mindedness and deep understanding of the principal actors suffuse his account, as does a storytelling genius that is close to sorcery. There are no cheap shots here, which makes the ultimate conclusion all the more damning. In the spirit of Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August and Marc Bloch's Strange Defeat, To Start A War will stand as the definitive account of a collective process that arrived at evidence that would prove to be not just dubious but entirely false, driven by imagination rather than a quest for truth--evidence that was then used to justify a verdict that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and a flood tide of chaos in the Middle East that shows no signs of ebbing.

Presenting a significant new interpretation of Napoleonic warfare, Robert M. Epstein argues persuasively that the true origins of modern war can be found in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809. Epstein contends that the 1809 war -- with its massive and evenly matched armies, multiple theaters of operation, new command-and-control schemes, increased firepower, frequent stalemates, and large-scale slaughter -- had more in common with the American Civil War and subsequent conflicts that with the decisive Napoleonic campaigns that preceded it. - Jacket flap.

On War is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work's first appearance in 1832, it has been read throughout the world, and has stimulated generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals.

How and when do military innovations take place? Do they proceed differently during times of peace and times of war? In Winning the Next War, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation. He also discusses the changing relationship between the civilian innovator and the military bureaucrat. In peacetime, Rosen finds, innovation has been the product of analysis and the politics of military promotion, in a process that has slowly but successfully built military capabilities critical to American military success. In wartime, by contrast, innovation has been constrained by the fog of war and the urgency of combat needs. Rosen draws his principal evidence from U.S. military policy between 1905 and 1960, though he also discusses the British army's experience with the battle tank during World War I.