We study how lobbying affects the resolution of failed banks, using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2014. We show that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. In addition, the FDIC incurs higher costs in such auctions, amounting to 16.4 percent of the total resolution losses. We also find that lobbying winners have worse operating and stock market performance than their non-lobbying counterparts, suggesting that lobbying results in a less efficient allocation of failed banks. Our results provide new insights into the bank resolution process and the role of special interests.

Examines the law and policy of financial regulation using a combination of conceptual analysis and strong empirical research.

In this paper, we discuss whether and how bank lobbying can lead to regulatory capture and have real consequences through an overview of the motivations behind bank lobbying and of recent empirical evidence on the subject. Overall, the findings are consistent with regulatory capture, which lessens the support for tighter rules and enforcement. This in turn allows riskier practices and worse economic outcomes. The evidence provides insights into how the rising political power of banks in the early 2000s propelled the financial system and the economy into crisis. While these findings should not be interpreted as a call for an outright ban of lobbying, they point in the direction of a need for rethinking the framework governing interactions between regulators and banks. Enhanced transparency of regulatory decisions as well as strenghtened checks and balances within the decision-making process would go in this direction.

The deferred recognition of COVID-induced losses at banks in many countries has reignited the debate on regulatory forbearance. This paper presents a model where the public's own political pressure drives regulatory policy astray, because the public is poorly informed. Using probabilistic game stages, the model parameterizes how time consistent policy is. The interaction between political motivations and time consistency is novel and complex: increased policy credibility can entice the politically-motivated regulator to act in the public's best interest, or instead repel it from doing so. Considering several regulatory instruments, the paper probes the nexus of political pressure, perverse bank incentives and time inconsistent policy.

The ramifications of the Global Financial Crisis, which erupted in 2007, continue to surprise not only the general public but also finance professionals, economists, and journalists. Faced with this challenge, Preparing for the Next Financial Crisis goes back to basics. The authors ask: what do theory and empirical observations tell us about the causes and the consequences of financial crisis and instability? In what has become an increasingly complex financial world, what lessons can we learn from economic policies, which have been implemented, and research, which has developed extremely rapidly in recent years, so as not to repeat past mistakes? In this comprehensive review of the literature, which is both complete and balanced, the authors highlight the points of consensus among economists and policymakers. They assess the capacity of economic policies and institutions in limiting the cost of financial instability. In conclusion, they ask if the financial system has become safer, in the light especially of the Covid-19 Global Crisis. Ten years after the GFC crisis, this is a timely review of the reform agenda, the progress made, and the areas where further changes need to be made to address new risks and challenges.

The United States has two separate banking systems today—one serving the well-to-do and another exploiting everyone else. How the Other Half Banks contributes to the growing conversation on American inequality by highlighting one of its prime causes: unequal credit. Mehrsa Baradaran examines how a significant portion of the population, deserted by banks, is forced to wander through a Wild West of payday lenders and check-cashing services to cover emergency expenses and pay for necessities—all thanks to deregulation that began in the 1970s and continues decades later. “Baradaran argues persuasively that the banking industry, fattened on public subsidies (including too-big-to-fail bailouts), owes low-income families a better deal...How the Other Half Banks is well researched and clearly written...The bankers who fully understand the system are heavily invested in it. Books like this are written for the rest of us.” —Nancy Folbre, New York Times Book Review “How the Other Half Banks tells an important story, one in which we have allowed the profit motives of banks to trump the public interest.” —Lisa J. Servon, American Prospect

A tour de force of historical reportage, America’s Bank illuminates the tumultuous era and remarkable personalities that spurred the unlikely birth of America’s modern central bank, the Federal Reserve. Today, the Fed is the bedrock of the financial landscape, yet the fight to create it was so protracted and divisive that it seems a small miracle that it was ever established. For nearly a century, America, alone among developed nations, refused to consider any central or organizing agency in its financial system. Americans’ mistrust of big government and of big banks—a legacy of the country’s Jeffersonian, small-government traditions—was so widespread that modernizing reform was deemed impossible. Each bank was left to stand on its own, with no central reserve or lender of last resort. The real-world consequences of this chaotic and provincial system were frequent financial panics, bank runs, money shortages, and depressions. By the first decade of the twentieth century, it had become plain that the outmoded banking system was ill equipped to finance America’s burgeoning industry. But political will for reform was lacking. It took an economic meltdown, a high-level tour of Europe, and—improbably—a conspiratorial effort by vilified captains of Wall Street to overcome popular resistance. Finally, in 1913, Congress conceived a federalist and quintessentially American solution to the conflict that had divided bankers, farmers, populists, and ordinary Americans, and enacted the landmark Federal Reserve Act. Roger Lowenstein—acclaimed financial journalist and bestselling author of When Genius Failed and The End of Wall Street—tells the drama-laden story of how America created the Federal Reserve, thereby taking its first steps onto the world stage as a global financial power. America’s Bank showcases Lowenstein at his very finest: illuminating complex financial and political issues with striking clarity, infusing the debates of our past with all the gripping immediacy of today, and painting unforgettable portraits of Gilded Age bankers, presidents, and politicians. Lowenstein focuses on the four men at the heart of the struggle to create the Federal Reserve. These were Paul Warburg, a refined, German-born financier, recently relocated to New York, who was horrified by the primitive condition of America’s finances; Rhode Island’s Nelson W. Aldrich, the reigning power broker in the U.S. Senate and an archetypal Gilded Age legislator; Carter Glass, the ambitious, if then little-known, Virginia congressman who chaired the House Banking Committee at a crucial moment of political transition; and President Woodrow Wilson, the academician-turned-progressive-politician who forced Glass to reconcile his deep-seated differences with bankers and accept the principle (anathema to southern Democrats) of federal control. Weaving together a raucous era in American politics with a storied financial crisis and intrigue at the highest levels of Washington and Wall Street, Lowenstein brings the beginnings of one of the country’s most crucial institutions to vivid and unforgettable life. Readers of this gripping historical narrative will wonder whether they’re reading about one hundred years ago or the still-seething conflicts that mark our discussions of banking and politics today.