On 1 July 1916, after a stupendous seven-day artillery preparation, the British Army finally launched its attack on the German line around the River Somme. Over the next four and half months they continued to attack, with little or no gain, and with horrendous losses to both sides. This book, written by the world's foremost expert in the subject, describes in chilling detail everything from the grand strategy to the experience of the men on the ground. Illustrated throughout, it is a stunning and absorbing depiction of the horror that was the Somme in 1916.

Much has been written about the Battle of the Somme. From July through late November 1916, British, French, and German armies fought one of the costliest battles of the twentieth century. Well over a million casualties and only a few miles of ground gained by the Allies were the result when the battle ended. Little, however, has been written about the second battle which occurred simultaneously, this one in the skies above the Somme, where for the first time in the history of warfare a deliberate attempt was made to control the sky. The British Royal Flying Corps, under the resolute command of General Sir Hugh Trenchard, fought to gain air supremacy from the German Air Service. Trenchard believed that the best way to support the ground force was to dominate and control the sky above the battlefield. This air campaign was critical because of its impact on the doctrine and theory of air warfare which followed it. This study examines the efforts of the Royal Flying Corps to gain air supremacy against the German Air Service before and during the Battle of the Somme.

Set out topographically, it covers everything from the famous battle sites of High Wood and Mametz Wood to obscure villages on the outlying flanks. The British first began to take the Somme sector over from the French Army in June 1915. From this time onwards they built up a very close bond with the local population, many of whom continued to live in local villages close to the front line. The author draws on the latest research and analysis, as well as the testimony of those who took part, to present all aspects of a battle that was to become a symbol of the horrors of the Great War.

This is a long-overdue study of Sir Frederick H. Sykes, Chief of the Air Staff of Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) during the First World War. Historians, for the most part, have either overlooked Sykes or misinterpreted him, leaving a gap in the story of British flying. Contrary to previous images of Sykes, we now see that he was not a secretive intriguer or a tangential subject in RAF history. Rather, he played a fundamental part in organizing and leading British aviation from 1912 to the end of 1918. He provided organization, visionary guidance and efficient administrative control for the fledgling service that tried to survive infancy in the heat of battle.

This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and material. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analysed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.

Arthur Tedder became one of the most eminent figures of the Second World War: first as head of Anglo-American air forces in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and North Africa; then as Deputy Supreme Commander to General Eisenhower for the Allied campaign that began in Normandy and ended in Berlin. During those anxious, exhilarating years, he was, as The Times of London wrote, 'the most unstuffy of great commanders, who could be found sitting cross-legged, jacketless, pipe smoldering, answering questions on a desert airstrip.' After the war, promoted to five-star rank and elevated to the peerage as Lord Tedder, he was made Chief of the Air Staff, holding this appointment for longer than anyone since his time: four critical years (from 1946 to 1949) that saw the tragic start of the Cold War and the inspiring achievement of the Berlin Airlift. In 1950, he became Britain's NATO representative in Washington: a year that saw the start of a hot war in Korea that threatened to spread around the globe. This book provides the first comprehensive account of a great commander's public career and uses hundreds of family letters to portray a private life, both joyful and tragic.